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Abstract 
This thesis examines decisions made in one country and implemented in 
another. Implementation of such decisions is explored principally by means 
of a case study of implementation, namely implementation of the Government 
of India Act, 1935, passed by the British Parliament that year. The first 
chapter shows, that decision-making literature, in the field of 
international relations, has concentrated on the process by which 
decisions are arrived at, while implementation of such decisions has been 
largely neglected. Where implementation has been dealt with in the 
literature, it can be organised in terms of two models. A third model of 
implementation which describes better the implementation process, and a 
number of propositions about implementation derived from the existing 
literature are put forward. The model and propositions are tested against 
the case study. The method adopted is one of using case studies to build 
theory. The implementation of three decisions within the 1935 Act is 
examined; the first dealt with division of revenues between the centre and 
the provinces; the second, the grant of autonomy to the provinces; and the 
third, the establishment of an all-India federation to include both, the 
princely states and the provinces of British India. The model and the 
propositions guide the analysis of the case studies, though these are not 
rigidly structured in order to allow the idiosyncratic aspects of each 
case to be taken into account. The period having been thoroughly examined 
by historians, mainly secondary sources were used, though some primary 
material, not fully examined by historians till now, was used in the first 
case study. The first two decisions were implemented, while the third was 
not, and a comparison between the three cases is made in the concluding 
chapter. The chapter examines the evidence for the model and for the 
propositions that was found in the case studies. Comparison of the three 
cases enables conclusions to be drawn about factors that are conducive to 
successful implementation, and those that are antithetical to 
implementation. 
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Preface 
In the course of studying international relations, I had found the 
subject of decision-making one of particular interest. The very simplicity 
of the idea on which it is based was attractive. The pioneering works by 
Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, and by Allison, seemed to state the obvious. Yet, 
till then, though decision-making had been analysed in other fields, it was 
absent in the analysis of international relations. A very different 
approach had been implicitly used to analyse the behaviour of states as 
Allison convincingly showed. After decision-making analysis had been 
introduced as an explanation of state behaviour, it flourished, and a vast 
and complex literature now exists on this subject. 
Despite the existence of this body of literature, one aspect of the 
subject did seem to be neglected - this was the implementation of 
decisions. While at first it seemed this aspect had been completely 
ignored, more careful reading revealed that implementation issues had been 
implicitly dealt with. Going outside the literature on international 
relations, it became clear that there were several works which dealt with 
issues of implementation, such as implementation of specific government 
programs or of implementation within a bureaucracy. Recently however, 
works dealing specifically with foreign policy implementation have 
appeared. Just as decision-making analysis developed first outside the 
study of international relations and was applied to it after a time lag, so 
too with implementation; it has been. analysed in other fields such as 
public administration and is only recently being studied in international 
relations. It is with this emerging body of literature that this thesis 
belongs. 
My preference in exploring this aspect of decision-making was to adopt 
the case-study approach (coincid, entally also. adopted by others who have 
tackled this subject). The case study chosen was from the Indian 
subcontinent, and as one who was born and grew up there, I have an abiding 
interest in events in that area, both past and present. The formation and 
passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, was an important step on 
India's path of independence from Britain. Implementation (and non- 
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implementation) of the provisions of the Act was crucial to the shaping of 
future events in India. One of the major provisions of the Act, the 
establishment of an all-India federation was not implemented, and this 
provides one of the interesting 'ifs' of Indian history, for, it has been 
suggested, if federation had been implemented, the partition of the 
subcontinent in 1947 would have been avoided. Thus the case-study provided 
both, an intrinsically interesting subject of study, and one which was 
fruitful for the analysis of an aspect of decision-making that had been 
neglected, namely implementation. The fact that India was still a colony of 
Britain, meant that British policy towards India could not strictly be 
termed foreign policy. The main title of the thesis (also the title of an 
article by H. Wallace, referred to in the thesis), was chosen as one which 
provides a correct description of the subject matter of the thesis. 
I should like to thank my supervisors, David Potter and Richard Little 
for the guidance and encouragement they gave me over the many years that 
this research stretched. Though both were extremely busy with their own 
teaching and research, both gave generously of their time and were always 
available when I needed their help. 
David Potter I saw frequently over the years. He kept a close eye on my 
progress and subjected all I said or wrote to close scrutiny and 
examination. He was always critical of muddled thinking or 'writing, 
unnecessary digressions, and failure to pay attention to details, but the 
criticism was always combined with encouragement to continue with my 
research. His support over the years ensured that the research was brought 
to a conclusion. 
I am grateful to Richard Little for continuing to supervise my work 
even after he left the Open University and moved to the University of 
Lancaster. We had few meetings, but they were crucial to the thesis and at 
long sessions, he helped me to sort out the- main issues. - He read and 
commented on everything I sent to him with a speed that can only 'be 
described as remarkable, and throughout expressed a willingness to arrange 
future meetings or to discuss my work on the telephone. 
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Chapter One 
Implementation of Decisions 
1.1 Introduction 
While the subject of decision-making has been widely studied, the 
implementation of decisions has been comparatively neglected. In the 
literature on decision-making, implementation has received less attention 
than has the process by which decisions are arrived, at and formulated. It 
is however increasingly being recognised that implementation is an 
important, even vital, part of the decision-making process. 
"Implementation is about putting policies into practice. It is the 
often complex process of planning, organisation, coordination and 
promotion which is necessary in order to achieve policy objectives. As an 
activity implementation constitutes an important, even a central, phase in 
the policy process. " [1] 
The subject of this study is this neglected though important aspect of 
decision-making - implementation. The implementation side of the decision- 
making process is explored through the use of a case study. The case study 
chosen for analysis, is one of considerable interest to a student of 
Indian history. Use of the case study to explore implementation of 
decisions in general, opens up an area which has received less attention 
in the literature on decision-making than has the process by which 
decisions are arrived at and formulated. 
The case-study chosen for analysis is the implementation of the 
Government of India Act, 1935. Events in India after the passing of the-Act 
-------------- 
[1] Hyder, M. (1981) "Implementation. The Evolutionary Model. ", in Lewis, D. 
& Wallace, H. (eds) Policies into Practice, London, Heinemann Education 
Books, p 1. 
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are reexamined as attempts to implement a major decision. The Government 
of India Act, 1935, was a major decision about the future of India; major 
because of the length of the Act, the number of features incorporated 
within it and the wide-ranging changes it was to bring about in the 
government and administration of the country. The formation and passing of 
the Act, stretching as it did over a period of 8 years and involving 
numerous people both in Britain and in India, was an important development 
in modern Indian history. It was not however the passing of the Act that 
would bring about the proposed changes, but its implementation. The Act 
came about in response to developments in India, and its implementation 
would be an important determinant of future developments. 
Thus events in India during the years when attempts were made to 
implement the Government of India Act, 1935, provide an interesting case 
study which can be analysed to explore implementation in general. 
Implementation is examined by means of a model of implementation and 
several related propositions derived from the literature which are to be 
tested against the case study. The propositions help structure the case 
study, for they raise a number of questions to which answers are sought in 
the exposition of the case study. 
While it is possible to regard the Act as one major decision, [2] it is 
more correct to regard it as being composed of several decisions. The Act 
had two major provisions. First, by granting a further measure of self- 
government In response to nationalist demands, it was a means by which the 
British sought to avoid violent revolution in India. Secondly, the Act 
proposed the formation of an all-India federation which would bring 
together the provinces and the princely states, Hindus and Muslims, and 
thus retain the unity of the country. The Act also incorporated within it 
several less important provisions. In this it showed a similarity with 
other major pieces of legislation, which often bring together several 
[21 See Ghosh, S. C. (1972) Decision-Making and Power in the British 
Conservative Party, Calcutta, Oceania Publishing House. The author 
examined the decision-making process within the Conservative Party, 
by studying a particular decision, the formation of policy towards 
India within the party, which-culminated in the passing of the 1935 
Act. Ghosh focuses on the role played by the various sections of the 
Conservative Party in the making of this decision. 
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decisions in one document. For example, when examining Britain's policy 
towards the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), 
Clarke found: 
"The demands of the Final Act, [3] as we have seen are intellectually 
and behaviourally various, and the scope of governmental concern that they 
cover is very wide. So we should be aware that when we refer to 'Britain's 
policy' towards the CSCE, we are in fact referring to a whole series of 
different policies and types of behaviour that are co-ordinated, mainly in 
the mind of the observer, under the general heading of 'CSCE policy'. " [4] 
Not only is such an approach more correct, it is also more fruitful for 
analysis, for it brings an awareness that different decisions require 
different implementing activities, different 'types of behaviour'. It also 
permits comparison between cases of successful and unsuccessful 
implementation which can be used to throw light on factors which affect 
implementation. 
Ideally, a study of the implementation of the provisions of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, should analyse implementation of the two 
major decisions and of all the minor decisions. This would, however, make 
the study unmanageably large without contributing substantially to our 
understanding of the implementation process. Instead, it is proposed to 
study implementation of the two major decisions, which select themselves, 
and one comparatively less important decision, dealing with the financial 
relations between the centre and the provinces. 151 
Several issues are raised by the adoption of the above approach, the 
use of a case study (or case studies), to examine implementation in 
general, and these are dealt with in this chapter. First of all, the 
adoption of a social sciences approach to historical events, events which 
are unique, has been the subject of much controversy and some of the 
arguments on both sides of the debate are summarised below. Next, the 
[3] Helsinki Declaration of August 1975. 
[4] Clarke, M. (1985) "The Implementation of Britain's CSCE Policy, 1975- 
84, " in Smith, S. & Clarke, M. (eds) Foreign Policy Implementation, 
London, George Allen & Unwin, p 148. 
[5] For the reasons for selecting this particular decision see Chapter 2. 
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chapter examines the major theoretical works in the available literature 
on decision-making and shows that while the process by which decisions are 
formulated has been examined in detail, the issue of implementation has 
been largely neglected. Some discussion of implementation is, implicit in 
the literature, and this is organised in terms of two models. A third model 
of implementation is put forward. Several propositions about 
implementation are derived from the literature, and these are to be tested 
in the analysis of the case studies. The next section deals with the use of 
case studies in theory or model building. It shows that this is a method 
that is gaining importance in the social sciences, and is one that has been 
adopted by several analysts. The final section provides a brief sketch of 
the historical background to the Act to set the scene for the case studies 
that follow. 
1.2 Scientific vs Historical Approaches 
The use of a case study to develop theoretical propositions about 
implementation involves adoption of a social scientific approach to the 
study of a historical event. To question whether adoption of such an 
approach can improve our understanding of the subject is to question the 
application of the scientific method to the social sciences. In the field 
of international relations, there have been, over the years, heated debates 
on whether the scientific or historical method should be adopted as the 
mode of study. 
Those advocating the scientific method believe that, despite the 
complexity of the international arena, there are regularities in 
international affairs, distinct patterns of behaviour. These regularities 
will not be revealed to anyone who concentrates merely on studying the 
facts, but if the facts are structured with the help of a theoretical 
framework, an underlying order will be revealed. Waltz [6] is emphatic 
that collection of more and more data, establishing more and more 
correlations, will not lead to a better understanding, since data cannot 
[6] Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, Reading, 
Massachusetts, Addison Wesley Publishing Co. 
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speak for themselves. It is not enough, he writes, to examine numerous 
cases and hope that connections and patterns will emerge. To get beyond 
the facts of observation to explanation, theory is necessary. 
"A theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of 
activity.... A theory indicates that some factors are more important than 
others and specifies relations among them. In reality, everything is 
related to everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from others 
in order to deal with it intellectually. " 171 
Theory seeks answers to questions such as how things work, what causes 
certain effects, why certain events occur. Theories indicate what is 
connected with what and how the connection is made, they convey a sense of 
how things hang together. It makes, in his opinion, little sense to 
manipulate data, until the questions of how variables may be connected is 
answered. Theoretical questions must be raised at the outset of inquiry. 
Thus, the social scientist, with the help of'theory, attempts to uncover 
underlying patterns of behaviour and hopes to base predictions of future 
behaviour on. them. The objective is to be able to predict what is likely to 
happen in the future, to develop skill in showing the likely trend of 
affairs rather than to predict what will happen in a particular year or 
period. 
Rosenau has been a consistent advocate of the scientific approach. [8] 
The endless piling up of historical case materials, he writes, will only 
lead research (in foreign policy) to a dead end. To identify variables is 
not enough, there is a need to establish causal relationships, to formulate 
if-then propositions (about foreign policy behaviour). He, suggested steps 
that could be taken which -would 
help in the formulation of such 
propositions. One was the construction of pre-theories to , organise 
materials, so that data could be similarly processed and rendered 
comparable. Once data is presented in terms of pre-theories, comparisons 
will be possible and, it should also be possible to discern patterns among 
different policies and situations. Pre-theories would not be enough to 
[7] ibid, p 8. 
[8] Rosenau, J. N. (1971) The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York, 
The Free Press. 
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progress towards theory. Similarly processed materials need theoretical 
concepts to give them structure and to facilitate, formulation'of if-then 
propositions. In a later work, Rosenau stresses again the need for 
analysis. (9] Analytic interpretation involves a readiness to seek 
regularities and patterns in events that are not evident in historical 
descriptions. Analysis is more difficult than description, it is also 
based - on less reliable evidence, but the advantage is that greater 
understanding is gained when one sees links between phenomena that are not 
self-evidently associated. 
For those advocating the historical method, the central belief is that 
each event is unique. Given the complexity of events and the role played in 
them by human will, it is not possible to reduce the international system 
to systemic terms. The historian aims at providing the best possible 
description of past events, using the most reliable data available and 
deriving clues from it about the future. Charles Reynolds has been one of 
the major critics of the scientific method. [10] He "adopts a 'strict' 
definition of what theory- involves. Above all, he writes, theory must 
produce hypotheses which are capable of refutation or falsification. He 
examined several theories in international relations and concluded that 
"no attempt at formulating a theory has yet proved successful" since no 
empirically testable hypotheses have resulted from adopting the 
scientific approach to international relations : "the reason appears to 
lie in the difficulty of defining and measuring the variables for human 
behaviour, and in the problem of making valid and testable propositions 
about human cognition and volition. " [111 
Most attempts at theorising, however, adopt a much looser definition of 
what theory involves. Eckstein writes that two polar-positions on what 
constitutes theory can be identified [12] At one extreme - the 'hard' line 
[9]' Rosenau, J. N., Thompson, K. W. & Boyd, G. (eds) (1976): ' World Politics : An 
. 
Introduction, New York, The Free Press. 
[10] Reynolds, C. (1973) Theory and Explanation in International Politics, 
London, Martin Robertson. 
(11] ibid, P 7. 
[12] Eckstein, H. (1975) "Case Study and Theory in Political Science", in 
Greenstein, F. I. & Polsby, N. W. (eds) Handbook of Political Science, 
Volume 7, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison Wesley Publishing Co. 
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on theory - is the view that theory consists solely of statements like 
those characteristic of contemporary theoretical physics; at the other 
extreme - the 'soft' line - theory is simply regarded as any mental 
construct that orders phenomena or inquiry into them. If, as he states, the 
term theory were always prefaced by an appropriate adjective, wrangling 
about these, and less extreme positions could be avoided. 
Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty show how the term theory has several meanings 
in the social sciences. [13] In the natural sciences : "A theory sets forth 
a systematic view of phenomena by presenting a series of propositions or 
hypotheses which specify relations among variables in order to present 
explanations and make predictions about the phenomena". [14] While 
attempts have been made to develop such formal theories, the term 
theoretical approach has acquired several meanings in the field of 
international relations. 
Theory can mean a deductive system in which propositions which are 
logically consistent are set forth. Such theoretical systems may be 
directly, related to the real world, such as the balance of power system 
developed by Waltz, [15] or they may not be linked with the real world, 
such as the systems of Morton Kaplan. [16] Theory can be a conceptual 
framework, a classificatory scheme or a taxonomy. This provides categories 
in which data may be placed thus providing for their orderly arrangement 
prior to examination. Rosenau's pre-theories. are examples of such a 
taxonomy. Theory can also be a series of statements about rational 
behaviour based on a dominant motive such as power, or based an a dominant 
economic imperative, such as Marxist works on imperialism. Theory can also 
involve propositions about political behaviour inductively derived from 
empirical studies, Deutsch et al's study of integration in the North 
Atlantic Area is an example of such theoretical work. [17] Theory can also 
[13] Dougherty, J. E. & Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (1981) Contending Theories of 
International Relations, 2nd edition, New York, Harper & Row. 
[141 bid, p 20. 
[15] Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
[16] Kaplan, M. A. (1957) System and Process in International Politics, New 
York, John Wiley. 
[17] Deutsch, K. W., et al (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic 
Area, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
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be normative, setting out norms and values, indicating how political 
actors ought to behave. Theory building can be done at two different 
levels. At the macro level, are attempts at 'grand theory', in which 
explanations of political behaviour in general are sought, and a-few 
variables are seen as explaining a wide range of phenomena. Morgenthau, who 
explained states behaviour in terms of the power political motive, 
formulated a 'grand theory' of the behaviour of states. [181 Most analysts 
however, attempt to formulate middle-range theories, to explain a limited 
range of political phenomena. For example, studies on integration and 
whether integration in one sector leads to spill-over into others, or 
studies of decision-making behaviour, which seek to explain how states 
formulate foreign policy, are partial explanations of political behaviour, 
which concentrate on certain aspects of international relations. 
The authors adopt a simple definition of theory: "theory' is a way of 
organising our knowledge so that we can ask questions worth answering, 
guide our research toward valid answers". There is, they conclude, no one 
model for theory. "Good theory may be inductive or deductive: micro or 
macro; highly specific, mid-range or 'grand' .... All these approaches are 
valid and useful when handled with intelligence and methodological 
care. " [19] 
There are several advantages to be gained by adopting the behavioural 
approach. Firstly, it forces one to make one's assumptions explicit. C. B. 
Joynt [20] makes the point, that even if a descriptive method is adopted, 
the narrative, no matter how detailed, is selective in that it is not 
possible to include every single fact. There is thus always an implicit 
model being used. The virtue of the behavioural sciences is that they 
compel us to realise that any model is always a partial representation of 
reality, and force us to make our assumptions explicit. Frankel lists 
several advantages of the scientific method. [21] Theory encourages 
[18] Morgenthau, H. J. (1973) Politics Among Nations, 5th edition, New York, 
Alfred Knopf. 
[19] Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, pp 40-41. 
[20] Joynt, C. B. (1979) "Behavioural Sciences in International Relations", 
The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol 33,224-242. 
[21] Frankel, J. (1973) Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour 
of States, London, Oxford University Press. 
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scientific, systematic thinking. It requires clear definition of concepts 
and their organisation in an analytic framework. It helps in the 
organisation and storage of data. Starting with a general framework 
questions are posed which might not otherwise be asked. For example, an 
account of a diplomatic issue written from a decision-making angle may not 
be very different from one written by a historian, but will raise 
different questions. It also arranges the account in such a way that it can 
be used much more readily for purposes of comparison. Theory helps to 
separate and identify more clearly the relevant factors of an issue. The 
search for theory has a broadening effect for it brings a willingness to 
look at evidence from various angles. Frankel concludes that despite the 
many shortcomings of international relations theory, it does have its 
uses, for it "can provide interesting new insights and angles". [221 
Critics of the scientific approach believe that given the complexity of 
the international arena, it is not possible to reduce the international 
system to systemic terms. They stress the intractable nature of the 
subject. The number of variables of which any generalisation about state 
behaviour must take into account is unmanageable, it is not possible to 
carry out controlled experiments, above all, the part played by human will 
makes the subject unsuitable for scientific inquiry. "The practitioners of 
the scientific approach are unlikely to make progress of the sort to which 
they aspire" wrote Hedley Bull, a consistent critic of the scientific 
approach. Arguments for both sides of the debate, including the detailed 
criticism by Bull are to be found in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds) 
Contending Approaches to International Politics. [23] The conclusion, one 
shared by other writers in the field was that, though differences between 
the two approaches are bound to persist, both are necessary and have 
different but valuable contributions to make to the study of the subject. 
[22] ibid, p 7. 
[23] Knorr, K. & Rosenau, J. N. (eds) (1969) Contending Approaches to 
International Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
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1.3 Literature on decision-making 
The available literature on decision-making is vast and disparate. The 
process of decision-making was systematically examined first in fields 
outside political science and in addition to political science, the 
concept is prominent in other disciplines such as economics, psychology 
and sociology. Thus the study of foreign policy decision-making 
concentrates on one part of a general phenomenon, of interest to social 
scientists and to policy makers. Even in the field of' international 
relations, a great body of literature has grown up around the subject of 
decision-making. - The brief survey below attempts' to show that' major 
theoretical advances were made on the making of decisions, on the act'of 
choice among alternatives, so that most of the literature developed on the 
process of decision-making while the execution or implementation of these 
decisions, for a long time, was not examined in any detail. Studies on 
decision-making concentrated on how individuals, groups or organisations 
made a choice among alternatives, and other works appeared round this 
central core. The major developments in decision-making theory are briefly 
outlined below. Robinson and Snyder, prefer to use the word 'conceptions' 
rather than theories because: "many such formulations are loose, 
suggestive approaches that identify variables or categories for data 
collection rather than specify predictive relations among 
variables. " [24] 
Economists made significant early contributions to decision-making 
theory and the classic conception of decision-making originated in 
economic theory. It assumed as a decision-maker, a rational man who knew 
all possible alternatives, understood the possible consequences of each of 
these alternatives, and had arrived at a clear hierarchy of preferences 
among them. H. Simon, who was one of the first to criticise the rationality 
model of decision-making, sets out the steps required for such a rational 
decision-making process. [251 
[241 Robinson, J. A. & Snyder, R. C. (1965) "Decision-Making in International 
Politics", in Kelman, H. C. (ed) International Behaviour, New York, Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, p 437. 
[251 Simon, H. A. (1976) Administrative Behaviour, 3rd edition, New York, The 
Free Press. 
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The decision-maker would, firstly, list all alternative strategies, 
determine all consequences that follow upon these strategies and finally 
make a comparative evaluation of these sets of consequences. The subject 
would thus have to know all possible alternative strategies, he would have 
to have a complete description of the consequences of following each 
strategy, and be able to list these consequences in their order of 
preference so as to be able to choose between them. Thus the decision- 
maker surveys all available alternatives, assigns values to them, assesses 
their probabilities, and then chooses the optimal course. Economists 
developed a conceptual scheme, indifference curves, to describe this 
process and showed how the rational decision-maker attempts to maximise 
expected utility. The above model is of a wholly rational man who is 
supplied with a complete range of information and who has the 
computational capacity to exploit this information in order to discover 
the best possible course of action. 
Simon was an early critic of the rationality model. Studies in 
psychology, particularly the works of Freud had shown that man does not 
always act rationally. Secondly, man's cognitive capabilities place 
boundaries on the exercise` of--rationality. Economists attribute to 
economic man an omniscient rationality. He has a complete and-consistent 
set of preferences that allows him to choose among alternatives open to 
him. He is completely aware of what these alternatives are and there are no 
limits to the complexity of the computations he can perform in order to 
determine which alternatives are best. 
Simon pointed out: "It is impossible for the behaviour of a single 
isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality. The number of 
alternatives he must explore is so great, 'the information he would need to 
evaluate them is so vast, that even an approximation to objective 
rationality is hard, to conceive. " [26] 
Objective rationality implies that the subject a)views the behaviour 
alternatives prior to decision in panoramic fashion, b)considers the whole 
complex of consequences that would follow on each choice, c)uses his 
[263 L bid, p 79. 
r 
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system"of - values' to single out one from the whole set of alternatives. 
Actual behaviour falls short of this ideal for the above concept of 
rationality implies a completeness of knowledge that is-in reality 
unattainable - only a few of all possible alternative behaviours come to 
mind, human beings have only a fragmentary knowledge of the consequences 
of their action, values can be only imperfectly anticipated. Man quite 
simply, has not the wits to maximise. 
This is not, to imply that he therefore acts irrationally. For 
maximising or optimising behaviour, Simon substituted the notion of 
'satisficing' behaviour. Unable to choose the best alternative from among 
all those available to him, the decision-maker examines alternatives 
sequentially till he finds one that is 'good enough'. He aims not for 
maximisation-but for satisficing, and thus does not have to undertake a 
search for all possible alternatives. Simon showed that limited 
rationality was a better description of the way man acted, and he 
introduced the concept of bounded rationality, a concept applicable both 
to individuals and to organisations. 
Similar criticisms of the rationality model were made by Braybrooke & 
Lindblom, who examined how policy-makers acted when confronted with a 
complex problem. [271 
The rationality model, termed by them the synoptic method, states that 
policy makers choose among alternatives after careful and complete study 
of all possible consequences and after an evaluation of those consequences 
in the light of commonly shared values. However, what decision-makers 
generally do in the face of a complex problem, does not approximate the 
synoptic method, for it represents an 'ideal' approach to problem solving 
that cannot be attained. It cannot be attained because problems facing 
policy-makers can often be complex, capable of infinite variation, and can 
have a multiplicity of solutions. Solutions of these problems, according 
to the synoptic method, requires comprehensiveness of analysis that is 
beyond human capabilities. Not only is such information as is required by 
[27] Braybrooke, D. & Lindblom, C. E. (1970) A Strategy of Decision, New York, 
The Free Press. 
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the synoptic ideal difficult to get, it can also be costly to obtain and 
policy-makers have to take into account the costliness of gathering 
information. 
Thus a number of obstacles prevent the synoptic ideal from being 
achieved. Policy-makers, unable to adopt the rational model use adaptive 
strategies to make decisions. Other adaptive strategies are possible, for 
example, satisficing behaviour as suggested by Simon, or the suggestion by 
Snyder and Paige in a study of the Korean decision, [28] that in a crisis, 
when a decision must be compressed into a short time period, single 
alternatives rather than multiple alternatives will be considered. [29] 
One such adaptive strategy used by decision-makers is the one which 
Braybrooke &. Lindblom term "disjointed incrementalism". Policy proceeds, 
they suggested, not according to any comprehensive or coordinated 
strategy, but through small, incremental moves on specific problems. The 
clue to the actual behaviour of policy-makers, lies, according to the 
authors, in the incremental concept. In evaluating and deciding on 
alternative policies, policy-makers take into account the costliness, in 
time, energy and other resources, of analysis, as well as the 
impossibility, in sufficiently complex problems, of bringing analysis to 
an end. They adapt to these difficulties by following a policy of 
disjointed incrementalism - they focus on alternatives that differ only 
incrementally from earlier policies. 
More recently, J. Steinbrunner has formulated a cybernetic theory of 
decision that challenges the - notion of rationality, even 
limited or 
bounded rationality. [30] In the analytic theory of decision (term used by 
him to describe decision-making theory based on the rational process), it 
(28] Snyder, R. C. & Paige, G. D. (1958) "The United States decision to to 
resist aggression in Korea", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 3, 
341-379. 
[29] Several simplifying strategies adopted by decision-makers are 
described in Janis, I. L. & Mann, L. (1977) Decision-Making, New" York, The 
Free Press. Among them the simplest is the use of a single, formula 
employed by policy-makers as the sole decision rule in dealing with 
complex problems, rather than careful search and analysis and 
weighing of alternatives. 
(30] Steinbrunner, J. D. (19,74) The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press. 
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has generally been recognised that the ideal rational process is 
impossible to attain, so constraints have been introduced - limits of time 
and costs of information. The analytic decision-maker is nonetheless seen 
to make alternative -outcome calculations. Since he cannot take all trade- 
offs into account, it is assumed he considers only those which are 
directly and immediately affected. Though he cannot assign probablilities 
to all occurences, he is nonetheless seen to make some attempt to predict 
the consequences of a particular course of action. Unable to maximise, he 
aims to satisfice. Despite limitations of costs and of time, the decision- 
maker strives towards as complete an understanding as is possible of the 
forces which determine outcomes. The decision-maker's rationality may be 
'bounded' or 'limited', but it is still the dominant concept. 
Steinbrunner challenged the entire concept of rational choice. A better 
explanation of today's complex decision processes, he wrote, is to be found 
in cybernetic theory which studies how human beings process information, 
supplemented by cognitive theory which studies the fundamental operations 
of the human mind. The cybernetic theory of decision also provides a 
better explanation of events which seem puzzling when studied within a 
rational framework. These are usually rationalised post hoc but an 
alternative explanation can be provided by cybernetic theory. 
Adoption of the cybernetic paradigm involves a rejection of all the 
basic assumptions of analytic logic. Cybernetic decision-making involves 
no calculations about the outcomes of action and no attaching of pay-off 
values to outcomes. The decision process according to cybernetic logic is 
a much simpler one. Thus the approach challenges the central focus of the 
rationality approach - finding an optimal solution under given 
constraints by direct calculations. 
Examples of cybernetic decision-making are provided by tennis players 
who manage to play without making calculations about the speed and 
trajectory of the ball; and by bees, who by following simple instructions 
from fellow workers can locate pollen bearing flowers at places remote 
from the hive. Servo-mechanisms provide examples of simple decision- 
making, thermostats which keep temperatures within certain limits and the 
Watt governor for regulating speeds of steam engines. In all the above 
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examples there is no preference ordering, no 'calculation of outcomes and 
no optimising process. 
Instead, the cybernetic decision-maker simplifies complex situations 
by eliminating variety and by ignoring elaborate calculations. The 
decision-maker monitors a few feedback variables and makes a behavioural 
adjustment. The decision-maker has a set of responses which determine the 
action he has to take once he receives information to which he is 
sensitive. Most everyday human. activity, such as walking, eating and 
writing, involves such highly focused, programmed decisions. The 
cybernetic approach is clearly important in the- study of routine 
behaviour. 
According to Steinbrunner, cybernetic logic is also applicable to 
complex problems such as those to be found in the field of foreign policy. 
Complex problems become fragmented into specific ones, each dealt with by 
a separate decision-maker. The number of decision-makers increases to deal 
with each specific problem. This is the natural cybernetic explanation for 
the rise of mass bureaucracy. Theories of organisational behaviour help to 
extend the cybernetic paradigm from individual to collective decision- 
making. However, organisational theory is not enough, particularly in cases 
where complex problems are not decomposable, so that the problem is not 
sufficiently structured to yield a cybernetic process. The uncertainty 
surrounding such problems makes analytic calculations impossible. However 
decision-makers still find it possible to act. The answer is to be found in 
cognitive theory which explains how the mind deals with situations of 
uncertainty. Cognitive principles are.. used to derive three concepts, 
grooved thinking, uncommitted thinking and theoretical thinking. This 
modified cybernetic/cognitive paradigm provides a better explanation of 
governmental decision-making under conditions of complexity and 
uncertainty, than does the concept of rationality, even bounded or limited 
rationality. 
G. Allison too had earlier rejected the view of government behaviour as 
a matter of deliberate choice and had offered two alternative models of 
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governmental decision-making. [311 The Organisation Process model, like 
Steinbrunner's cybernetic theory of decision, deals with the routines and 
standard operating procedures built up by large organisations. The 
routines are necessary for any modern bureaucracy to be able to function, 
for they allow large organisations to deal with everyday matters in an 
efficient manner. According to the Organisation Process model, a 
government consists of a number of loosely allied organisations, each 
organisation having its own area of concern. It is unlikely that a problem 
faced by a government will be dealt with by a single organisation, but, 
more commonly, will be dealt with by several of them. Government leaders 
sit atop this conglomerate of organisations and attempt to coordinate 
their activities. They cannot however control the workings of these 
organisations which act in quasi-independence. Each organisation acts 
according to its, goals, programs and repertoires. Organisations function 
according to standard patterns of behaviour and change in these patterns 
is difficult to achieve. Government behaviour is composed of the 
independent outputs of several large organisations. Allison showed how 
behaviour which according to the rational policy model (one implicitly 
used by analysts when analysing events) appeared puzzling, became 
understandable when it was seen as the outputs of organisations 
functioning according to their standard operating patterns. He provided 
several examples from the Cuban missile crisis which he examined in depth. 
Another model which rejects the view of decision-making as abstract 
choice between alternatives is the Bureacratic Politics model put forward 
initially by Allison, but developed by Allison and Halperin. 1321 The 
model focuses on the competition and conflict between the different 
bureaucracies involved in a particular decision. Foreign policies are the 
result 'of 'bargaining among the decision-making units. Each unit. is 
concerned with promoting or furthering its own vested interests so that 
there is intensive competition among the units and the outcome or decision 
is the result of compromise between these groups pulling in different 
1311 Allison, G. T. (1971) Essence of Decision, Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
[321 Allison, G. T. & Halperin, M. H. (1972) "Bureaucratic Politics. A Paradigm 
and Some Policy Implications", in Tanter, R. & Ullman, R. H. (eds) Theory 
and Policy in International Relations, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
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directions. 
Thus according to the Bureaucratic Politics model, government behaviour 
can be understood as the outcome of bargaining games. The players in these 
games are political leaders and men who head critical organisations. The 
nature of foreign policy problems permits disagreement among the players 
concerning what ought to be done, at the same time the issues before the 
players are of vital importance. Thus men share power, men differ 
concerning what must be done, and the differences matter. Government 
decisions are the result of a bargaining game between these players, they 
are not made by rational choice, but by the pulling and hauling that is 
politics. 
Thus the state is seen, not as a unitary actor but as being composed of 
many actors and the interaction among these actors determines the actions 
of the state in international politics. The Bureaucratic Politics approach 
involves answering 3 central questions: 1)Who plays? That is, whose 
interests and behaviour have an important effect on the government's 
decisions and actions? In any government there exists a circle of senior 
players such as the chief executive and major political figures. Around 
the central circle of senior players are various circles of junior 
players. The press, interest groups, and the public form concentric circles 
around the central arena, circles that demarcate limits within which the 
game is played. 2)What determines players' stands? Players' stands are 
affected by what they perceive national security interests to be. 
Organisational, domestic and personal interests affect how players 
perceive national security interests. For example, members of an 
organisation come to believe that maintaining the health of that 
organisation is vital to the national interest. Thus its members act to 
maintain the organisation's autonomy and to protect the organisation's 
essence by maintaining or expanding its roles, missions and budgets. 
Another example is that of politicians who will concern themselves with 
the domestic implications of policy as this will affect their chances of 
reelection. Thus when an issue arises, players will see quite different 
faces of the issue and this determines their stands on that issue. 3)How 
are players' stands aggregated to yield decisions and actions of "a 
government? Once an issue arises, often in response to an event, the game 
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is begun and consists of each player engaging in various manoeuvres to 
achieve his desired results. Each player's probability of success depends 
upon bargaining advantages, skill and will in using these advantages and 
on other players perceptions of these two elements. Decision games are 
followed by action games. As in decision games, players probabilities of 
success depend upon their power. In action games, bargaining advantages 
stem from formal authority, control over resources, responsibility for 
carrying out the action, control over information and persuasiveness with 
other players. 
While the above theories may seem to offer conflicting views of the 
decision-making process, they can be seen as complementary, if they are 
regarded as theories which deal with the intellectual and with the social 
processes of decision-making. Robinson and Majak distinguish between the 
intellectual, social and quasi-mechanical aspects of decision-making. [33] 
Problem solving, collecting and analysing information, defining 
situations, formulating alternatives, these and similar activities are 
primarily intellectual processes. Thus concepts such as optimising and 
satisficing emphasise the intellectual dimension. The pluralist theory of 
decision-making dealing as it does with individuals, groups and 
organisations who must arrive at a common decision, emphasises the social 
dimension. However decision-making may also be the result of quasi- 
mechanical processes, the standard operating procedures of large 
organisations are an obvious example. These three aspects can be regarded 
as subprocesses of decision-making. The process by which most decisions 
emerge is likely to include two or three of the subprocesses, that is, a 
decision rarely emerges from intellectual processes without related and 
complementary social and/or quasi-mechanical processes. Thus theories of 
optimising, satisficing or of bureaucratic politics, offer a theoretical 
explanation of only part of the decision process and the process by which 
a given decision is arrived at can be viewed as a combination of these 
subprocesses. 
133 3 Robinson, J. A. & Majak, R. R. (1967) "The Theory of Decision-Making", in 
Charlesworth, J. C. (ed) Contemporary Political Analysis, New York, The 
Free Press. 
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The above survey of the major theoretical advances in decision-making 
shows that the literature in decision-making has concentrated on the study 
of how decisions are arrived at, and on the techniques and criteria for the 
taking of decisions by policy-makers. Several aspects of decision-making 
have been studied so that there is now an extensive literature on the 
subject, but most works have appeared round this central core which deals 
with the analysis of how decisions are made. Some of these works are 
briefly mentioned below. 
A considerable amount of literature now exists on the making of 
specific foreign policy decisions. The initial focus was on decisions made 
in situations of crisis, but was later extended to decisions made over a 
much longer period. Crisis decisions studied include decisions which led 
to the outbreak of World War I, [34] the United States decision to 
intervene in Korea, [35] the British decision to intervene in the 
Suez, [36] and the Cuban missile crisis. [37] Of these, Paige's study of 
the United States decision to intervene in Korea, was an application of a 
specific decision-making framework, put forward by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 
to an actual case study. Paige was essentially faithful to the Snyder et al 
model. He first placed the decision in the context of its internal and 
external setting, then presented a meticulously reconstructed narrative. 
In a concluding chapter he presented numerous empirical propositions 
derived from the case study. He recognised the , 
difficulties of 
generalising from a single case study and the propositions are to be taken 
not as valid generalisations, but as hypotheses which might be tested in 
other studies of crisis decision-making. Holsti, North and Brody followed 
a different methodological approach, using content analysis and a 
stimulus-response model to study the outbreak of World War I. The focus of 
their study was on the interaction between decisional units rather than 
within a unit. 
[3L] Holsti, O. R., Brody, R. A. & North, R. C. (1968) "Perception and Action in 
the 1914 Crisis", in Singer, J. D. (ed) Quantitative International 
Politics, New York, The Free Press. 
[35] Paige, G. D. (1968) Korean Decision, New York, The Free Press. 
[36] Childers, E. B. (1962) The Road to Suez, London, MacGibbon and Kee. 
[37] Allison, Essence of Decision. 
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Several analysts have sought to gain a better understanding of crisis 
behaviour. Important contributions to the analysis of crisis have been 
made by C. Hermann, [38] whose definition of crisis was widely accepted, 
and by O. R. Holsti. [39] Crisis behaviour continues to be analysed as was 
done by Brecher in studying two crises faced by Israel in 1967 and 
1973. [40] A Jerusalem 'Crisis Seminar' was held in 1975-76 and led to a 
project in which data for 469 international crises over the period 1938- 
1975 was collected and analysed. [41] Attempts have been made in crisis 
forecasting despite the difficulty in predicting such unique events. [42] 
The effects of stress caused by being in a crisis situation and how this 
affects the efficiency of decision-makers has been studied. [43] In short, 
both individual crises and the theoretical aspects of crisis received 
considerable attention in the literature on decision-making. 
The perceptions of decision-makers have been studied as part of 
decision-making theory. The environment can be divided into the 
'psychological environment' within which decisions are conceived and the 
'operational environment' within which foreign policy is executed (the 
distinction was first suggested by Harold and Margaret Sprout). The 
psychological environment is seen as being more important to the process 
of decision-making as it is the decision-makers' perceptions of the 
operational environment that determines how they decide on a particular 
issue. The Snyder, Bruck and Sapin pioneering approach, [44] concentrates 
upon the images and perceptions of the decision-makers. Elite image is the 
decisive input of a foreign policy system in Brecher's framework for the 
[38] Hermann, C. F. (ed) (1972) International Crises New York, The Free 
Press. 
(39] Holsti, O. R. (1972) Crisis, Escalation, War, Montreal, McGill Queens' 
University Press. 
[40] Brecher, M. (1980) Decisions in Crisis, Berkeley, University of 
California Press. 
[41] Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, pp 496-497. 
[42] McC1elland, C. A. (1977) "The Anticipation of International Crises", 
International Studies Quarrterly, Vol 210), 15-38. 
[43] Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War. 
[44] Snyder, R. C., Bruck, H. W. & Sapin, B. (eds) (1962) Foreign Policy Decision- 
Making, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe. 
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study of foreign policy behaviour. [415] 
Analysts have turned to the discipline of psychology to provide 
explanations of decision-making behaviour. Steinbrunner, it has been seen, 
needed to supplement cybernetics with cognitive theory to provide a theory 
of decision-making. Jervis showed how mutual misperceptions can arise 
between statesmen, and how this leads ultimately to conflict. [46] The 
behaviour of individual statesmen has been scrutinised, [47] as has the 
behaviour of small groups and the tendency to concurrence-seeking 
behaviour which has been labelled 'groupthink'. [418] Janis and Mann have 
studied the effects of psychological stress, caused by the conflicts which 
arise when a decision has to be made, on decision-making behaviour. (49] 
Extensive work has been done on decision-making in the U. S. There are 
studies of the foreign policy making machinery of the U. S. and the role of 
the State Department, the military, and the Congress have all come under 
scrutiny. The role of interest groups and pressure groups as well as the 
influence of public opinion on foreign policy decision-making are some of 
the issues which have been analysed. A number of specific foreign policy 
decisions made in the U. S. have been studied and the American foreign 
policy decision-making process has been studied more thoroughly than that 
in any other country. 
1.4 Models of Implementation 
ý, 
[45] Brecher, M. (1972) The Foreign Policy System of Israel, London, Oxford 
University Press. 
[46] Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
[47] Rivera, J de (1968) The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, 
Columbus, Ohio, Charles E Merrill. 
[48] Janis, I. L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink, Boston, Houghton Mifflin. 
[49] Janis, & Mann, Decision-Making, 
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1.4.1 Literature on Implementation 
The above survey of the major theoretical' advances-in the study of 
decision-making in the context of foreign policy, shows that the emphasis 
was on the process by which decisions are arrived at and an extensive 
literature has developed around this central core. 
"To date, the greatest part of decision analysis has been 'within the 
process' rather than on the relation of process to outcomes. " [50] 
The process of decision-making continued to receive attention over the 
years, while problems of implementation were largely overlooked: "there 
has been a continuing inconsistency in foreign policy analysis in that the 
techniques of taking decisions are much considered, whereas the 
implementation or performance of them has tended to be ignored, taken for 
granted, or described in different terms. " [51] 
Even in the field of public administration, where too decision-making 
has been an important subject of study: "The easy assumption prevailed 
that, once a decision had been taken, its execution was a simple and 
mundane affair that did not merit a great deal of attention. " [52] 
The same point was made by Hood: "It is by now commonplace that policy 
'implementation', 'execution' or 'administration' is a class of problems 
which need more analytic attention than they have received in the past. 
Several writers have drawn attention to the lack of balance in the 
standard administrative and business literature between the emphasis on 
planning and decision-making on the one hand, and the lack of a systematic 
discussion of implementation processes on the other hand. Control and 
policy execution, it would sometimes appear, is a matter of mere fiat, 
.... 1531 
[50] Robinson & Majak, "Theory of Decision-Making", p187. 
[51] Clarke, M. (1979) "Foreign Policy Implementation: Problems and 
Approaches", British Journal of International Studies, Vol 5(2), p 
113. 
[52] Hyder, "Implementation. The Evolutionary Model. ", p 1. 
[53] Hood, C. C. (1976) The Limits of Administration, London, John Wiley. 
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Pressman and Wildavsky came to the conclusion that: "Research on 
implementation is primarily conspicuous, by its absence. " [54] They wrote: 
"There is (or there must be) a large literature about implementation in 
the social sciences - or so we have been told by numerous people. None of 
them can come up with specific citations to this literature, but they are 
certain it must exist. Surely, they will say, the vast scholarly attention 
paid to poverty programs and efforts to secure compliance in the field of 
civil rights has generated work on problems of implementation. It must be 
there; it should be there; but in fact it is not. There is a kind of 
semantic illusion at work here because virtually everything ever done in 
public policy or public administration must, in the nature of things, have 
some bearing on implementation. Analytical study (as opposed to mere 
mention) of implementation seems so eminently reasonable that few can 
imagine it does not exist. Everyone is aware , certainly, of the widespread 
concern about the inability to implement governmental programs. 
Nevertheless, except for the few pieces mentioned in the body of this book, 
we have been unable to find any significant analytic work dealing with 
implementation. " [55] 
Masood Hyder however, makes the valid point, that though analyses of the 
phenomenon characterised and defined as 'implementation' were not to be 
found, insights into implementation could have been gained from many 
studies in politics, economics and social administration. [56] 
Hyder provides a succint review of the literature on implementation 
that has developed since Pressman and Wildavsky's assertion. Some of the 
important works which deal explicitly with issues of implementation are 
very briefly referred to here. 
Pressman and Wildavsky conducted a post-mortem on a federal program in 
which the goals were clearly specified, there was political agreement, and 
adequate funds were available, yet the-program was not implemented. An 
agency, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) was set up in 1965 
[54] Pr'essman, J. L. & Wildavsky, A. (1973) Implementation, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, p 167. 
[55] ibid, p 166. 
[56] Hyder, "Implementation. The Evolutionary Model. ", p 1. 
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to create employment for the "minorities, and was provided with adequate 
funds. Difficulties arose when broad agreement had to be translated into 
specific decisions. Problems were caused by the "technical details" of 
implementation. These, though apparently simple and straightforward, were 
in reality, complex and convoluted. What had looked like a relatively 
simple and direct program, involving one federal agency (EDA), one city 
(Oakland), and had the advantage of a substantial and immediate funding 
commitment, eventually involved numerous diverse participants. These 
included federal agencies such as the departments of Labour and Health, 
Education and Welfare, the Navy, the U. S. General Accounting Office and 
local government bodies. All the participants agreed on the goal of 
providing jobs for the unemployed from the minority community (blacks), 
but their differing perspectives meant that general agreement on policy 
dissolved into specific disagreements on the steps needed for 
implementation. 
Hood analysed problems of implementation [57] by trying to form an 
ideal picture of implementation comparable to the way the model of perfect 
competition is employed in economics. Hood identified three types of 
limits to perfect administration: 1) External limits - resource and 
political limits; 2) Strictly administrative 'limits; 3) Quasi- 
administrative limits which are a hybrid, with elements of both 1) and 2). 
To identify administrative limits, he analyses cases where the 
conditions of political acceptability and of resource availability are 
met, but execution still presents a problem. For example, many taxes on 
personal property would not suffer from problems of political 
acceptability or of resource availability, but suffer from administrative- 
problems, they are difficult to enforce. 
Hood identifies five major conditions as the 'internal' components of 
perfect administration. Perfect administration (implementation) requires 
both extra-administrative conditions and internal conditions. It is the 
latter conditions that Hood deals within his book, and the limits which 
arise when these are not fulfilled. 
(57] Hood, C. C. (1976) The Limits of Administration, London, John Wiley. 
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Like Hood, 'Dunsire [58] ignored external conditions 'such as inter- 
organisational relationships or the problem of non-compliance by citizens. 
He concentrated upon the >structures and' processes within central 
government departments and analysed the conditions under which policy 
objectives are translated into bureaucratic action within a government 
department. Since government 'departments vary widely, he considers an 
'ideal type' model of a bureaucracy and examines how such a bureaucracy is 
mobilised for action. An understanding of the working structure and 
processes of a bureaucracy draws attention to some problems of 
implementing government policy that have their roots in the nature of a 
bureaucracy. Such limits on 'perfect implementation' will thus always be 
present. An example of such a limit, familiar to, all who have had dealings 
with any bureaucracy, is that categorisation and 'impersonal treatment' is 
inescapable, with a consequent loss of information and of individuality. 
A more recent contribution to this growing literature on 
implementation is a book which provides a number of case studies of 
implementation. [591 An evolutionary model of the implementation process 
is put forward in the opening chapter and provides the framework'for the 
book. The main features of the model are outlined below.. 
In present day conditions with factors such as increasing inter- 
organisational 'turbulence' [60] and growing interdependence between 
countries, outcomes of policies are uncertain and we must expect to adjust 
their contents from time to time. The approach to implementation must be 
flexible and experimental, in short, evolutionary. 
The evolutionary model is depicted as: 
P, ->H, -I-E->P2-> 
[58] Dunsire, A. (1980) "Implementation Theory", in Implementation, 
Evaluation and Change, Course D336, The Open University, Milton 
Keynes, The Open University Press. 
[59] Lewis, D. & Wallace, H. (eds) (1984) Policies into Practice, London, 
Heinemann Education Books. 
[60] Inter-organisational 'turbulence' refers to the change in the 
organisational environment caused by increasing interdependence 
between organisations. As a result individual organisations become 
more dependent on the cooperation of other organisations, and the 
environment becomes 'turbulent'. 
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where P is the problem, H is the policy. Policy is regarded as a hypothesis 
since a policy is only a tentative solution to a problem. The policy or 
hypothesis has to be tested against reality. I represents implementation 
and E evaluation. Problems are rarely completely solved so that P1 is 
followed by P2. H2 then follows P21 then I, E, P3 and so on. The model is 
evolutionary because through the process of implementation, the initial 
policy H, takes on a new form H2, H2 becomes H3, and so on. 
The model, though a simplification of reality can, he feels, be of help 
to. practitioners of policy implementation. There are advantages in making 
the model on which one is acting explicit. 
"The practical man acts on the basis of a mental picture of the process 
acquired over a number of years, and possibly a very adequate one. However 
it remains largely unarticulated, unquestioned and untested; and it 
therefore runs the risk of being incomplete, and possibly in conflict with 
reality. The academic analyst proceeds in a fundamentally different way, 
by generalising, deliberately simplifying, and organising the data into 
significant patterns. " [61] 
Academic analysis helps the practitioner to cope with situations which 
are beyond his own experience. It also holds out the possibility of 
choosing the right methods in advance and of avoiding the costs of 
learning from experience. 
The study of implementation across national boundaries, however, in 
comparison, continued to receive little attention. 
"One feature of the literature on policy implementation is the tacit 
assumption that there is a high degree of insulation, which contains the 
process within national boundaries.... The rather separate body of 
literature on foreign policy analysis has not included implementation 
among its central preoccupations. " [621 
[611 Hyder, "Implementation. The Evolutionary Model. ", p 3. 
[62] Hyder, "Implementation. The Evolutionary Model. ", p 8. 
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In an attempt to fill this gap, Part II of the book edited by Lewis and 
Wallace deals specifically with cases of implementation in which the 
process transcends national boundaries. The analysis is however, of a 
particular type of cases of implementation. It is "intended to aid our 
understanding of how international agreements are given substance through 
implementation within states. " [63] The introductory article deals with 
issues of securing compliance with international agreements. Of the case 
studies that-follow, two are concerned with implementation of policies 
within the EEC and the third with a case of bilateral collaboration 
between the U. S. and the U. K., namely, implementation of the Polaris project. 
That implementation is an important subject that merits attention and 
analysis had been recognised much earlier: "Among the most important tasks 
of decision-making studies is the extension of research to the process- 
outcome nexus" wrote Robinson and Majak. [64] The task, they wrote, was a 
necessary one, for ability to relate how decisions are made to the 
outcomes and effects of those decisions, would help in the building of a 
theory of political decision-making. 
In outlining a framework for the study of foreign policy decision- 
making, Brecher too, explicitly recognised the need to study the outcomes 
of decisions: 
An inquiry into foreign policy may be said to have two interrelated 
goals. The first is to explain the sources of decision, that is, the 
pressures flowing from the real and perceived environments leading to a 
choice among policy options. The second is to explain the outcomes of 
decisions, that is the consequences of choice, both for the particular 
issue and for the foreign policy system as a whole. " [65] 
This, he states, avoids the pitfalls of analysing decisions in a vacuum. 
It also helps to give some form to the concept of feedback, a concept which 
is central to an approach aspiring to prediction of probable behaviour. 
[63] Wallace, H. (1984) "Implementation Across National Boundaries", in 
Lewis & Wallace (eds) Policies into Practice p 129. 
[64] Robinson & Majak, "Theory of Decision-Making", p 187. 
[65] Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel, pp 14-15. 
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Conventional works on foreign policy ignore the total system and focus on 
selected decisions. The analysis then, is illuminating about the specific 
decision or issue studied, - "but the cumulative contribution to knowledge 
about the behaviour of that state or that type of state in a cluster of 
related issues - an issue area - is minimal. " [66] It is only through an 
integrated framework, one that deals with the inputs, process and outputs 
of decision-making, that cumulative insights can be gained. It will then be 
possible to amass sufficient knowledge about state behaviour in the past, 
to permit predictions of probable responses to similar challenges in the 
future. 
In a recent work that deals with a wide range of cases of 
implementation that transcend national boundaries, the authors argue that 
there is a vast gap in the existing literature. 
"In the existing literature the implementation of decisions is assumed 
rather than examined. The fundamental assumption of the theoretical 
literature in foreign policy analysis is that the central problem to be 
explained is the decision.... 
"The foreign policy analysis literature focuses almost exclusively on 
the decision as that which has to be explained: explain foreign policy 
decisions and you have explained foreign policy behaviour. This literature 
has a number of distinct theories and myriad methodologies, but the 
dominant feature of it is a concern with explaining decisions. On this 
basis the focal points of theories may be very different (domestic inputs, 
images, bureaucratic politics, groupthink, national interest, and so on), 
but each is concerned with explaining why decision-makers took certain 
decisions rather than others. Indeed, it can be claimed that to the extent 
rival theories of foreign policy behaviour can be distinguished, they are 
concerned with competing explanations of decision-making, with their 
utility assessed by their success in this explanation. " [67] 
[66] ibid, p 15. 
[67] Smith, S. & Clarke, M. (1985) "Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign 
Policy Behaviour", in Smith, & Clarke, (eds) Foreign Policy 
Implementation pp 2-3. 
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In an attempt to fill this gap, the collection of essays focuses on the 
implementation of foreign policy decisions. [68] 
"It not only argues that the implementation process may cause foreign 
policy to turn out in a, way unintended by decision-makers (an empirical 
perspective), but also assumes that thinking about foreign policy 
behaviour from an implementation perspective encourages us to ask 
slightly different types of question about how foreign policy emerges (a 
theoretical perspective). " [69] 
In the literature, concentration on decisions has meant that 
implementation has often been assumed to take place without 'slippage', it 
has been seen in many respects as a natural follow-on to the decision, and 
thus has not been regarded, as important in the explanation of foreign 
policy behaviour. The authors argue that implementation is an important 
area of study, for, as numerous examples show, the implementation process 
can be an important factor that determines foreign policy behaviour - 
"implementation matters". I 1I 
"the most important issue that implementation raises for the study of 
foreign policy behaviour is that it shifts the focus from the decision to 
behaviour itself. This is of critical importance since it is the behaviour, 
and not the decision, to which other states' decision-makers have to 
respond. To be sure, the decision is clearly an important determinant of 
behaviour but it is a determinant .... The implementation perspective 
forces us to consider the extent to which behaviour was the intended 
consequence of decisions, or was the unintended consequence of the 
implementation process. As such it offers a potentially very powerful 
perspective for the examination of explanations of foreign policy 
behaviour. " [70] 
[68] Foreign policy is interpreted, rather loosely. A more correct 
description would be that the essays deal with cases of 
implementation that transcend natignal boundaries. 
[69] Smith, & Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour", p 2. 
[70] ibid, p3. 
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The book explores implementation through a set -of case studies, 
deliberately chosen from a wide range of cases, both unilateral and 
multilateral, covering different types of issue-areas. 
"In each case we hope to explain how the process of implementation 
affected the relationship between decision-making and behaviour; that is, 
we hope to give a series of detailed examples of the relationship between 
foreign policy behaviour and actual decisions. In many cases that 
behaviour was significantly different from that planned by decision- 
makers as a result of difficulties emerging when implementation was 
undertaken. " 1711 
It is with this important, but comparatively neglected, subject of 
implementation, that this study is concerned. It explores implementation 
through three case studies, the efforts made in India, after the passing of 
the Government of India Act, 1935, to implement three of the decisions 
embodied in the Act. As stated earlier, the Act incorporated a number of 
decisions. Implementation of three decisions is analysed, the two major 
decisions, plus one comparatively minor decision. A model of 
implementation and a set of propositions about implementation are put 
forward and these help to structure the case studies. 
While implementation has been comparatively neglected in the 
literature on foreign-policy decision-making, except for the recent works 
mentioned above, issues of implementation have been considered to some 
extent in the earlier literature. Though the focus was on the process by 
which decisions were made, insights into implementation can nonetheless be 
gained. It is possible to organise what has been said about implementation 
of decisions in terms of models. It should be emphasised that nowhere in 
the literature referred to are these models explicitly stated, rather, 
they are implicit in the literature. These models have been extracted from 
the available literature and have been set out below. Two models have been 
employed in dealing with the implementation of decisions. 
1711 ibid, p 9. 
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1.4.2 One Tier Model of Implementation 
[ Decision-Makers ] 
Decision-makers are defined as: "those whose authoritative acts are, to 
all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the action 
taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence the state is its 
decision-makers. " 1721 
In this model, decision and implementation are closely integrated. 
Issues of implementation are dealt with ahead of time, at the time of 
decisiön-making. Typically, decision-makers faced with several alternative 
courses of action, look ahead to problems of implementation and rule out 
those that cannot be implemented or those that would cause difficulties in 
implementation. They do not, in this model, choose one alternative, then 
look to its implementation, but considerations of implementation determine 
which alternative is chosen. Of the several simplifying strategies used in 
choosing among alternatives, one is to narrow down the number of 
alternatives being considered, by ruling out those that cannot be 
implemented or those that would provide particular difficulties in 
implementation. Thus issues of implementation are dealt with at the time 
of decision-making, when choice is being made among alternative courses of 
action. This close integration between decision-making and, implementation 
is represented in the one tier model. 
Use of this one tier model of implementation is implicit in Allison's 
analysis of the Cuban missile crisis. Once the presence of the Soviet 
missiles in Cuba was confirmed, a group of fifteen senior members of the 
U. S. administration, the Executive Committee of the National Security 
Council (Ex 
_Com) 
was formed, to decide what actions the U. S. should take in 
response. Six categories of action were considered. One category was that 
of applying diplomatic pressures, such as arraigning the Soviet Union 
before the U. N. Security Council. This was rejected since the Russians 
could veto any course of action proposed by the Security Council. Another 
alternative considered was that of an invasion of Cuba. The fact that 
[72] Snyder, Bruck & Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p 63. 
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there would be problems of implementation, for U. S. troops would have had 
to directly confront 20,000 Soviet troops, led to this alternative being 
rejected. Yet another alternative considered was a surgical air-strike, 
one that would destroy all the missiles and missile sites. It was the Air 
Force's warning that destruction of all the missiles could not be 
guaranteed, that led to the air-strike being ruled out. [73] 
Use of the one tier model is also implicit in Allison's analysis of the 
crisis in terms of the other two models advanced by him, the Organisation 
Process model and the Bureacratic Politics model. Both show that the 
options available to the U. S. were quickly narrowed to two, an air-strike, 
and a blockade. That issues of implementation were considered by the 
decision-makers in choosing among the alternatives, is clear from the 
quote below: 
"Deliberations of leaders in Ex Com meetings produced broad outlines of 
alternatives. Details of the alternatives, and blueprints for their 
implementation, had to be specified by the organisation that would be 
responsible for execution. These organisational outputs effectively 
answered the question: What specifically could be done? " 1741 
What could be done was an important factor in choosing among the 
alternatives. "What effectively foreclosed that option (a surgical air- 
strike) was the Air Force's assertion that the air strike the leaders 
wanted could not be carried out with high confidence of success. " [75] 
Other factors too, were responsible for the air-strike being rejected. 
Robert Kennedy did not want his brother to go down in history as one who 
had ordered a 'Pearl Harbour in reverse'. The Bureaucratic Politics model 
brings out the pulling and hauling that led to the blockade being chosen 
as the U. S. response. However, it is clear, that of the many factors that 
led to the choice of this course of action from among the alternatives' 
considered, problems associated with implementation of other courses' of 
action were an important factor. Thus the model of implementation implicit 
[73] Allison, Essence of Decision, pp 56-62. 
[74+] ibid, p 123. 
1751 ibid, p 124. 
32 
in Allison's analysis is the one tier model, where decision-making and 
implementation are closely"integrated and decision-makers look ahead to 
aspects of implementation at the time they are engaged in the making of 
the decision. 
Another example of the implicit use of the one tier model, is provided 
in Paige's account of the U. S. decision to intervene in Korea. [76] Several 
decisions were taken which together determined the U. S. response to the 
North Korean attack on South Korea. Issues of implementation were 
considered at the time of making the decisions and influenced the 
decisions that were made. 
At the first conference between President Truman and his advisers on 25 
June 1950, Secretary of State Acheson suggested five courses of action, 
which included action by the Air Force (to evacuate American women and 
children), and by the Navy (it was to be ordered to prevent Chinese 
invasion of Formosa), and all the advisers present were asked to comment 
on the proposals. Implementation of these proposals and what it would 
involve, was clearly in President Truman's mind when he asked questions of 
his advisers. He questioned Admiral Sherman about the Seventh Fleet, 
asking how long it would take to bring it into the Straits of Formosa. He 
asked how many divisions the U. S. had in Japan and how long it would take 
to move two or three of them to. Korea. Next he asked the Secretary of the 
Air Force what the disposition of the Air Force was, and how long it would 
take to reinforce U. S. air units in the Far East. 1771 "After listening to 
his advisers discuss Secretary Acheson's recommendations and questioning 
them about the points of information he felt were necessary for decision, 
the President announced his conclusions. " (Emphasis added. ) [781 Among the 
points of information needed for decision were considerations, of 
implementation. 
As the crisis escalated, a second conference was held to discuss what 
further action the U. S. might take to save the Republic of Korea. Again the 
[76] Paige, Korean Decision. 
[77] bid, pp 125-135. 
[78] bid, p 137. 
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Secretary of State made several recommendations which-centred on air and 
sea support, and 'these were discussed. Two generals voiced the opinion that 
American ground troops might be needed. "One of the President's advisers 
expressed the view that if a decision to employ ground forces were taken, 
mobilisation would be required; otherwise the United States could not meet 
its obligations elsewhere throughout the world - especially in vital 
Europe. The United States was limited in whatever help it could give Korea 
to its airplanes and ships in Far Eastern skies and waters and to the four 
understrength divisions deployed in Japan. " [79] 
Thus at the time of making decisions during the Korean crisis, the 
decision-makers looked ahead to problems of implementation of these 
decisions. What the U. S. could do was an important factor in making the 
decisions. Thus, as the one tier model suggests, decision and 
implementation are closely integrated. 
1.4.3 Two Tier Model of Implementation 
Decision-Makers < 
> Implementers 
In this model, decision and implementation are not closely integrated. 
Issues of implementation may be dealt with ahead of time as in the one 
tier model, but it is also recognised that decisions have to be 
implemented by implementers. In the two tier model, it is recognised, that 
after a decision has been made, agents of the government, both individuals 
and organisations have the task of putting it into effect. Typically in 
foreign policy decisions, the Foreign Office of a country is involved in 
implementation, but special agents may be appointed, or organisations may 
be formed. Such a model is implicit in works of decision-making which deal 
explicitly with the implementation of decisions. The arrows indicate that 
there is close interaction between decision-makers and implementers. 
1791 ibid, pp 165-166. 
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Allison and Halperin in setting out the Bureaucratic Politics 
model, [80] stated that the model involves answers to three central 
questions: 1) Who plays? 2) -What determines players stands? 3) How are 
players' stands aggregated to yield decisions and actions of a government? 
The last question can be said to divide into two: i) How are players' 
stands aggregated to yield decisions? ii) How are players' stands 
aggregated to yield actions? There are thus decision games in which 
players manoeuvre to get the result they want, which lead to decisions. 
These are followed by action games which are very similar to decision 
games, for players again see different faces of the issue and manoeuvre to 
get the result they want, and which result in the actions of a government. 
Thus foreign po. licy actions can be divided into two parts, one which leads 
to decisions by senior players and a second part [81] which follows from 
those decisions. 
The difficulties that can arise in implementation are recognised by the 
authors. "Decisions are rarely tailored to facilitate monitoring. As a 
result, senior players have great difficulty in checking on the faithful 
implementation of a decision. " [82] Faithful implementation does not 
always follow for a number of reasons. "In most cases, players will feel 
that the decision leaves them considerable leeway in implementation. 
Players who supported the decision will manoeuvre to see it implemented. 
They may go beyond the spirit if not the letter of the decision. Those who 
opposed the decision, or who oppose the action, will manoeuvre to delay 
implementation, to limit implementation to the letter but not the spirit, 
or even to have the decision disobeyed. " [83] 
The two tier model of implementation is implicit in Halperin's book, 
Bureaucratic Politics, [841 in which he sets out a framework for 
[80] Allison & Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics". 
[81] Allison and Halperin rejected the term implementation though it is 
frequently used to refer to this second part. They rejected it as 
being too narrow, pointing out that actions of a state can take place 
for several reasons, e. g. actions may be the result of routine 
behaviour of organisations. 
[82] Allison & Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics", p53- 
[831 ibid, p53. 
[84] Halperin, M. H. (1974) Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
Washington D. C., Brookings Institution. 
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explaining the decision-making process in the U. S. in the area of national 
security. Part of the book deals explictly with implementation. The 
interaction between decision-makers and implementers, and the role played 
by implementers who can be in favour of or against the decision, are 
brought out. 
If we wish to answer the question, "how does the U. S. act? ", then, 
according to Halperin, we need to explore the relationship between 
presidential decisions and the subsequent actions of government officials. 
This is necessary as faithful implementation of presidential decisions 
does not always occur. He lists three main reasons why decisions may not be 
implemented: 1) Officials may not know what it is they are supposed to do; 
2) They may be unable to do what they have been ordered to do 3) They may 
resist doing what they have been ordered to do. 
Halperin outlines the struggle over implementation. A Presidential 
decision rather than settling the question of what is to be done, opens up 
a new round of manoeuvres. The process which occurs after a presidential 
decision is similar to the process by which a decision is made. The 
participants are often the same as those involved in framing the decision, 
although many more lower-level officials may be involved in 
implementation. Participants will see different faces of the issue, have 
different stakes, and fight for different kinds of action. If they favour 
the action, officials charged with implementation are likely to be able to 
proceed despite the opposition of other groups. If they resist, then the 
problem of implementation is much more difficult. 
Brecher, who, as shown earlier, had recognised the need to study the 
outcomes of decisions, implicitly employed the two tier model outlined 
above, [85] for he examined the working of the Israeli foreign office, the 
principal organisation concerned with implementing Israel's foreign 
policy decisions. Brecher classified foreign policy decisions into 
strategic, tactical, and implementing decisions. The Foreign Office of 
Israel, like all foreign ministries, is concerned with the last category of 
decisions. Its role is to make the correct implementing decisions that 
[85] Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel. 
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will help operationalise strategic and tactical level decisions, decisions 
which are generally made by higher authority. Study of implementation then 
becomes a study of how implementing decisions are made. Brecher examined 
the structure and workings of the Israeli Foreign Office. He describes the 
origins of the Foreign Ministry, its structure, method of recruitment, and 
growth of the Ministry. He deals with the major sources of decision from 
the Foreign Minister downwards and the extent to which each successive 
minister concentrated authority in the minister's office. Thus like 
Halperin, Brecher focuses on the bureaucracy responsible for the 
implementation of foreign policy decisions. 
The two tier model is implicit in Sapolsky's study of how the decision 
to develop the Polaris missile, the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Program 
was implemented in the U. S. The program involved the development, 
procurement and deployment of the Polaris missile, along with attendant 
sub-systems and a force of 41 nuclear-powered submarines. The Polaris 
program is considered an outstanding success; the missile was deployed 
years ahead of the original schedule, submarine building was completed 
rapidly, and there were no cost overruns. 
The book describes the setting up of a new organisation, the Special 
Projects Office (SPO), to manage the program, and examines in detail the 
tactics followed by the members of the SPO to ensure successful 
implementation of the FBM programme. The proponents of Polaris strove to 
secure organisational autonomy. They were aware of, the many ways in which 
projects can fail because of their dependence on cooperation among 
government agencies, each having independent bases of power and having 
conflicting goals and interests. Members of the SPO had two objectives: 1) 
to attract a broad base of support for Polaris both inside and outside the 
Navy; and 2) to prevent the rest of the Navy and the rest of the government 
from interfering in the management of the Polaris programme. 
To achieve these objectives, four bureaucratic strategies were employed 
by the members of the SPO. These strategies were not codified in any 
program document, but an examination of the actions of the Director and 
staff of the SPO, reveals patterns consistent with the four strategies. The 
strategies followed were: 1)Differentiation. A unique demand was created 
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for the FBM system; the SPO tried to show that only their program would 
fulfil a particular national defence need. 2)Cooptation. Potential sources 
of opposition were made to feel part of the program. 3) Moderation. 
Attempts were made to build long-term support by sacrificing short-term 
gains. 4)-Managerial innovation. The SPO invented a number of managerial 
techniques, such as Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT), and 
thus gained a reputation for innovativeness and effectiveness in 
management control, which prevented intervention by high-level outside 
officials. These strategies enabled the proponents of Polaris to promote 
and protect the programme so that Polaris implementation was a success. By 
the end of 1960,2 FBM submarines were in operation and by 1967,41 were 
constructed and deployed. The SPO achieved this with a minimum. of 
interference despite the fact that Polaris was one of the costliest 
projects in U. S. history. 
Thus the above works have implicitly employed the two tier model where 
decisions are seen as being put into effect by implementers who can be 
either the existing bureaucracy or a special organisation set up for this 
purpose. 
1.4.4 Four Tier Model of Implementation 
Analysis of implementation is possible in terms of the one tier and two 
tier models indicated above. It is possible however, to put forward a third 
model, a four tier model, which provides a- better description of the 
complexities of the implementation process. That a two tier model which 
considered decision-makers and implementers may be, inadequate in some 
cases has been recognised. Listing the reasons why decisions may not be 
implemented, Halperin writes that one possible reason may be that 
officials may be unable to do what they have been ordered to do. Sometimes, 
implementation requires -getting another country to do something, and 
officials may find it impossible to implement the decision. [86] Thus 
analysis in terms 'of decision-makers and implementers may be insufficient 
to explain implementation of such decisions. 
[86] Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics, p 242. 
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An, example of a decision in which implementation involved actions by 
other countries is provided by Israel's decision in 1951, to seek and 
accept reparations for Jewish property lost in Europe. [87] In January 
1951, the Government of Israel decided to pursue this objective through 
the four Occupying Powers. This appröach failed. The decision could not be 
implemented as Moscow acknowledged Israel's notes but did not answer them, 
while the Western Powers were sympathetic, but declined to intervene. A 
second decision was then made to enter into direct negotiations with the 
West German government. Implementation of this decision too involved 
getting another country to do something. First, the West German government 
had to agree to pay compensation, then negotiations took place to 
determine the amount of compensation and the manner in which it would be 
paid. A study of the -implementers of Israel's foreign policy and their role 
in the negotiations that led to the final agreement, can tell only part of 
the story. Cases such as this suggest that a model which encompasses 
actors in both countries would be more appropriate in the analysis of 
implementation of some decisions. 
In trying to identify 'administrative limits' (a necessary first step 
in any'attempt to make improvements in administration), Hood shows that 
there can be other 'external' limits to policy implementation. Some 
policies cannot be carried out because the available resources are 
insufficient. Other policies cannot be carried out because they are 
unacceptable for political reasons. Any workable policy must involve both 
resource ' availability and political acceptability, as well as 
'administrability'. Hood distinguishes between three types of external 
limits: 1) Resource limits. These apply to failures in policy 
implementation which are caused by a shortage (relative or absolute) of 
materials, or of money. 2) Political limits. These refer to cases where 
policy implementation fails as a result of the application of power rather 
than by lack of resources or by, unadministerability. 3) Quasi- 
administrative limits. These are a hybrid in that in some cases policy is 
'administrable', but may be politically unacceptable. The reasons for the 
failure of policy turn out to be that the implications of proper policing 
[87] Brecher, M. (1974) Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, London, Oxford 
University Press, Chapter 3. 
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are too unpleasant or too expensive to be accepted, not that thetask is 
inherently impossible. [88] 
The notion of "quasi-administrative" limits on a government's ability 
to implement any policy, indicate that while implementation may involve 
administrative or organisational problems, availability of, resources, as 
well as political acceptability among those affected by implementation of 
the policy, are also important factors. Thus, "quasi-administrative limits 
implicitly recognise that government agents and publics make up a complete 
political arena within which a government must exist". [89] An analysis of 
decision-makers and implementers is important, but other factors such as 
acceptability of the decision among those affected by implementation is 
another factor that needs to be taken into account. An analysis of 
implementation that takes into account decision-makers and implementers, 
cannot explain implementation of decisions in cases where there are other 
limits other than 'administrative limits' present. 
Pressman and Wildavsky, who studied the implementation of a federal 
programme to create jobs for the minorities, were critical of an approach 
that concentrates solely on the implementers, the agents or, operators of 
government policy: 
"One person says that he likes to think of implementation as problems 
that arise when goals are set at high levels of organisational decision 
but are not realised because of resistance or distortion at lower levels 
of organisational performance. We cannot force anyone to accept our choice 
of words or concepts, but we do think it makes more sense to conceive of 
'organisation' in an extended sense so that it encompasses those whose 
cooperation is necessary for a program to be carried out. To us, it seems 
strange to talk of a program as being implemented merely because lower- 
level participants in the sponsoring organisation attempted to carry it 
out though essential support from others was not forthcoming. Support for 
a program within an organisation is but one stage of implementation as we 
[88] Hood, Limits of Administration, Chapter 1. 
[89] Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation", p 119. 
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understand it. " [90] 
The inadequacy of the two-tier model- is recognised by Smith and Clarke 
who state that it is important to study implementation, for the 
perspective involves major shifts of emphasis in the study of foreign 
policy behaviour. One shift of emphasis - "is to see the international 
arena as an area of policy implementation". [91] It is not enough to 
concentrate primarily upon the agents of government, but it is necessary 
to shift to a study of the whole political arena. 
"leaders are- concerned to establish -a coalition of implementing 
agencies to perform aggregate parts of the overall:., function that is 
required, and they must maintain that-coalition over time. Giving orders is 
clearly not enough. " [92] 
The case studies in the book, incorporate this shift in emphasis, and 
recognise the need to extend analysis beyond decision-makers and 
implementers (the two tier model), into the environment in which 
implementation takes place. 
"Most studies of policy implementation have looked primarily at 
policies handled within the distinctive environment of the state. Only a 
few of these studies take seriously the broader environments in which 
policy must be sustained. Even in the foreign policy literature, where the 
environment of policy is clearly more ambiguous and where authority and 
power are equally more uncertain, writers have tended to focus on problems 
of bureaucratic, control and 'co-ordination. Now while" bureaucratic 
difficulties can be a major headache for policy implementation, -the 
central focus of this chapter is on the way in which-the international 
environment of policy distorts, - obstructs, or confounds, decisions, even 
when they are taken by a relatively powerful and-cohesive foreign policy- 
machine in which bureaucratic conflict, -. disobedience, or misunderstanding- 
[90] Pressman & Wildavsky, Implementation, pp xv-xvi. 
[91] Smith & Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour", p 6. 
[92] ibid, P 7. 
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are very limited. " 1931 
That a shift in emphasis to the study of`the whole political arena is 
necessary was self-evident in an analysis of implementation within the 
European Community. 
"Studying implementation within the EC, however,: does provide one 
important advantage. Much of the debate among students of implementation 
is concerned with the validity or otherwise of adopting .. a 'top-down', 
hierarchical perspective. While much of the early writing on 
implementation did assume that implementation was simply that which 
followed decision-making in a neat sequential manner, and sought to 
prescribe effective -solutions to problems of securing control and 
compliance within a hierarchical framework, more recent studies have 
argued that this is an oversimplistic approach .... All these authors are 
fighting against the implicit assumption that, within a unitary 
organisation or single nation-state, implementation is simply a problem of 
authority. When looking at the EC, we have no need to dispel such an 
assumption, as (in most cases) the EC has no such effective authority, and 
must proceed by bargaining and consensus-building. " [94] 
Thus the case studies bring out the need to extend the two tier model, 
to include both implementers, those responsible for implementing a policy, 
and target parties, those affected by the implementation of a decision or 
policy. 
All these factors suggest that a model of implementation, that goes 
beyond decision-makers and implementers and extends into the 'whole 
political arena' may be needed in the analysis of 'implementation of some 
decisions. This` is necessary, to take into account the role played in 
implementation by the actors affected by implementation, both individuals 
and organisations. Such a model is sketched below. 
(93] Farrands. C. (1985) "'Diamonds and Impotence': the Implementation - of 
Giscard d'Estaing's African Policies", in Smith & Clarke,,, (eds) 
Foreign Policy Implementation, p 72. 
(94] Allen, D. & Byrne, P. (1985) "Multilateral Decision-Making, and 
Implementation: The Case of the European Community", in Smith & 
Clarke (eds) Foreign Policy Implementation pp 123-124. 
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> Interested Parties < 
> Decision-Makers < 
> Implementers < 
> Target Parties < 
Decision-makers and implementers are the same as in the earlier two 
tier model. Included in the four tier model are 2 more categories of actors 
- interested parties and target parties. These last two categories of 
actors enable the environment in which the decision is made, and the 
environment in which the decision is implemented, to be included in the 
model. While everything in these environments could be considered 
relevant, it is useful for analysis to consider only those parties that 
become directly involved in the process. For example, in an analysis of 
decision-making within-the Conservative Party during the years 1929-34, 
Ghosh found that though there was a formal structure of decision-making 
within the party, in practice, various pressure groups become involved and 
they 'are as much part of the decision-making process as are the formal 
institutions of the party. [95] In setting out the Bureaucratic Politics 
model, Allison and Halperin write that in the 'game' of decision-making, 
there is a central circle of senior and junior players, but outside these 
are groups such as influential Congressmen, members of the press, and other 
interest groups. These groups too can enter the 'game' and participate in 
it. [96] Thus the role played by interest groups in decision-making has 
been recognised. The model extends into the environment in which the 
decision is implemented. Here, target parties, those affected by 
implementation, can become involved in the process of implementation along 
with the implementers, those formally charged with implementation of a 
decision. 
The model, like all models, is an oversimplified presentation of 
reality. The categories of actors in it are artificially defined. In 
reality, it is difficult to make clear-cut distinctions between decision- 
[95] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power. 
[96] Allison & Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics", p 47. 
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makers and implementers. Decision-makers and implementers can move between 
the boxes, being decision-makers at one point of time in the process, and 
acting as implementers at another. The Secretary of State for India, 
provides an example of one, who, as a member of the Cabinet, was a decision- 
maker, and was also at the head of the hierarchy of implementers. 
The arrows in the model indicate that there is interaction among all 
the four categories of actors throughout the process. The model suggests 
that there is no neat cut-off point at the moment of decision. Interested 
parties, for example, will not only try and influence decision-makers (as 
has been recognised in the literature), but even after the decision has 
been made, will try and influence implementers and target parties. They 
will try and get the decision implemented if they are in favour, and they 
will try to prevent it from being implemented if they are opposed. Target 
parties will be affected by the actions of other parties, but will in their 
turn, try and influence these parties. They may try to influence decision- 
makers at the time the decision is made, and they may seek allies among 
interested parties. They may also try and influence implementers so that 
the decision is implemented in a way that is favourable to them. The 
existing literature on implementation suggests that target parties can, 
and do play an active role in implementation. 
Thus the four tier model depicts implementation as a continuous 
process. Four broad groups or categories of actors are involved and these 
try to influence the process as it unfolds over time. 
The four tier model is to be tested against case studies of 
implementation of three decisions, all three contained within the 
Government of India Act, 1935. The model suggests that a study of 
implementation would involve a study of decision-makers, implementers, 
interested parties and target parties and of the interactions between 
these groups of actors. Since this involved actors in both Britain, and 
India, the task of studying who is involved, the stands adopted by them and 
an analysis of the interactions between them, would be a daunting one. One 
way of simplifying analysis is to test the model with a set of 
propositions about implementation. 
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The model is-tested by asking one fundamental question: What are the 
factors that are likely to be conducive to implementation, and what are 
the factors that are likely to, be antithetical to implementation? The 
propositions set out below help to answer this central question. 
1.4.5 Propositions 
1. The longer the time taken over the decision, greater the chances of 
opposition to the decision, as there is more time available for opposition 
to form, and thus the greater the likelihood of controversy. 
2. Greater the controversy at the time of decision, greater the chances 
of opposition being carried through to implementation and thus greater the 
difficulties in implementation. 
3. Greater the controversy at the time of decision, the less the chances 
of successful implementation, as there would be less willingness to reopen 
or amend a decision reached after long negotiations, hence reducing the 
room for manoeuvre. 
4. More open the decision, the greater would be the difficulties in 
implementation. Decisions are often intentionally open as this may be the 
only way to make a decision acceptable to those responsible for making it. 
5. The greater the amount of time available for implementation, more the 
chances for opposition to make itself felt, and therefore the less the 
chances of successful implementation. 
6. The greater the number of parties involved in implementation, the 
less the likelihood of the decision being implemented. Bargaining among 
the parties would need to be resolved by compromise, and greater the 
number of parties involved, the greater the difficulty in reaching a 
compromise. 
7. Lower the level of cooperation received from implementers, greater 
will be the problems in implementation. 
8. The greater the ability of target parties to resist, the greater will 
be the problems in implementation. 
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9. The longer the chain of command, the greater would be the 
difficulties in implementation. Decisions are rarely tailored to 
facilitate monitoring, and as a result, senior players have great 
difficulty in checking on the faithful implementation of a decision. 
10. Greater the number of actors involved in both decision and 
implementation, the greater the chances of successful implementation. A 
corollary of this is that ambassadors and field commanders do not feel 
obliged to faithfully implement decisions because they are not usually 
involved in the making of the decision. 
11. Organisations get involved in implementation in fairly regularised 
ways. Where a decision leaves leeway for the organisation that is 
implementing it, that organisation will act so as to maximise its 
organisational interests. This will create difficulties in implementation 
if the organisation is opposed and further implementation if it is in 
favour. 
12. Interest groups tend to get involved in implementation on an ad hoc 
basis and on particular, discrete issues, and act so as to protect or 
advance those interests which are the raison d'etre of their group. The 
greater the involvement of such groups, the greater the difficulties in 
implementation. 
13. Interest groups will have influence when there is an ideological 
connection between them and those whose task it is to implement decisions, 
the implementers. Such groups will not be able to influence officials if 
they, are in ideological or political conflict with them. There is 
generally a close affinity between officials and the individual or group 
whose position they are persuaded to support. 
14. Domestic pressures or even anticipation of such pressures can 
hinder implementation as they can restrict a government's ability to act. 
The propositions set out above do not add up to a complete picture of 
the implementation process, but they do draw attention to factors that can 
affect implementation. The propositions suggest that what happens at the 
time the decision is made has important consequences for implementation. 
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If the period over which the decision was taken was long, there is time for 
opposition to form and this opposition can be carried through and can 
cause difficulties in implementation. Thus it is necessary to study the 
amount of time taken over a decision and to investigate whether there was 
controversy over it. The nature of the decision, whether it is closed or 
open, can affect implementation, and it is also necessary to examine if 
efforts were made to reopen or amend the decision. The amount of time 
available for implementation, the number of actors involved and whether 
these actors were involved in both decision and implementation, all these 
are important factors in implementation. The propositions suggest that 
successful implementation needs cooperation from both implementers and 
target parties. Organisations and interest groups can get involved in 
implementation, and both the manner of their involvement and their 
influence on the implementation process, are worthy of investigation. In 
short, the propositions lead to an examination of the role played in 
implementation by decision-makers, implementers, interested parties and 
target parties, the four categories of actors in the four tier model of 
implementation. The propositions raise a number of questions to which 
answers are sought in the case studies. 
In a recent book which examines several case studies of 
implementation, [97] a set of questions as to the nature of implementation 
were set out in the opening chapter to serve "as a guideline for the 
research and analysis of the case studies". [98] Briefly, these questions 
were as follows: 
1. What issues were involved? This required a historical outline of the 
issue to be examined. 
2. What decisions were involved? Were the decisions crisis or routine? 
Were they concerned with military, political or economic issues? 
3. What were the actual decisions? What decisions were taken, when and 
by whom? 
[97] Smith & Clarke, Foreign Policy Implementation, pp 9-10. 
[98] Smith & Clarke, Foreign Policy Implementation, pp 9-10. ° 
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4. How was the implementation of the decision attempted? 
5. What were the results of the attempt at implementation? 
The propositions about implementation set out in this chapter also 
raise a number of questions to which answers are sought in the analysis of 
the case studies that follow. These go beyond the five questions set out 
above and ask more detailed questions about the implementation process. 
1.5 The use of case studies to build theory 
The use of case studies to build theory is a method that transcends the 
scientific vs historical debate, for it involves elements of both. While 
each historical case that is analysed will be unique, it can be used to 
make more general statements about the phenomenon in question. 
"The interests of the behavioral scientist, however, do lead him to 
attempt to go beyond a narrative of events and the enumeration of relevant 
factors into a search for explanatory theory that transcends the bounds of 
the particular case. He seeks, like the poet Stanley Kunitz, 'to crack the 
kernel of the particular in order to liberate the universal', or like Walt 
Whitman, 'to leap beyond, yet nearer bring'. From this point of view, the 
reconstruction and analysis of a single empirical case are instruments by 
which to advance the building of theory. If there are general laws of human 
behaviour, then even a single case offers an opportunity for potential 
insight into them. " [99] 
It is thus both possible and useful to attempt to formulate a more 
theoretically relevant concept of the single case to guide political 
research. Paige lists several ways in which case studies can be used to 
build theoretically relevant concepts. Possible theoretical uses of single 
case research are: - the assembling of an empirical basis from which 
theoretical propositions may be induced with or without an explicit a 
priori frame of reference, the provision of an empirical test of pre- 
existing propositions; and the establishment of an empirical basis for 
1991 Paige, Korean Decision, p 10. 
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creating a conceptual framework or typology. Paige himself-applied the 
Snyder, Bruck and Sapin decision-making framework to the U. S. decision to 
intervene in Korea in June 1950. It should be noted however, that Paige's 
application is concerned with the effect of crisis on the three variable 
clusters suggested by the Snyder framework rather than with how these 
three variable clusters - spheres of competence, communication and 
information, and motivation - affect decision-making behaviour. [1001 
Eckstein distinguished among the several types of case studies and the 
different uses they have. He uses the term configurative-idiographic to 
describe a case study couched in idiosyncratic terms that are specific 
only to that case. A disciplined-configurative study on the other hand is 
one which is couched in terms of general variables. The former would have 
an idiographic (individually interpretative) emphasis, while the latter 
would be nomothetic (generalising, rule-seeking). [101] The use of case 
studies to build theory involves the disciplined-configurative mode of 
analysis. The uniqueness of the event is recognised, but the case is 
described and analysed in terms of general variables. This permits 
comparison with other cases and cumulation of findings which is not 
possible with the configurative-idiographic method of analysis. 
Alexander George has built on earlier works such as that by Eckstein to 
put forward a method of building theory through analysis of a small number 
of cases, a strategy he terms 'stuctured focused comparison' which involves 
'controlled comparison' of a few appropriately selected cases. [102] 
George sets out clearly what such an approach involves, namely, a 
combination of the historical and, behavioural methods, gives the 
advantages to be gained by this approach, and outlines the steps to be 
taken in carrying out a 'controlled comparison'. Some of the arguments in 
this important article are summarised below. 
[100]See Sullivan, M. P. (1976) International Relations, London, Prentice- 
Hall, pp 68-69. 
[101]Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science", pp 96-104. 
[102]George, A. L. (1979) "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method 
of Structured, Focused Comparison" in Lauren, P. G. (ed) Diplomacy, New 
York, The Free Press. 
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Development of historically grounded theory could not take place while 
there was considerable controversy about whether the historical or 
behavioural method was best suited to the study of international 
relations. Historians stressed the uniqueness of each case, pointed out 
that history does not repeat itself, and viewed with suspicion efforts by 
political scientists and others to generalise from historical case 
studies. Political scientists on the other hand were drawn to the 
behavioural approach and argued that one can deal with unique cases by 
treating them as members of a class or type of phenomenon one is seeking 
to understand better, such as deterrence, alliance formation, or crisis 
decision-making. This controversy has given way to a consensus that the 
two approaches are complementary, that they perform different tasks, both 
of which are needed. 
At first there were optimistic expectations of the behavioural 
approach, but difficulties encountered in attempts at theory building have 
led political scientists to believe that a variety of methods, both 
qualitative as well as quantitative, must be employed to develop theory. 
For example, difficulties were encountered in efforts to develop 
generalisations via statistical analysis of a large number of cases of a 
given type or phenomenon. While generalisations or laws were sought that 
applied to all cases of a particular type, the study of particular cases 
led to the addition of more and more variables which led to an explanation 
tailored to each case. This did not lead to the conclusion that the quest 
for theory and generalisations was infeasible, that henceforth only 
atheoretical single case studies should be undertaken. "Rather the 
solution to this apparent impasse is to formulate the idiosyncratic 
aspects of the explanation for each case in terms of general 
variables. " (103] (Emphasis in original. ) Thus the uniqueness of the 
explanation is recognised, but it is described in more general terms. 
The use of case studies to build theory helps us to draw the correct 
lessons from history. Lessons of history are often inconsistent, sometimes 
contradictory, and generalisations are therefore hazardous. People often 
disagree as to what is the correct lesson to be drawn from a particular 
-------- -------- 
1103]ibid, p 46. 
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historical experience. Secondly, people often misapply lessons learnt from 
one case to a 'new situation that differs from the past one in important 
respects. But historical- experience' can be utilised to deal with 
contemporary situations that bear a resemblance to past historical cases. 
This can be done by: "stating lessons in a systematic and differentiated 
way from a broader range of experience that deliberately draws upon a 
variety of historical cases. In other words, the task is to convert 
'lessons of history' into a comprehensive theory that encompasses the 
complexity of the phenomenon or activity in question. " [104] (Emphasis in 
original. ) 
Theory helps to show the similarities between historical events and 
also helps in identifying the differences between them, so that correct 
analogies can be made. 
"Theory attempts to absorb the 'lessons' of a variety of historical 
cases within a single framework; it is the task of theory to identify the 
many conditions and variables that affect historical outcomes and to sort 
out the causal patterns associated with different historical outcomes. By 
doing so, theory accounts for the variance in historical outcomes; it 
clarifies the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions among the 
'lessons' of different cases by identifying the critical conditions and 
variables that differed from one case to the other". 11051 
The use of case studies to develop theoretical concepts, involves 
adoption of an analytical inductive approach. This is. different from the 
deductive approach in which historical cases are used to illustrate 
general points deduced from abstract models and theories. In the inductive 
approach, generalisations are induced from systematic examination of 
historical cases. The deductive approach, it has been recognised, can 
present difficulties. Early theories of deterrence and coercion were, 
developed as deductivist products of decision and game theory and were not 
well grounded in historical experience, and, as subsequent empirical work 
showed, offered only rudimentary explanations for why and when deterrence 
[104]ibid, p 43. 
[105]ibid, p 44. 
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and coercive efforts could be expected to be successful. This would not 
have presented serious problems if the theories had been offered only for 
heuristic purposes, in fact, they were presented as prescriptive theories 
which could serve as guides to policy-making. 
"As a result of this experience, many political scientists now have a 
better appreciation of the limits of formal deductivist approaches as a 
strategy for developing policy-relevant theory and the utility of 
analytical induction as an alternative approach for this purpose. " [106] 
It is thus both possible and useful, to attempt to build theory through 
analysis of single case studies. Explanations for each case are set out in 
terms of general variables, and this enables comparison with other cases. 
"The circumstances and paraphernalia will differ between the 
Peloponnesian War and World War II, but the patterns of human fears and 
anxieties and perceptions of threat and injury may not be dissimilar. A 
fundamental part of the problem lies in identifying the levels of 
abstraction at which problems or events that are widely separated in time 
and space are found to be similar. " 11071 
Alexander George, has, as stated earlier, put forward a method of using 
case studies towards theory building, through analysis of a small number 
of cases, a method that involves structured, focused comparison. The 
procedure to be followed in carrying out such a study is outlined by 
George and is briefly summarised below. Concentration on a small number of 
cases permits both, an in-depth investigation and a comparison between the 
cases chosen for analysis. 
In carrying out a structured, focused comparison, the investigator must 
first select appropriate cases for in-depth investigation. He must define 
clearly the type of event or phenomenon that is to be studied and select 
cases accordingly. They must all be instances of a phenomenon the 
investigator wishes to study or theorise about, such as instances of 
[106]ibid, p 48. 
[107]Holsti, Brody & North, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", p 
124. 
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coercive diplomacy or instances of alliance formation. The cases selected 
must be instances of the same class or universe, one must not mix apples 
and oranges. 
Having selected appropriate cases for intensive analysis, the 
investigator must be selective and focused in his treatment of the cases 
being studied. 
"It is the investigator's theoretical and/or practical interest which 
should define what aspects of a historical case he singles out for 
description and explanation. One reason why single case studies in the 
past contributed so little to theory development was that they either 
lacked a common focus or a common approach to the study of a given type of 
problem. In analysing a historical case, the investigator often attempted 
to do justice to all those aspects of it that were particularly 
interesting or unusual, or on which reasonably good historical data was 
available. There was no assurance, therefore, that those aspects of the 
case relevant for developing a particular kind of theory would be included 
or treated adequately in the case study. " [108] 
In the method of structured focused comparison, the investigator uses 
selected data, rather than all the data that is available. He selects 
certain aspects of the case for analysis and these in turn are determined 
by his theoretical interests. By being selective in the aspects of the 
case that he analyses, by choosing a focus for the study, the investigator 
makes the study comparable to other investigations, and cumulation of 
findings becomes possible. 
The procedure for employing a research strategy of structured focused 
comparison can be split up into three phases. In phase one, the design and 
structure of the study are formulated. First, the investigator must 
specify the kind of phenomenon or behaviour that he is-'singling out for 
examination, then specify the variables that will be examined in the study. 
Appropriate cases are selected for examination and in phase two, the case 
studies are carried out in accord with the design. The investigator 
[108]George, "Case Studies and Theory Development", p 50. 
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develops a historical explanation for the outcome in the cases being 
examined, but transforms the specific explanation into the concepts 
comprising the conditions and independent variables of the theoretical 
framework specified in phase one. In phase three, the investigator 
concludes the study by drawing upon the results of the investigation in 
order to assess, reformulate, or elaborate the initial theory. The method 
outlined above employs a research strategy of structured, focused 
comparison; the method is structured because it employs general questions 
to guide data collection, and it is focused because it deals with selected 
aspects of the cases being studied. 
This study involves an application of the method of structured, focused 
comparison. It involves a study of implementation, and the implementation 
of three decisions is examined. The decisions, though separate, and easily 
identifiable as such, were incorporated within one Act, the Government of 
India Act, 1935. The outcomes in the cases chosen for analysis were 
different, two of the decisions were implemented, and one was not 
implemented. Thus a comparison between cases of successful and 
unsuccessful implementation is possible and this should enable 
investigation of whether the factors set out as a series of propositions 
did or did not affect implementation. Thus the cases selected are 
particularly appropriate and interesting for study. In addition, as 
indicated earlier, the Act was an important development in modern Indian 
history, and non-implementation of one of the major decisions had far- 
reaching consequences for the future of the subcontinent. While three is a 
small number of cases to study, it can nonetheless provide a basis for 
comparison. 
"The desideratum that guides selection of cases in the controlled 
comparison approach is not numbers but variety, that is, cases belonging to 
the same class that differ from each other. Thus the investigator in 
designing the study will either seek cases in which the outcome of the 
dependent variable differed or cases having the same outcome but 'a 
different explanation for it. " [1091 
[ 109]ibid, p 60. 
54 
Two of the three cases of implementation examined had the same outcome, 
they were implemented, while the third had a different outcome, it was not 
implemented. 
Each of the case studies is guided by the model and by the propositions 
set out earlier in the chapter. In each case, answers are sought to 
questions raised by the propositions. Some of these questions relate to 
the making of the decision. Was the decision taken over a long or short 
period of time? Was there controversy at the time the decision was made? 
These factors, the propositions suggest, may have important effects on the 
implementation of those decisions. Other questions concern the decision 
itself: Was it open or closed? What was the length of time available for 
implementation? Was any attempt made to reopen the decision? Questions are 
asked about who was involved in implementation, and of the role played in 
the implementation process by interested parties, decision-makers, 
implementers and target parties, the four categories of actors, that the 
four tier model suggests are involved in the process. 
Specific questions and answers are however, not-sought-in each case for 
two reasons; one, this would break up and fragment the narrative of events 
and two, it would prevent examination of the idiosyncratic features of 
each case. The restrictive effect of setting out case studies in the form 
of questions and answers was recognised by George and Smoke. [110] In 
applying the method of structured focused comparison, George and Smoke, 
set out eight questions which can be asked of the cases of deterrence 
chosen by them for analysis, questions which show the sequence of 
deterrence efforts and probes. However, explicit lists of questions and 
answers are omitted in the analysis of the cases in the interests of 
readability. There is some uniformity in the presentation of the cases, but 
where necessary, aspects idiosyncratic to a particular case are dealt with 
in detail. 
A strategy similar to the structured focused comparison method, was 
adopted by Brecher in examining two crisis decisions in Israel's foreign 
[110]George, A. L. & Smoke, R. (1974) Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 
New York, Columbia University Press. 
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policy, during 1967 and 1973, though he labels it "structured empiricism". 
Brecher too sets out a list of 9 questions which guide the inquiry. The 
data for the two crises is however structured not according to these 9 
questions, but by employing the framework for the research of foreign 
policy behaviour, developed by Brecher earlier. The case studies are then 
utilised to make comparisons between decision-making behaviour during the 
pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. [111] 
Smith & Clarke too, though they set out a number of questions to guide 
research and analysis of the case studies of implementation put together 
in a recent work on implementation, "decided that it would be unrealistic 
to set out a rigid framework of implementation within which each of the 
case studies could be examined; " [112] 
The case studies examined in this thesis are also not set out as 
answers to the specific questions raised by the propositions. Comparison 
between the cases will be made after the exposition of the case studies. 
The study will investigate whether there was a similarity in the two cases 
of successful implementation, and ask in what way the case of unsuccessful 
implementation differed from these two cases. 
1.6 Historical background. Setting the scene. 
Before turning to the three case studies of implementation examined in 
this thesis, namely the three decisions incorporated in the 1935 Act and 
their implementation, it is necessary to go back in time a little, for the 
Act was a continuation of a process begun much earlier by which 
responsibility for Indian affairs was sought to be transferred into Indian 
hands. A brief sketch of earlier constitutional developments sets the 
scene, but first an unusual feature of the Raj, the dual nature of the 
control it exercised over its subjects is noted. 
[111]Brecher, Decisions in Crisis. 
[112]Smith & Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour", p 9. 
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1.6.1 Dual nature of control - provinces and states. 
Within a hundred years of Clive's laying the foundations of the British 
Empire, the whole of India (except Nepal, also the small enclaves of Goa, 
which was Portuguese, and Pondicherry, which was French) was under British 
rule. There were, however, two distinct and separate methods of, control, a 
duality brought about by the two separate means by which the territories 
had been brought under British rule, and these persisted till the end of 
the Raj. 11131 
About 3/5 of the country was subject to direct British administration. 
Over the years, these territories had been annexed (to the British Crown) 
through war and conquest or by taking over territories by applying the 
notorious 'Doctrine of Lapse' (by which the title of the ruling dynasty was 
held to have lapsed through lack of lawful heirs). These annexed 
territories formed the provinces of British India [114] and like the other 
colonies of the British Empire, were under the control of Parliament. 
Parliamentary control was exercised through the Secretary of State for 
India, who in turn acted through the Governor-General or Viceroy. [115] 
Major changes could only be brought about by Parliament, but the, Governor- 
General had the authority to make the multitude of minor laws needed to 
deal with local matters. Neither the central, nor any provincial 
government could introduce any bill unless it had been approved by the 
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State also exercised tight control 
over the finances of the central government and through it over the 
finances of the provinces. Thus legislative and financial means were used 
to maintain overall control over the territories of British India, though 
matters of day-to-day administration were left to the government in India. 
[113]Coupland, R. (1942) The Indian Problem 1833-1935, London, Oxford 
University Press, Chapter I; Menon, V. P. (1956) The Story of the 
Integration of the Indian States, Calcutta, Orient Longmans Ltd, pp 1- 
12. 
[114]See map p viii. 
[115]Where the Governor-General was referred to as the statutory head of 
the Government of India, he was designated as Governor-General; where 
he was regarded as representative of the Sovereign, he was spoken of 
as Viceroy. The distinction between the two titles was blurred, and 
the terms were used interchangeably. The term Viceroy was first used 
in the Royal Proclamation of 1858. 
57 
The other 2/5 of the country was subject to indirect rule, these were 
the princely states, [116] and were often referred to as 'Indian India'. 
These had been brought under British rule by a system of subsidiary 
alliances instituted by Wellesley and continued by succeeding Viceroys. 
Under these subsidiary alliances, the hereditary rulers maintained control 
over the domestic affairs of their states, but accepted the suzerainty of 
the Crown, and surrendered all control over external affairs to the 
Paramount Power. In return they received protection against external 
aggression and internal rebellion. A British Resident was installed in 
every state which accepted a subsidiary alliance. Thus the relationship of 
the states with the British Government was very different from that of the 
provinces. Their territories had not been annexed, and relations with the 
Crown were governed by agreements concluded in the past. 
The rulers retained their domestic autonomy, their territory did not 
become British soil, nor their subjects British subjects. Neither 
Parliament in Britain, nor any legislature set up by it in India was 
entitled to make laws for the internal government of the states. At the 
same time, the rulers were not fully sovereign. They could not make war or 
carry on negotiations with any other states without the permission of the 
Paramount Power, which also retained the right to intervene in states' 
affairs - 'the Governor-General was present by proxy in every State'. 
Thus the provinces and states differed both in their form of government 
and in their relations with the Raj. The provinces were in subjection, 
complete in law and considerable in practice, to the supreme authority of 
the central government and the Secretary of State. The states too were 
subordinate to the Paramount Power, but the subordination was much more 
limited since they retained control over their domestic affairs. In the 
provinces, the power of the central government permeated everywhere, in 
the states it could be exercised in their internal affairs only in 
exceptional circumstances. There was thus a basic dualism in the structure 
of the British Raj, which was separated into British India and Indian 
India. 
[116]See map p viii. 
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It had however, not been possible to separate the two completely, since 
geographically, the states and provinces were closely intertwined. There 
were inevitably matters of common concern for both Indias, the railways 
provide an obvious example. On such matters, the government was able to 
legislate for the provinces, 'but needed to secure the agreement of the 
states and this had to be done through bargaining. The states were thus in 
a position to obtain privileges and concessions, while the provinces were 
not. For example, the Government of India would have been unable to 
effectively impose customs duties if states along the coast had continued 
to import goods without imposition of any duties. Maritime states had 
agreed to impose the same customs duties as those levied at British Indian 
ports, but in return they had been permitted to keep some of the proceeds. 
The duties collected at ports in the provinces on the other hand, went 
directly to the central government. 
The dual nature of control exercised by the British Raj had important 
consequences for the implementation of the decisions examined in this 
thesis. One of the decisions, the proposed all-India federation sought to 
bring together both Indias, but the government exercised different degrees 
of control over the target parties in British India and those in Indian 
India. For the states, relations were conducted through a Political 
Department set up under the direct charge of the Governor-General. The 
Political Department had Residents and Political Agents in all the 
important states and groups of states. 
The system of governing British India and the changes that had been 
brought about over the years are dealt with briefly in the next 
subsection. No attempt is made to trace political developments, but a 
sketch of constitutional developments provides the necessary background 
for this study. 
1.6.2 Events leading to the 1935 Act. 
The shock of the mutiny in 1857 brought major changes in Britain's 
control over its Indian empire. In 1858, ' the East India Company was 
abolished and Parliament assumed direct control over British rule in 
India. The mutiny had revealed the necessity of establishing closer 
59 
contacts between British rulers and Indian subjects. Only by establishing 
closer contacts with those whom it governed, could the government become 
aware, by other means than violent rebellion, of prevalent Indian opinion. 
Legislation was undertaken to expand, and if necessary, establish 
Legislative Councils, both at the centre and in the provinces. Many of the 
additional members were to be chosen from outside the ranks of the civil 
service, they were to be 'non-officials' and most were Indians. The 
majority in the Councils were still officials, and all non-officials were 
nominated by the government. The legislative councils continued to be 
unrepresentative of Indian opinion. By the appointment of Indians to the 
legislatures, the government merely sought to increase the association of 
Indians with the government. [117] 
It was not till 1909 that moves towards representative government were 
made and that the principle of election was recognised, both at the centre 
as well as in the provinces. The 'Indian Councils Act of 1909, [118] also 
known as the Morley-Minto Reforms (after the Secretary of State and 
Viceroy respectively), led to the existing councils being expanded. 
Provision was made for the election of the majority of non-official 
members, both in the central and provincial legislative councils. The 
method by which these members were elected was that of indirect elections; 
those at the centre were elected by the provinces, and those in the 
provinces were elected by a variety of public bodies, such as 
municipalities and district boards. 
Together with the expansion of the councils, the number of non- 
officials was increased. A small official majority was retained at the 
centre, but in all the provinces the officials were outnumbered by the 
nominated plus the elected members. This non-official majority in the 
provinces was not effective as the government could usually rely on the 
support of the nominated members. 
[117]Coupland, Indian Problem p 21. 
[118]Spear, P. (1965) The Oxford History of Modern India 1740-1947, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, pp 329-332; Misra, B. B. (1970) The 
Administrative History of India 1834-1947, Bombay, Oxford University 
Press, pp 49-58. 
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There were no changes'in the executive. The government could enforce 
its will at the centre through its official majority and in the provinces 
through the powers of the governors. 
The Act of 1909 continued the earlier trend of British policy which was 
opposed to conceding any form of government comparable to a colonial 
constitution. The provinces continued to be no more than agents of the 
centre, and the centre was in turn, subordinate to the Secretary of State. 
The Act is notable for the introduction of the principle of election 
and for the concession of separate electorates for Muslims. The Muslims 
had asked Lord Minto, the Viceroy, for representation of Muslim interests 
through special constituencies. Special constituencies for Muslims were 
created at the Centre and the Provinces, and the principle, once conceded, 
was continued thereafter and : "It may perhaps be described as the 
official germ of Pakistan". [119] 
It was, it is generally agreed, the first World War which provided the 
impetus for an advance from representative government to responsible 
government. In the first place, Indian contribution to the war effort was 
substantial in terms of men, money and materials, and came from both the 
provinces and the states. Secondly, the magnitude of the Indian effort, 
together with the fact that the Allies were fighting to preserve freedom 
and democracy against attack from Germany, meant that the British 
Government had to make some response to the demands of Indian 
nationalists. A third contributory factor, was that the defeat of Turkey 
brought together Hindus and Muslims in the Khilafat movement, thus 
strengthening nationalist demands for responsible government. All these 
factors meant that the British Government had to consider an advance in 
its Indian policy. [120] 
Despite its preoccupations with the war, the Cabinet in London approved 
a statement that was made by the Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, in the 
House of Commons on 20 August 1917. It was a historic announcement which 
[119 ]Spear, History Modern India, p 332. 
[120]Coupland, Indian Problem, pp 51-52; Spear, History Modern India, pp 
335-336.1 
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committed Britain to the development of self-government in India: 
"The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of 
India are- in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of 
Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development 
of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation 
of responsible government in India as an integral part of-the British 
Empire .... 
I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by 
successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on 
whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian 
peoples, must be the judges of time and measure of each advance, " [1211 
The announcement stressed that the process by which India was to gain 
self-government was to be a slow one. Britain had conceded ultimate self- 
government for India, but the Congress was demanding immediate home rule. 
Thus though both acknowledged the same aim, there were differences between 
them about the rate of progress by which these were to be achieved. This 
difference was to continue and to be a crucial factor 
in the future when 
further moves towards self-government were planned.. [ 1221 
After the announcement, the Secretary of State toured India and 
together with the Viceroy, Chelmsford, produced a Report on Indian 
Constitutional Reforms. Its recommendations were incorporated in the 
Government of India Act of 1919. Some of the main features of the Act are 
briefly summarised below, as it introduced a measure of responsible 
government and provided the starting point for the next, set of 
constitutional reforms. The reforms of 1919 introduced a small measure of 
responsible government and the next set of reforms could only go forward 
from this position. 
Government of India Act, 1919 - The main features of the Act were that 
it gave the provinces independent powers, by devolution from the centre and 
[121]Philips, C. H. (1962) The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947 : 
Select Documents, London, Oxford University Press, pp 264-265. 
[122]Spear, History Modern India, pp 339-340. 
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that it granted limited self-government' to the provinces by a device known 
as dyarchy. 
There were 9 Governors provinces - Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United 
Provinces, Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces, Assam, and 
Burma. There were also 7 other territories left in charge of Chief 
Commissioners who acted as agents of the Central Government; these were - 
NWFP, Baluchistan, and the minor units of Delhi, Coorg, Ajmer-Merwara, and 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Before 1919, the provinces had been 
subordinate to the centre in both finance and legislation. Under the Act 
of 1919, devolution of authority to the provinces was effected by"a 
division of subjects into central and provincial. Demarcation between the 
central and provincial fields was identical for all the"provinces. The 
central government was to be responsible for subjects such as defence, 
foreign affairs, customs and railways, and relations with the princely 
states. Provincial governments were to be responsible for subjects such as 
police, prisons and administration of justice (law and order), public 
health, education, agriculture and land revenue. 
Self-government was introduced in the provinces by means of 'dyarchy'. 
The provincial subjects were further subdivided into 'reserved' and 
'transferred' and this division differed between the various provinces. 
'Reserved' subjects which included justice, police and prisons, land 
revenue administration and labour matters were to be administered by the 
Governor. 'Transferred' subjects which included local self-government, 
agriculture and fisheries, education and public health, were to be 
administered by Ministers who were responsible to the provincial 
legislatures. This distribution of executive powers in the-provinces, 
between the Governor-in-Council, and the Governor acting with the advice 
of his Ministers responsible to the provincial legislature, was called 
dyarchy. 
Provincial legislatures could legislate on subjects specified as 
provincial, but the Central legislature remained entitled to legislate 
over all subjects. Bills passed by a provincial legislature required the 
assent of the Governor and of the Governor-General, so that'both had 'the 
power of veto. In addition, the Governor could, in the case of a Bill 
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relating to a reserved subject, 'certify' that its passage was essential 
for the discharge of his responsibility for that subject. If the 
provincial council refused to consider or pass such a bill, he could treat 
the Bill as though it had been actually passed by the legislature, though 
any such measure had to be laid before Parliament. 
At the Centre, the Governor-General continued to be responsible to the 
Secretary of State and to Parliament. The legislature was expanded. and 
reconstituted on a bicameral basis. The lower house was tobe known as the 
Legislative Assembly and to have 145 members, 104 elected and 41 nominated 
members. The upper house, or Council of State had 60 members with an 
unofficial majority. Since the majority of the members of the legislature 
were now elected, provision was made for the enactment of measures in 
special circumstances without normal approval of both chambers. The 
Viceroy had reserve powers to overcome any deadlocks that might arise in 
the legislature. The Viceroy could pass bills and carry them into law over 
the heads of the legislature if they were certified to be necessary for 
the safety and tranquillity of India and to authorise expenditure in the 
same way. In addition, certain heads of expenditure such as defence were 
not subject to popular vote. 
The existence of separate electorates was continued and the principle 
was extended to cover other communities - Sikhs in the Punjab, Indian 
Christians in Madras, and Anglo-Indians and Europeans in certain 
provinces. There were special constituencies as before for representation 
of special interests such as universities, landholders and industry. Apart 
from communal and special electorates, the members of provincial 
legislatures were elected from territorial constituencies. The method of 
election both in the provinces and at the centre was that of direct 
elections. The franchise was extended but certain property qualifications 
were retained. [123] 
Thus by the Act of 1919, there was a devolution of executive, 
[123]For a summary of proposals of the Act of 1919, see Spear, History 
Modern India, pp 342-345; Coupland, Indian Problem, pp 61-65; Misra, 
Administrative History, pp 70-76. 
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legislative and financial [124] powers from the centre to the provinces. 
The provinces gained authority over certain subjects and also a measure of 
responsible government through the system of dyarchy. No responsibility 
was introduced at the Centre. The Governor-General was given a wide range 
of powers to ensure the stability of the government and these were 
mirrored in the reserve powers of the governors which ensured the 
stability of provincial governments. Thus in one respect the Act broke new 
ground, it introduced the principle of self-government in the provinces, 
but in another respect continued earlier trends and maintained a strong 
centre. 
The Montford Reforms applied only to British India, to the provinces, 
and not to Indian India. Parliament did not have the authority to 
legislate for the Indian states, this was the basic duality of the British 
Raj. The authors of the Report warned that the growth of nationalism in 
British India was bound to affect the states - 'Hopes and aspirations may 
overleap frontier lines like sparks across a street'. Changes in the states 
could not however be brought about directly as they could be in British 
India. Given the fact that there were so many matters of common concern to 
the provinces and the states, the authors cautiously suggested that the 
two Indias might some day in the distant future come together in some sort 
of federation. Meanwhile, to break down the isolation of the rulers from 
one another and from British India, the report proposed the formation-of a 
Council of Princes. This was to be a permanent body, set up for 
deliberative purposes, which would permit discussions between the Princes 
and the Government. The Chamber of Princes was established by a Royal 
Proclamation on 8 February 1921. [125] 
"t 
This then was the picture at the time when moves began which culminated 
in the next set of reforms, the decisions whose implementation are the 
subject of this study. India was still very much part of the British 
Empire, büt was itself divided into two areas, British India and Indian 
India, over which the government exercised very different forms of 
control. The British Government had recognised India's contribution to the 
------- 
[124 ]Devolution of financial powers is dealt with in Chapter 2. 
[1251Menon, Story Indian States, pp 13-17. 
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war effort by making concessions towards self-rule. India's right to 
ultimate self-government was recognised, and by the Act of -1919, a small 
step was taken towards this goal by the introduction of dyarchy in the 
provinces. 
The Act of 1919 proved unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons., The 
chief one was the growing strength of Indian nationalist opinion, 
particularly of the Congress, now under Gandhi's leadership, which was 
demanding greater concessions towards self-rule. The Indian National 
Congress launched a non-cooperation campaign. Meanwhile those who had 
cooperated with the government and had agreed to work the reforms of 1919, 
began to ask for an advance in the constitutional position almost as soon 
as they took their seats in the Assembly. [1261 
The Montford Report had recommended that at the end of ten years -a 
Commission should be appointed to examine the working of the new 
constitution and to investigate the possibility of further devolution of 
powers. Subsequent commissions were to be appointed thereafter every 12 
years. The government looked to this provision for periodical inquiries 
and, as a concession to nationalist opinion, appointed a Statutory 
Commission, two years before the appointed date, in November 1927.. The 
Commission was to review the working of the Act and to suggest changes in 
response to the growing political demands. 
The appointment of the Simon Commission marked the beginning of a 
lengthy process that culminated eight years later in a new set of 
constitutional reforms, the Government of India Act, 1935. During this 
period, negotiations were conducted, an attempt was made to reach a 
consensus among the different parties involved, committees were appointed 
to deal with matters such as franchise and taxation, and opposition to the 
Act within the Conservative party was overcome. The Act itself was a 
voluminous document, 326 pages long, containing 10 schedules and 321 
clauses, and was the longest statute to be passed by the British 
------------------ 
[126]Coupland, Indian Problem, pp 77-78. 
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Parliament. C1271 In many ways the Act served as a blueprint for 
independent India, long sections from the Act were lifted whole and 
incorporated in the constitution of 1950. The Act was a major decision 
about the future of India. 
The Act separated Burma from India, created three new provinces, Sind, 
Orissa and the NWFP, and led to the reconstitution of provincial 
assemblies with second chambers being added in several provinces. The Act 
proposed two major changes, these were the introduction of responsible 
government in the provinces, and the formation of an all-India federation 
to bring together the provinces and the princely states. It is the 
implementation of the changes to be brought about by the Act that are the 
subject of this study. 
As stated earlier, while the Act can be regarded as one decision, its 
length and complexity and the number of changes it was to bring, suggest 
that it is more correct to see it as several decisions incorporated in one 
piece of legislation. Such an approach is also more fruitful from an 
analytic point of view. The implementation of three decisions, the two 
major decisions, concerning federation and provincial autonomy, plus one 
of lesser importance, the division of finances between the centre and the 
provinces is examined. While two of the decisions were implemented, a 
third, the establishment of an all-India federation was not implemented, 
and it has been suggested, this led ultimately to partition. 
Implementation (and non-implementation) of the provisions of the Act had 
important consequences for the future of the subcontinent. 
Each of the three case studies of implementation begins with an account 
of the making of the decision, for the propositions suggest that the 
length of time and controversy at this stage can affect the implementation 
process. In the analysis of implementation answers are sought to the 
questions raised by the propositions, such as whether the decision was 
open or closed, how much time was available for implementation, who were 
the parties involved in the process, did organisations get involved in 
[127]Moore, R. J. (1970) "British Policy and the Indian Problem, 1936-40", in 
Philips, C. H. & Wainwright, M. D. (eds) The Partition of India, London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, p 79. 
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regularised ways, was there involvement of interest groups, and if so did 
they have influence. The narrative is not broken up into questions and 
answers in the interests of readability. The analysis of these three case 
studies is guided by the model and the propositions set out earlier in the 
chapter. The applicability and validity of the model and the evidence 
supporting (or refuting the propositions are dealt with in the concluding 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Financial Autonomy. Distribution of Revenues Between 
the Centre and the Provinces. 
2.1 Introduction 
The issue of centre-provincial finances though not one of the major 
features of the 1935 Act is an important issue that merits study. Firstly, 
it, provides a case-study of successful implementation and as stated in 
Chapter 1, a comparison is to be made between cases of successful and 
unsuccessful implementation. Secondly, it established the pattern for 
financial relations between the centre and the provinces in the future. 
The financial provisions under the 1935 Act and the way they were 
implemented, determined financial relations between the centre and the 
provinces in the remaining years of British rule and even after India 
became independent. In many ways, the 1935 Act was used as a blueprint for 
the constitution of independent India and this was specially true of the 
financial provisions. Future financial settlements between the centre and 
provinces closely followed those made under the 1935 Act. Finally, a first- 
hand account of how the decision on separation of finances between the 
centre and the provinces was implemented is available in the papers of P. J. 
Grigg, Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council from January 1934 
- September 1939. As Finance Member, P. J. Grigg was at the head of the 
bureaucracy responsible for implementing the decision, the Finance 
Department of the Government of India. [1] The Grigg papers are thus a 
valuable source which gives an inside view of the implementation of this 
[1] The executive government consisted of the Viceroy and members of his 
Council. The Council consisted of 7 members of whom 3 were Indians. 
The portfolio system had been introduced as early as 1861. See 
Spear, P. (1965) The Oxford History of Modern India 1740-1947, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, "p343; and Misra, B. B. (1970) The Administrative 
History of India 1834-1947, Bombay, Oxford University Press, P30 and 
P74. 
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decision. This primary source has not been fully investigated by 
historians though most other sources relating to the period under study 
have been closely scrutinised. References to the Grigg papers have been 
made in historical works dealing with more general topics or covering a 
wider timespan and thus have been referred to rather than studied in 
detail. [2] For the present study, the papers are an invaluable source. A 
study of the papers reveals the extent to which the Finance Department and 
the Finance Member in particular was able to influence implementation of 
the decision. 
2.2 Historical Background 
A brief sketch of the way centre-provinces financial relations had 
developed over the years is given below. While a general background sketch 
of events is given at the end of Chapter 1, a brief review of purely 
financial aspects is necessary for an understanding of the implementation 
of the decision being examined in this chapter. 
After 1858, when the Crown assumed sovereignty over the territories of 
India, a unitary form of government was established. The post of a 
Secretary of State for India was created and was given overriding 
authority for the government of India. The supremacy of the Secretary of 
State was affirmed in the financial sphere by giving him complete control 
over the finances of India. There was a single budget for the whole of 
India, revenues collected by the Centre or the Provinces were included in 
this one budget and the Government of India did not have power to impose 
taxes, assign revenues to the provinces or raise any loans without the 
sanction of the Secretary of State. [3] This tight control by the' 
Secretary of State over the finances of the Government of India led to the 
centre maintaining in turn, a tight grip on the finances of the 
[21 See Tomlinson, B. R. (1979) The Political Economy of the Raj 1914-1947, 
London, Macmillan, p91; and Gallagher, J. (1982) The Decline Revival and 
Fall of the British Empire, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
p138. 
[31 Chanda, A. (1965) Federalism in India, London, George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd, p 134. 
70 
provinces. [4] There was no distinction between the classes of taxes that 
might be levied by central and provincial governments, and money raised by 
taxes -levied by the provinces became part of the common revenue of the 
Government of India as did money raised within a province by central 
taxation. The provinces had no legal claim to a share in the proceeds of 
taxation. Local governments had to rely on doles from the centre to carry 
out the functions of administration allotted'to them. 
The Secretary of State's control though legally absolute, was 
restricted in practice by two factors. One was the distance of India from 
. 
England and the second was the sheer volume of business involved. Thus in 
practice, financial control was exercised in matters of policy but the 
details of carrying it out were left to the Government of India. #[5] The 
Government of India in its turn found it difficult to run such a 
centralised system where every little detail of expenditure in a province 
had to be referred to the centre. [6] 
Over the years a slow devolution of financial, authority to the 
provinces took place, starting in 1871 when the proceeds of specified 
heads of revenue were assigned to the provinces. [7] A series of 
Provincial Financial Settlements followed and the centre. was able to relax 
the close control it had previously exercised over the finances. of 
provincial governments. [8] Rules were also made authorising provincial 
expenditure for stated purposes within limits laid down by the centre. The 
concept of 'divided heads' of revenue evolved along with the settlements. 
At first the Centre retained wholly revenues whose locale was not a true 
guide to their incidence and all other revenues were made divisible 
between the centre and provinces. The first step in the granting of 
financial autonomy to the provinces was taken when provinces were awarded 
eý 
[4] Vakil, C. N. and" Pate 1, M. H. (1940) Finance Under Provincial Autonomy, 
Bombay, Longmans Green and Co Ltd, ppl-2; Gallagher, Decline, Revival, 
Fall, p78. 
[5] Coupland, R. (1942) The Indian Problem 1833-1935. Report on the 
Constitutional Problem in India. Part I. London, Oxford University 
Press, ppl0-11. 
[6] Misra, Administrative History, p373. 
[7] ibid, p375. 
[8] Details of settlements in ibid, pp373-387. 
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definite percentages of certain revenues. This autonomy was increased when 
shortly before the reforms of 1919, some revenues were allotted wholly to 
the centre, some were made divisible between the centre and provinces and 
some were allotted wholly to the provinces. [9] Central control over 
provincial expenditure continued and since the Government of 'India took a 
percentage of the revenue from some taxes, it continued to have 'a motive 
for interfering in the administration of the provinces. [10] 
The reforms of 1919 introduced limited responsible self-government in 
the provinces. Along with the division of legislative and administrative 
functions between the centre and provinces a division of financial 
resources was necessary. The Montford Report proposed an-end to'the old 
system. It suggested that provinces be given financial autonomy' by 
allocating certain revenues entirely to provinces, and others entirely to 
the centre and recommended that divided heads of revenue should be 
abolished completely. The allocation of taxes suggested in the Report 
would have left the Centre heavily in deficit and the only way the 
proposed separation of the revenues of the centre and the'provinces could 
be carried out was by getting the provinces to make contributions to the 
centre to meet this deficit. A Financial Relations Committee with Lord 
Meston as chairman was appointed to determine provincial contributions to 
the centre. It was also to examine a claim made by the province of Bombay 
to a share in the proceeds of income-tax. The Committee made several 
recommendations about provincial contributions. It advised against 
income-tax being made a divisible head of revenue and 
suggested that the 
centre and the provinces should have their own distinct and separate heads 
of revenue. 
The devolution rules issued under the Government 'of India Act, 1919, 
embodied the suggestions made by the Joint Select Committee of Parliament. 
Sources of revenue were to be divided into provincial and central; customs 
and income-tax were the major central source and land revenue the major 
[9] Chanda, Federalism in India, pp135-136. 
[10] For an excellent clear account of the evolution of centre- provincial 
financial relations, see Chanda, Federalism in India, Chapter IV. For 
details of changes over the years see Misra, Administrative History, 
PP373-391. 
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provincial source. Provincial contributions to the centre were to be 
abolished when the financial position of the Government of India 
permitted. The right of the provinces to revenue from income-tax was 
recognised, and provinces were to be given a share in any increase in 
revenue from income-tax. The share given to the provinces was small, 1.5% 
of any increased yield from income-tax. It is however important because it 
modified the earlier belief that there should be a complete separation 
between the revenues of the centre and the revenues of the provinces. Once 
introduced, income-tax had to be retained in all subsequent financial 
settlements as a levy in which the provinces were to be participants by 
right. The Act of 1919 gave the provinces a measure of financial 
independence. They were given the right to pass measures of taxation on 
transferred heads of revenue and the right to spend what they chose to on 
the transferred subjects without obtaining the prior sanction of the 
Government of India. They also had the power to float loans both in India 
and abroad on the security of their revenues. 
The financial settlements made under the 1919 Act were found to be 
unsatisfactory over the course of the next few years. Provincial 
contributions to the centre had been determined on the basis of budgetary 
assumptions that were incorrect. Expanding sources of revenue had been 
allotted to the centre while sources of revenue allotted to the provinces 
were inelastic. At the same time the activities and thus needs of the 
provinces expanded with the transfer to them of social services such as 
education, public health and. sanitation, while the activities of the 
central government remained more or less static. Provincial contributions 
were gradually reduced and finally abolished in 1928-29. The abolition of 
provincial contributions to the centre gave considerable relief to 
agricultural provinces such as Madras and UP whose contributions because 
of the importance of land revenue as a levy had been high (Rs 34.8 and Rs 
24 million respectively). [11] It brought only little relief to 
[11] Land revenue was 30% of the total revenues of the centre and 
provinces together and 55% of the revenues of the provinces alone. 
Its incidence varied from province to province and agricultural 
provinces were financially better off than other provinces. Therefore 
their contributions to the central government had been fixed at a 
high level. See Chanda, Federalism in India, pp139-140. 
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industrialised provinces such as Bombay and Bengal whose contributions 
had been low (Rs 5.6 and Rs 6.3 millions respectively), and whose claim to a 
share in income-tax had not been conceded. The central government on its 
part was able to make ends meet but it had no resources on which it could 
fall back on in case of any emergency such as an economic crisis or war. 
Thus it became clear that the distribution of resources made under the Act 
of 1919 was unsatisfactory and a new formula would have 'to 'be found. 
Provincial autonomy was meaningless without sufficient financial 
resources. At the same time it was necessary to ensure the, financial 
stability of the central government. [12] 
2.3 Making of the decision on separation of revenues 
The brief account above shows that the evolution of financial relations 
between the centre and the provinces had led to a situation that was 
unsatisfactory for both. An important issue which needed to be resolved 
was that of division of revenues between the centre and provinces in a way 
that would provide both with sufficient finances to enable them to fulfil 
their responsibilities without dependence on one another. 
The issue of centre-provincial financial relations was reviewed along 
with constitutional reforms for the Government of India which began with 
the appointment of the Simon Commission in November 1927 and culminated in 
the passing of the 1935 Act eight years later. (131 The Simon Commission 
appointed to review the working of the 1919 constitution, in its turn 
appointed Lord Layton to advise the Commission on the division of 
resources between the centre and the provinces. Lord Layton supported the 
idea put forward by the Taxation Inquiry Committee (constituted in 1924) 
that income-tax should continue to be the balancing factor in any 
reallocation of resources. He endorsed the formula suggested by the 
Taxation Inquiry Committee for its distribution and suggested some 
changes. 
[ 12] For an overview see Vakil and Patel, Finance under Autonomy, pp 1-3. 
1131 Coupland, Indian Problem, p97. 
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The Federal Structures Committee constituted at the (Second) Round 
Table Conference, appointed a sub-committee (in 1931) under the 
chairmanship of Lord Peel to examine further the issue of allocation of 
resources between the centre and the provinces and to make 
recommendations. This Committee went further than the Statutory Commission 
and recommended that the entire proceeds of income-tax should be allotted 
to the provinces, though for the sake of administrative convenience, the 
tax should continue to be collected by the centre. The centre was to rely 
on indirect taxes for its finances. The Committee stated that distribution 
of income-tax (plus any other surplus the centre was able to accumulate 
from indirect taxes) required a detailed study and appointed an expert 
committee under Lord Percy to make proposals about its distribution. 
Meanwhile, in December 1931, the White Paper on Indian Constitutional 
Reforms had been published. It made several recommendations on the 
division of resources between the centre and the provinces. Among them it 
proposed that income-tax be made a divisible head of revenue but that 
taxes on agricultural incomes should be allotted wholly to the provinces 
and that corporation tax should be retained in its entirety by the centre. 
The expert committee under Lord Percy felt that transfer of income-tax 
-in its entirety to the provinces would leave the centre dependent on 
contributions from the provinces. It therefore suggested that the centre 
retain proceeds from certain heads of income-tax such as that realised 
from residents in federally administered areas. It made recommendations on 
the principles on which distribution of the tax should take place between 
the provinces and suggested that residence would provide a'fair basis for 
distribution and would be compatible with the federal concept. 
The Federal Structures. Committee of the Third Round Table-Conference 
had available to them the reports of the Peel and Percy committees and the 
proposals set out in the White Paper, but felt further examination of the 
subject of financial allocations was necessary. It appointed a committee 
with Lord Peel again as chairman for this purpose. Lord Peel revised his 
earlier, recommendation that the entire proceeds of income-tax be allotted 
to the provinces. He suggested, as had the White Paper and the Percy 
Committee that the centre retain proceeds of certain specified sub-heads 
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of the tax such as corporation tax and that the remaining proceeds should 
go to the provinces. The centre was also to retain some, of the provincial 
share of income-tax till such time as it had developed new sources of 
revenue. - *- 
Finally the question of allocation of resources was examined yet again 
by the Joint Select Committee which was in favour of the proposals made in 
the White Paper rather than those made by the other committees. 
Thus along with deliberations and negotiations for anew political 
constitution for the country that resulted in the 1935 Act, which 
envisaged a new federal structure with autonomous provinces, attempts were 
made to bring about a clear division in the finances of the provinces and 
those of the centre. This was necessary as finance and politics are 
closely related and provincial autonomy would not be meaningful without 
financial autonomy. While separation of expenditure between the centre and 
provinces caused little problems, division of revenues between the two was 
a knotty problem to which there was no easy solution. 
The above account of the making of the decision on separation of 
central and provincial finances shows that the time taken over the making 
of the decision had been very long. After the financial arrangements made 
under the 1919 Act had been found to be unsatisfactory, the question of 
centre-provincial finances had been examined and re-examined by 
committees and experts appointed for the task. There. was. common 
acknowledgement that while ideally, along with division of_legislative - and 
administrative functions, there should also be a clear division in the 
finances of the provinces and those of the centre, this was not, feasible. 
There was some agreement that income-tax would have to be used as a 
balancing factor. The differences in the recommendations of the various 
committees were on the share to be allotted to the provinces and on the 
basis of its distribution among them. Despite the length of the time taken 
over, the decision, however, the decision had involved little or no 
controversy. The discussions were restricted to committees and experts 
with each committee putting forward proposals which were then re-examined 
and modified or changed by the next one. There was no involvement in the 
discussions by interested parties or by members of the public. The lack of 
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controversy during the making of the decision meant that there 'was no 
controversy to be carried through during implementation. 
2.4 Financial Provisions under the 1935 Act 
The 1935 Act embodied the federal concept and went further than the 
1919 Act (which gave the provinces limited autonomy) by giving the 
provinces greater autonomy in the proposed federation. Complete separation 
of the finances of the centre and the provinces was thus necessary but 
proved difficult in execution. The difficulty was caused by revenues 
which, as has been shown, proved difficult to separate [14]. 
In the matter of expenditure, provinces were given complete freedom, 
the only restriction being that expenditure was not to exceed the 
resources that could be raised by taxation and borrowing (provinces had 
the right to borrow freely on the security of their revenues). Certain 
items of-expenditure such as salaries of the Governor and judges, debt 
charges and items which touched on the Governors' special responsibilities 
were to be a first charge on the revenues of a province and provinces were 
to have no control over them. Provincial legislatures were permitted to 
discuss these items but could not vote on them.. 
The central and provincial balances were separated. Each province was 
to maintain its own separate account with the Reserve Bank of India 
(established under an Act of the Central Legislature of 193Z1 which began 
functioning from 1 April 1935). In the event of a temporary deficiency, the 
provinces had to borrow from the market or obtain ways and means advances 
from the Reserve Bank. 
In the assignment of revenues the Act tried to improve the financial 
position of the provinces and at the same time secure the financial 
stability and credit of the centre. The Act assigned to the Centre, taxes 
on income other than agricultural income, corporation tax, salt duties, 
[14] See Government of India Act, 1935, Part VII, and Seventh Schedule, 
Federal and Provincial Legislative Lists, for financial provisions 
under the Act. 
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export duties with the exception of duty on jute export, surcharge, on 
income-tax, and surcharges on the taxes and duties levied and collected by 
the centre but allotted to the provinces (e. g. duties on succession, stamp 
duties). In addition the centre could at its discretion, retain for its 
use, a fixed percentage of income-tax assigned to the provinces. 
The revenues of the provinces were taxes levied by the provinces, of 
which land revenue and excise duties on alcohol were the principal ones; 
imposts such as estate duty and, taxes on railway fares and freights; taxes 
assigned to the provinces; and a share in the proceeds of export duty on 
jute and of income-tax. In addition there was provision for grants-in-aid 
from the Centre. [15] 
Thus the 1935 Act incorporated the common view that had emerged from 
the various committees that had examined centre-provincial financial 
relations that no clear-cut division of' resources was possible without 
affecting the financial viability of either the centre or of the 
provinces. Some financial interdependence was inevitable. Revenue from 
income-tax and from export duty on jute and jute goods was to be shared, 
and in addition, the centre was to make discretionary grants-in-aid to 
provinces which needed financial assistance. In the case of jute export 
duty the Act provided that a minimum of one half of the proceeds should be 
assigned to the provinces growing jute, and it was to be distributed among 
the jute growing provinces, in the ratio of quantity of jute grown in each, 
to the total quantity grown. The basis on which income-tax was to be 
distributed was to be determined initially by an Order-in-Council. 
Subsequent distributions were to be made by the federal legislature after 
it had been established. 
Thus the Act retained interdependence between the revenues of the 
centre and the provinces, but kept this to a minimum. It restricted shared 
taxes to two: export duty on jute and jute goods, and income-tax, and had 
provision for grants from the centre to the provinces where necessary. 
Some principles for the distribution of jute export duty were incorporated 
[15] For a summary of financial provisions under the 1935 Act, see Misra, 
Administrative History, pp390-391; Chanda, Federalism in India, pp150- 
15 . 
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in the Act but the details were left to be worked out later. The share of 
the provinces in the proceeds of income-tax was a problem that had 
occupied many committees and experts and the Act did not specify the 
provinces' share. This was left to be determined later, as was the amount 
to be received by the provinces as grants-in-aid. These financial 
provisions were not determined by the Act but details of these were 
left 
to be worked out later. They were to be made effective by the issue of an 
Order-in-Council. 
The federal provisions of the 1935 Act could only come into effect when 
a specified number of princes had acceded to the federation, but there 
were no such reservations on the other provisions of the Act. Provincial 
autonomy was to be inaugurated by 1 April 1937. This meant that the 
financial provisions had to be made effective by the issue of the relevant 
Orders-in-Council where so provided before this date. 
The 1935 Act had a unitary bias in that the autonomy granted to the 
provinces was checked by central control. In'the distribution of resources 
too, the balance was tilted in favour of the Centre. Though there was 
concurrent jurisdiction over certain matters, this did not extend to 
financial matters. Income-tax was a shared revenue, but there was no 
overlap of taxing powers. It was the Centre which was to levy and collect 
the. tax, retain its share and distribute the rest among the provinces in 
accordance with an Order-in-Council. (161 The position of the centre vis- 
a-vis the provinces was further strengthened during implementation as the 
account below shows. 
2.5 Implementation 
Thus after long deliberations stretching over many years, a decision 
had been reached on provisions that would give the provinces financial 
autonomy. Some important details were not laid down in the Act but were 
left to be worked out later. These related mainly to distribution of 
income-tax, a problem which many committees and experts had grappled with 
[16] Chanda, Federalism in India, p230. 
79 
over the years, distribution of export duty on jute, and determination of 
grants-in-aid to be made by the centre to the provinces. As stated earlier, 
the papers of the then Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, 
Sir P. J. Grigg [17] provide an inside view into the implementation of this 
decision. The papers clearly reveal that the Finance Department was able 
to exercise considerable influence on the way the decision was 
implemented. 
Aware of the financial provisions to be incorporated in the 1935 Act, 
that details of shared taxes would be decided by an Order-in-Council, and 
that a committee would be appointed to make recommendations, the Finance 
Member decided to take the initiative and began to act before the Act had 
become law. He suggested to the Secretary of State for India that the 
financial inquiry. precedent to provincial autonomy should be conducted by 
a single expert and that that expert should be Sir Otto Niemeyer, then with 
the Bank of England. [18] When in June 1935, Sir Otto Niemeyer wrote to his 
friend, the Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, saying he 
would be coming to India for a few days after Christmas, as his daughter 
was to get married in Lahore, Grigg replied that he was delighted that 
Niemeyer was coming to India and that "I have been trying to persuade the 
India Office to plant a certain job out here on you". [19] 
The Secretary of State accepted the suggestions made by Grigg. Sir Otto 
Niemeyer, he agreed, would be appointed to conduct the inquiry on condition 
that there were no objections from the provinces. [20] The provinces 
raised no objections, so Sir Otto Niemeyer was appointed to make 
recommendations on the assignment of revenues and he accepted the 
commission. Thus a single expert was put in charge of implementation. He 
was to advise on the percentage of shared taxes to be assigned to the 
provinces and also on the principles- on which these should be distributed 
between the provinces, and to make recommendations on grants from the 
[17] Papers of Sir Percy James Grigg (1890-1964), Archives Centre, 
Churchill College, Cambridge. Hereafter referred to as PJGG. 
[18] PJGG Evidence in a later letter from Grigg to Erskine and Brabourne, 
dated 29 July 1935. 
[19] PJGG Letter from Grigg to Niemeyer dated 19 June 1935. 
[20] PJGG Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy(Finance Department) 
dated 26 July 1935. 
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centre to the provinces. The Niemeyer Report was accepted in its entirety 
and embodied in the Government of India (Distribution of Revenues) Order 
1936. Thus a study of how the report came to be written is necessary for us 
to understand how the decision was implemented. 
The time available for implementation was fairly short. The existing 
plan was to introduce provincial autonomy early in 1937. This meant that 
the necessary -Orders-in-Council would have to be passed through 
Parliament in the summer of 1936. This in turn meant that the report of the 
financial inquiry would have to be published before mid-1936, and thus the 
inquiry would have to be held in the winter of 1935-1936. Any postponement 
would lead to a delay in introducing the provincial constitutions. Sir 
Otto Niemeyer, who was to conduct the inquiry and who was to visit India 
anyway that winter for personal reasons, could leave for India only after 
Christmas 1935. He had to return to England by March of the following year 
and thus he expected to have only two months actually in India to study 
the problem at first-hand. As much material as possible was, therefore, to 
be sent to him for study in England before he left for India. While in 
India, he was to have consultations with members of the Finance Department 
at the centre, and with the financial authorities of each province. On his 
return, he was to write a report incorporating his recommendations about 
shared revenues and grants-in-aid. The Finance Department and the 
provinces could send material to him before he came to India, and put their 
cases to him in the few months he was to spend there. Thus the time 
available for them to put their cases to the inquiry was both fairly short 
and well-specified. Since there had been no involvement of interested 
parties at the time the decision was made, it was expected that there would 
be none at this later stage. "We are of course assuming that enquiry will 
necessitate consultations with Central and Provincial Governments and 
that no question of evidence from public will arise. " [21] 
While still in England, Niemeyer had access to the large amount of 
material that already existed regarding centre-provincial financial 
relations, which has been briefly summarised earlier. Writing to Grigg 
[211 PJGG Telegram from Secretary of State for India-to Viceroy (Finance 
Department), dated 26 July 1935. 
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that he had accepted the commission, Niemeyer added, "I have been looking 
at a number of India Office documents, from which it appears that a large 
number of people in the past have pawed the-air on the subject". [221 
Niemeyer also received information from the various provinces. In his 
report, while listing the sources from which he was given information, he 
thanks the provinces for the detailed memoranda sent, by - them on their 
respective financial positions. [23] Lastly, Niemeyer was sent material 
which would be relevant to his inquiry, by the Finance Department. ' 
Thus implementation involved the single financial expert who was to 
conduct the inquiry, the bureaucracy dealing with finance at the centre 
and the financial authorities in the provinces. They were asked to send 
information to Niemeyer while he was in England and were to be consulted 
by him when, he visited India. It was as a matter of course that these 
bureaucracies became involved in the implementation of a, decision 
involving financial matters. Also involved was the India Office.. However a 
study of the Grigg papers shows that manouvering by the Finance Department 
effectively excluded both the India Office and the. provinces from the 
actual process of implementation. Thus the number of actors actually 
involved in implementation were very small, as the account below shows. The 
recommendations made by Niemeyer and incorporated in his, report, were 
arrived at as a result of correspondence between Niemeyer and Grigg, much 
of it marked Personal and Private. Through this correspondence, -Grigg and 
Niemeyer reached a consensus on some of the major issues before Niemeyer 
arrived in India. From this correspondence the provinces were of course 
excluded, while the India Office was almost completely ignored. 
Just how few people were actually involved in implementation is 
revealed when Grigg apologised to Niemeyer for being unprepared for the 
enquiry. The Government of India, was, he wrote, run on a very narrow margin 
of staff. "Nobody has done anything about the problem of separation before 
and even now there are only Nixon, and one other effectively working on 
[22] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 9 August 1935. 
[231, Indian Financial Inquiry Report, Cmd 5163,1936. Also referred to as 
the Niemeyer Report. 
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it. " [24] Thus the recommendations in the report reflect a consensus 
arrived at between a handful of people, Niemeyer, Grigg, Nixon (Secretary 
to the Finance Department), and 'one other'. Because of the non-involvement 
of any interest groups or parties, the implementation process was 
restricted to the bureaucracies concerned. Manouvering by the Finance 
Department ensured that the final recommendations were more favourable 
towards the centre than towards the provinces. 
The Finance Department began to act to get the decision implemented in 
a way advantageous to itself even before the appointment of a committee. 
The Finance Member, it has been shown, was responsible for Sir Otto 
Niemeyer being appointed as a one-man committee to conduct the inquiry. 
Their correspondence reveals that Grigg and Niemeyer were friends and the 
latter could therefore be expected to take note of suggestions or advice 
put to him by the former. 
Next, the 'Finance Department did more than send material regarding 
financial statistics for Niemeyer to study before he came out to'India. 
The Department sent Niemeyer a plan for provincial autonomy which the 
centre . felt should be put into action. This plan is set out in 'a D. O. from 
the Finance Department dated 5 September 1935. [25] The D. O. outlined a 
plan for financial autonomy of the provinces and gave the views of the 
Finance Department on the best way to achieve this. The proposals made in 
the D. O. are briefly summarised below. They are important, for much of the 
correspondence between Niemeyer and Grigg revolves round this D. O. 
Niemeyer showed a willingness to accept the proposals, but recognised the 
need to reconcile them with the demands put to him by the various 
provinces, with each' province trying to get the maximum of resources for 
itself. The influence of the D. O. is clearly to be seen in the Niemeyer 
Report. Niemeyer was appointed to determine the provinces share of income- 
tax and jute export duty and to determine the amounts of grants-in-aid 
from the centre to the provinces. The D. O. raised another issue that needed 
a satisfactory resolution, as the summary of the proposals given below 
[24] PJGG Letter from Grigg to Niemeyer dated 6 December 1935. 
[25] PJGG D. O. no D/302 dated Simla 5 September 1935, addressed to Baxter 
(at the India Office) and signed JC Nixon. 
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shows. 
2.6 Summary of proposals contained in D. O. sent by the Finance Department. 
Recent figures, based on the budget figures for 1935-36, showed that at 
the start of the new constitution, some provinces like Madras, Bombay and 
Punjab would have considerable surpluses, some, such as the United 
Provinces and Bihar would have small deficits, and some, particularly 
Bengal and Assam would have intolerable deficits. If provincial autonomy 
was to stand any chance of success at all, the deficits needed to be 
rectified. 
The problem of deficit provinces arose because of, the Montford 
proposals by which provinces were to get control over uniform heads of 
expenditure and revenue, thus offering them all equal opportunites. It led 
instead to inequalities. For example, land revenue was much greater in 
Bombay and Madras (where it had proved an elastic source of revenue), 
revenue from stamps was greater in the industrial places than in the non- 
industrial ones. If one province had natural advantages over another, it 
might seem right for it to profit by these advantages. The provinces were 
however to remain part of a single political entity so that there was a 
need to establish some measure of equality between them - "the principle 
of robbing Peter to pay Paul can justifiably be applied as between the 
provinces". [26] 
The problem was that no natural method of distributing income-tax could 
be found which would help to eliminate the problem of recurring deficits 
and achieve some parity between the provinces. The proposal which at that 
time 'held the field' was to distribute income-tax according to the 
personal incomes of the residents in each province. Any such scheme would 
give surplus provinces such as Madras and Bombay large amounts of 
resources and would fail to adjust the case of, the deficit provinces. Such 
a scheme would, in addition, cost the centre more than the immediate 
necessities of the case demanded. 
[261 PJGG D. O. no D/302, p3. 
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The Finance Department proposed that the process of adjusting finances 
between the centre and the provinces be undertaken in two separate stages: 
Stage I: Initial adjustments so that with the least strain on the 
finances of the centre, all provinces would start provincial autonomy in a 
solvent condition. 
Stage II: Subsequent adjustments. 
The D. O. was concerned mainly with Stage I. It suggested a series of 
expedients which purported to give identical concessions to all the 
provinces, but managed to deal nevertheless with the problem of surplus 
and deficit provinces. 
Expedient I: To relieve all provincial governments of the outstanding 
burden of debt incurred in the past in order to meet revenue deficits 
which they would otherwise be carrying upon the institution of provincial 
autonomy. [Memorandum I gives figures of., overdrawn accounts, with the 
centre by provincial governments. Total overdrafts = Rs 1011.50 
lakhs] [27] 
Expedient II: To relieve all provincial governments of a certain 
portion of their pre-Reform irrigation debt. This proposal was specially 
desirable as it would ameliorate what the provinces had regarded as an 
injustice in the past. [Total amount of debt for which the centre would 
assume responsibility = Rs 1914.03 lakhs] 
Expedient III: To assign to the provinces concerned a further fraction 
of jute export duty [under Section 1'0(2) of the Act]. The provinces 
affected would be Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. 
The annual relief to provincial budgets from these three expedients 
would be: interest payments on overdrafts + interest payments on 
irrigation debt + increased revenue from jute export duty Rs 190 lakhs 
2 crores approximately). [28] 
[27] 1 lakh = 100,000. 
[281 1 crore = 10,000,000. 
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The Centre would take over from the provinces a block of debt: 
Overdrafts 1011.50 lakhs 
Irrigation 1914.03 lakhs 
and suffer a worsening of its budgetary position by 190 lakhs. Estimated 
total annual cost to the Centre, adding to the above 2 crores other 
estimated budgetary deterioration, would be Rs 5 crores. 
Expedient IV: This was an inevitable consequence of provincial autonomy 
and was probably not within the jurisdiction of the Financial Enquiry. 
Under provincial autonomy, each provincial government would own its own 
cash, deal independently with the Reserve Bank and undertake its own local 
banking functions. All the debt and deposit heads would be decentralised. 
[In the past the Centre had done all the banking business for the whole of 
India. ] 
In addition it was proposed to seek to consolidate all the balances of 
outstanding pre-autonomy debts of each provincial government and make all 
of them repayable in equated instalments over 35-110 years. 
In conclusion the D. O. stated, "we should most strongly press upon the 
Financial Enquiry the view that the measures of initial relief proposed in 
the foregoing paragraphs should, if accepted in some form as this, be taken 
into account in determining the proportion of Income Tax to be eventually 
relinquished by the Centre in favour of the provinces". [29] 
2.7 Correspondence regarding Finance Department proposals. 
Correspondence between Niemeyer and Grigg, as stated earlier, revolved 
round these proposals. Niemeyer did agree on certain points or wanted 
clarification on others and replies from the Finance Department deal with 
the queries raised by him. One thing however became clear at the outset, 
Niemeyer would not be able to include the Finance Department's proposals 
in his report under the existing terms of reference. These followed 
directly from the decision and were: 
(29] PJGG D. O. no D/302, p7. 
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"To make recommendations to His Majesty's Government, after reviewing 
the present and prospective budgetary positions of the Government of 
India, and of the Governments of the Provinces, on the matters which under 
Sections 138(1) and (2), 140(2) and 142 of the Government of India Act, 
1935, have to be prescribed or determined by his Majesty in Council 
(subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament) and any ancillary 
matters arising out of the financial adjustments between the Government of 
India and the Provincial Governments regarding which His Majesty's 
Government may desire a report. " (30] 
The decision on centre-provinces financial relations had left 
important details to be worked out later. These details were specified so 
that the terms of reference of the Niemeyer Inquiry were equally clear and 
specific about matters on which he was to make recommendations. When 
Niemeyer found that the proposals of the Finance Department could not be 
put into effect under the existing terms of reference, he asked for the 
terms of reference to be changed. It would not be incorrect to say that 
this involved an amendment of the original decision. " 
"I have told the India Office that as the last paragraph of their Terms 
of Reference precludes me, in the absence of a request from H. M. G., from 
dealing with anything except the the specific questions which have to be 
prescribed under the Act, they must see that I receive such a request so 
that I can deal with 'ancillary' subjects. This is clearly all the more 
necessary in the light of your proposals. But I have urged them not to put 
their request in the form, of specific headings, but to give me a purely 
general formula such as 'to make recommendations on ancillary subjects' 
pure and simple. The India Office seem to be a little afraid that given 
such a formula you would endeavour to draw me into a number of subjects 
not very closely connected with the present Enquiry, but I"have assured 
them that I can look after myself on this,..... On the other hand I told them 
I should dislike exceedingly being limited in a way which might prove in 
fact embarassing. I think they are going to evolve a formula which will 
probably be quite general. " 1311 
[30] Indian Financial Inquiry Report, P3. 
[31] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 23 October 1935. 
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The terms of reference were duly amended. Instead of being restricted 
to making recommendations about the division of income-tax revenues, jute 
export duty and allocation° of grants-in-aid, Niemeyer was to make 
recommendations on other financial matters 'as you think fit'. The India 
Office had expressed some reservations, aware that the Finance Department 
would be closely involved in implementation and wary of giving it too much 
leeway in this matter. The terms of reference were however readily 
changed. [32] 
The Finance Member had been responsible for Niemeyer, a friend, being 
appointed to conduct the financial inquiry. To further ensure that 
implementation would take place so as to further the interests of the 
centre and not' those of the provinces, Grigg wanted to have someone from 
the Finance Department present whenever Niemeyer met representatives of 
the provinces. He sought to have Niemeyer bound formally to have J. C. Nixon 
(Secretary to the Finance Department), present at meetings with spokesmen 
from the provinces, for Grigg was aware that each province would try and 
get the maximum benefits for itself and these would beat the expense of 
the centre. The Secretary of State did not think he could so bind Niemeyer. 
Niemeyer was to have a free hand in determining how the Enquiry was to be 
conducted and would be free to have Nixon present at such meetings. It 
could be suggested to Niemeyer that he might find it advantageous to do so, 
but having Nixon formally present was not possible. [33] 
Niemeyer too was opposed to the idea of having Nixon formally attached 
to him. He reassured Grigg that he would consult fully with the Centre - 
".... you need not fear that I shan't consult the Central Govt (sic) at least 
as much as is good for them: but I am sure it would put matters wrong from 
the beginning to attach formally to me so high an official as Nixon. That I 
can't have - he's for the plaintiff or is it the defendant - not on the 
bench (though possibly unbeknown in the judge's private room)". 1341 
[32] For change in terms of reference, see Indian Financial Inquiry 
Report, p3. 
[33] PJGG Telegram from Wakeley (at the India Office) to Grigg dated 9 
September 1935. 
[34] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 30 September 1935. 
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Though Niemeyer would be landing in Bombay, he did not intend to stay 
there, but planned to go straight to Delhi as 'he considered it essential 
that he see Grigg before he had any discussions with any of the provinces. 
He would probably have to visit Bombay later as part of his inquiry, also 
Calcutta and of course Punjab where he was going anyway, but the others 
would have to come to Delhi. He himself preferred to see the 
representatives of the provinces in Delhi where he could, privately, be in 
touch with Grigg. [35] As to what he expected from the provinces, he wrote, 
- "No formal evidence. They can come and talk and I can summarise for 
myself so much of their remarks as I need. No outside bodies -I think - 
and certainly no general public. " [36] 
The lack of involvement of the public in the making of this decision 
led both the India Office and Niemeyer to expect that they would not be 
involved in implementation either. 
The proposals for provincial finance as set out in the Finance 
Department's D. O. had been sent to Niemeyer and to the India Office. The 
response from the India Office infuriated Grigg who found it "completely 
unconstructive and highly theoretical claptrap". He wrote to Niemeyer 
"Quite honestly if you show any serious disposition to be taken in by this 
sort of stuff, I think I shall chuck my hand in. " 1371 However Niemeyer's 
reply reassured him - "your letter of the 23rd sheaving your usual 
determination to take practical rather than metaphysical views was a great 
comfort". [381 
The India Office's views on implementation were thus ignored. The 
provinces were not a party to this correspondence between Niemeyer and 
Grigg, and the public was to play, little or no part. Some of the main 
points discussed in the correspondence are noted below. Their influence is 
to be seen in the final report of the Enquiry. 
[35] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 13 November 1935. 
[36] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 30 September 1935. 
[37] PJGG letter from Grigg to Niemeyer dated 28 October 1935. 
[38] PJGG Letter from Grigg to Niemeyer dated 11 November-1935. 
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After studying the proposals put to-him-by the Finance Department, 
Niemeyer sent back his comments. 
Firstly, he was personally in favour of adjustment via debt revision 
though the India Office seemed against it. 
Secondly, while Grigg argued that whatever was done then (about debt 
revision) should be taken into account in fixing the percentage of income- 
tax to be allotted to the provinces, the provinces could claim that by this 
method, a permanent percentage was reduced by the centre giving up a 
counter claim which in the natural course of events would have been paid 
off in 20-30 years. Also since Grigg was prepared to give up 5-8 crores to 
the provinces, what was he to say if they, said they preferred this as a 
percentage of income-tax? 
He was of the view that the irrigation debt proposal would give a lot 
of money to provinces which did not need it, such as Madras. He could 
suggest that remission should be given only to the necessitous provinces. 
Another source of concern was the standard of administration in the 
provinces. He felt it was impossible and also unnecessary to aim at 
bringing the standard of administration in the various provinces into 
rough conformity. 
His approach would be based on 3 principles: - 1 )That the financial 
stability of the centre, whose responsibilities are over-riding and indeed 
a condition of there being any provincial existence at all, must not be 
jeopardised 2)that every province must be placed in a position of 
financial equilibrium while preserving its existing standard of 
administration 3)that any resources available after'satisfying 1) and 2) 
should pass over to the provinces, but this must depend absolutely on 1) 
being satisfied. 1391 
In his reply, Grigg clarified that he was not proposing to give up 5-8 
crores, but only 2 crores. The main problem that needed to be solved boiled 
down to this. The standard of administration was highest (or any rate the 
[39] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 23 October 1935. 
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most costly) in Bombay. The separation of Sind was' liable to place Bombay 
in an even more advantageous position. Any process of distributing income- 
tax by origin would give Bombay the'lion's share. The problem was how this 
could be prevented. [40] 
In a letter dated 19 November, 1935, Niemeyer reiterated some of-the 
points made by him earlier. He admitted that the Finance Department's 
scheme was cheap, but what were they going to say if the provinces said 
they would rather have the same amount in income-tax. The Irrigation Debt 
scheme could be discussed further, but he did not see'why money should be 
given to Madras, Bombay and Punjab. On the differing levels of 
administration in the provinces, he wrote: 
"What strikes me very much in all this correspondence As the curious 
desire of the Central Government Finance Department to, attempt to equalise 
up the administration in the various Provinces. I should have thought this 
was a pure will o'the wisp; and that not primarily for financial reasons 
but for much deeper causes the scale of administrative needs and even 
desires in the various Provinces must very substantially differ; and 
indeed ought to. I shall require a good deal of convincing that this is not 
so, and I do not understand why you people appear to feel so strongly in 
the other direction. I do not believe at all that the inequality is due to 
Meston Settlement etc.: I think it runs much deeper, and I'rather regret 
that you have asked the provinces what-their Budgets would be if they all 
lived on the scale of Bombay. "-[411 
Later, he requested the Finance Department to take the figures for the 
last available year and to work out approximately the figures that would 
result if the Percy scheme of distribution [42] of income-tax was 
followed. 
7, 
Grigg's replies dealt with some of the issues raised, specially the 
question of income-tax. 
ýt 
[40] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 11 November 1935. 
[41] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 19 November-1935: 
[42] See page 75 above., 
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They were just getting (for the first time) an estimate of the 
financial effect of the decentralisation of balances, and were getting 
too, the results of the proposed consolidation of pre-autonomy debt. The 
main problem in connection with decentralisation of balances was to decide 
what particular bits of debt should be written off against the realised 
balances. This was important as any decision on this would affect both the 
debt consolidation scheme and the Finance Department's scheme as set out 
in the D. O. no D302. 
He clarified the position about the preferability of an empirical 
scheme for Stage I over an immediate distribution of income-tax. An 
immediate distribution of income-tax would have to be larger-than the 
centre could afford (at that time) if it was to cope with the position of 
the United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa and the Central Provinces. *Bengal 
and Assam would have to be dealt with by jute or by direct subvention. And 
if enough income- tax was given to UP, B&0 and CP, more than enough would 
have to be given to Bombay and Madras. By using a factor such as population 
for distribution, Bombay's portion could be reduced but not that of Madras. 
The initial needs of the provinces were, about Rs 2-, crores 
approximately, which was the sum of their recurring deficits. Of this 
Bengal and Assam accounted for Rs 70 lakhs and Rs 50, lakhs respectively 
and these would have to be dealt with by jute duty or subvention. This left 
well under a, crore for the rest, 'decrepit and prosperous alike'. It was not 
possible to deal adequately with the decrepit among the provinces by way 
of income-tax without giving too much to Bombay and Madras. 
"Our business is much rather to show how much (or how little) Income 
Tax -we can give up. The problem- of distributing it is not really our pigeon 
though we have been trying to provide you with something besides the 
shouts of individual provinces in order to help in reaching a 
solution. " [431 
Grigg stressed his views on income-tax "at the risk of being accused of 
suborning the judiciary". If the Percy scheme of distribution of income- 
[43] PJGG Letter from Grigg to Niemeyer dated 6 December 1935. 
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tax was followed, Bombay and Madras would get too much though they were 
already the two most prosperous provinces. In fact no scheme of 
distribution could be found that would not give too much to these two 
provinces. 
"The moral I draw from this is that you must do more on Stage I by way 
of some empirical scheme for debt adjustment and reduce by as much as you 
decently can the allocation of Income-Tax under Stage II. " [üü] 
Niemeyer reassured the Finance Member that in allotting revenues 
between the centre and the provinces he was on the side of the centre. He 
accepted the points put to him by the Finance Department, but needed 
arguments to support them. 
"As you know my only object in undertaking this dreary task is to help 
you; and what I am trying to do is to get you to provide me with arguments 
for that purpose, to meet the obvious arguments which will be brought 
against us. " [415] 
He accepted the. arguments that central annual expenditure could not 
reasonably be expected to fall and that the centre could not at that time 
afford to give away much money, but he needed to be-able to demonstrate 
them somehow. He accepted too, that the centre could not afford to give up 
any income-tax and that they. would have to make shift temporarily with 
other devices. But he would have to be prepared if "the victims" said they 
would prefer to to have the equivalent of the other devices in a first 
instalment of income-tax. He had, of course, under the terms of reference, 
to make recommendations about the distribution of income-tax as and when 
there was anything to distribute. 
[44] PJGG Letter from Grigg to Niemeyer dated 11 December 1935. 
[45] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 18 December 1935. 
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2.8 The Niemeyer Report 
In the light of the above correspondence it is not surprising to find 
that the Niemeyer Report [46] incorporated some of the proposals put 
forward by the Finance Department. This left the centre in a strong 
position vis-a-vis the provinces. The proposals of the Finance Department 
had concerned initial adjustments to be made at the start of provincial 
autonomy - specially those necessary to reduce the debt liabilities of the 
provinces. The Terms of Reference had been expanded to allow Niemeyer to 
deal with this problem. He had also to make recommendations that concerned 
the subsequent period and these dealt chiefly with the distribution of 
income-tax. 
The general considerations on which the report was based were several. 
At the start of provincial autonomy, each of the provinces should be in a 
position of financial equilibrium so it was necessary that the chronic 
state of deficit of some provinces should be brought to an end. This would 
meet the immediate needs of the provinces but it was also necessary to 
evolve a scheme that would also meet their future needs. At the same time 
it was necessary, above all, to maintain the financial stability of the 
Centre. Thus it was necessary, in determining the amounts of assistance to 
be given to the provinces to consider how far the Central Government was 
in a position to render such assistance without jeopardising its own 
solvency. 
While Niemeyer had expressed the view in his letters that it was not 
necessary to try and equalise the levels of administration in the 
provinces, he was convinced of its necessity by the time the report was 
written: "it is equally clear that some Provinces are intrinsically better 
off than others and at the moment less urgently in need of additional 
resources; and it is both fair and inevitable that a certain measure of 
correction should be applied, even if it means that provinces which have 
been able to attain higher standards of administration should now to some 
slight extent have to progress more slowly. " [47] 
[46] Indian Financial Inquiry Report, Cmd 5163,1936. 
[47] ibid, page 7. ' 
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He accepted budgetary needs as a broad'criterion. After examining the 
budgets of all the provinces and the special circumstances and needs of 
some of them, he recommended assistance to the provinces (excluding 
Bombay, Madras and Punjab) totalling Rs 450 lakhs. Of this Rs 258 lakhs was 
already provided for in the budget of the Government of India as 
subventions to NWFP, Orissa, and Sind. Thus the cost to'the Centre of the 
assistance recommended to the provinces would be equal to Rs 450 - 258 = 
Rs 192 lakhs. This was the figure the Finance Department had indicated it 
was prepared to give up. 
As for the form in which this assistance was to be given, he made the 
following recommendations: 
1. That all the outstanding debts of the provinces' of Bengal, Bihar, 
Assam, the NWFP and Orissa should be cancelled and 'that the debt of the 
Central Province should be substantially reduced. 
"Where financial assistance is to be given by a creditor to an existing 
debtor, elementary common sense suggests that the shortest and simplest 
method of adjustment is by reducing the claim of the creditor on the 
debtor. " ['8] 
The Finance Department had suggested debt cancellation as a method of 
placing the provinces on an even keel. 
2. That the share of provinces of the export duty on jute and jute goods 
be raised from 50 to 62.5% of the net proceeds of the duty. This benefited 
the jute growing provinces of Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Again, the 
Finance Department had suggested that the cases of Assam and Bengal could 
be dealt with by adjusting their shares of jute export duty. 
3. That annual grants-in-aid be made for a limited period to the United 
Provinces, Assam, NWFP, Sind and Orissa. The amounts to be made in grants 
were specified. 
[48] bid, page 13. 
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4. The final set of recommendations concerned income-tax. On the 
question of income-tax, the position of the Finance Department had been 
that it could not afford to give up any income-tax immediately and that 
the other forms of assistance- given to the provinces should be kept in 
mind while determining the provinces share in the proceeds of income-tax 
revenue. Niemeyer's recommendations were generous towards the centre. 
The report recommended that the maximum practicable distribution of 
the yield of income-tax should be made at the outset, but that the maximum 
that could be distributed, given the need of the centre, was 50%. Thus the 
minimum mentioned in the White Paper was adopted as the maximum possible. 
This 50% would amount to about Rs 6 crores. 
However - "It is clear that in the years immediately following the 
introduction of Provincial Autonomy there can -be no question of the 
Centre's relinquishing a further six crores or so of its resources. " 
The report therefore recommended that the centre should retain for a 
period of 5 years, a part of the provincial share of income-tax. This part 
was to be equivalent to the amount by which the central share plus the 
annual contribution made by the railways to central revenues would fall 
short of Rs 13 crores a year. At the end of the 5 years, this amount was to 
be gradually returned to the provinces over a further period of 5 years. If 
necessary, this second period could be extended if the circumstances so 
required, for the Governor-General could then use his delaying powers 
under Section 138 (2) (b) (ii). 
Finally, as regards distribution of income-tax between the provinces, 
the report considered previous discussions of the subject irrelevant 
since they had related to a different constitutional and financial scheme 
from that outlined in the 1935 Act. Several principles could be adopted as 
bases for distribution - collection, residence, and incidence. Each 
province advocated that basis for division which gave it the largest 
dividend. None of the above criteria had any particular scientific 
validity, and the report rejected them all. The report based its 
recommendations on other considerations - that in a federation, the 
constituent units, should be made as far as possible viable. The yield of 
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common taxes levied by the provinces, varied from one province to another 
and created budgetary imbalances in some. Federal assistance should aim to 
remove this imbalance as far as possible. The report recommended that the 
percentage of income-tax to be assigned to the provinces should be 
calculated partly on residence and partly on population. The latter, 
though an unscientific and unusual basis for adoption as a basis for 
distribution, could be said to reflect needs, and in a federation, central 
assistance should be based on needs. Lastly, for administrative reasons, it 
was convenient to base the distribution, not on figures to be ascertained 
each year, but on fixed percentages. These were as follows: 
Table 1: Niemeyer Scheme for distribution of income-tax 
Madras 15 
Bombay 20 
Bengal 20 
United Provinces 15 
Punjab 8 
Bihar 10 
Central Provinces 5 
Assam 2 
North West Frontier-Province 1 
Orissa 2 
Sind 2 
Total 100 
I 
The brief outline of the main points of the Niemeyer Report shows that 
it incorporated many of the proposals put forward by the Finance 
Department. In a letter to the Finance Member, sent after the report was 
published, Niemeyer wrote - "I think on the whole you got as much out of 
this affair as you could very well hope to do". [49] There was however, 
little reaction to' the report from outside the bureaucracies - "the 
English papers, as you will have seen, took it quite calmly (being of 
course no longer interested in India at all and knowing very little about 
it)". [50] 
[49] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to-Grigg dated 2 June 1936. 
[50] PJGG Letter from Niemeyer to Grigg dated 15 May 1936. 
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The decision on separation of finances of the centre and the provinces 
had placed the centre in a strong position vis-a-vis the provinces. 
Implementation of the decision and the part played in it by the centre, 
strengthened further the financial position of the centre. The payment of 
the necessary amounts of income-tax to the provinces was made dependent on 
the solvency of the centre. The centre was not receiving any contributions 
from the Railways due to continued deficits in the Railway Budget. The 
Report recommended that in the initial 5 year period the centre was to 
retain the whole or part of the share of the Provinces as was necessary to 
bring the proceeds of the share accruing to the centre plus the Railway 
contribution to Rs 13 crores, and this was to be gradually reduced over the 
next 5 year period. [511 This did lead to complaints from the 
provinces, whose demands for a share in the proceeds . of 
income-tax 
stretched back over a number of years, but they were in no position to 
resist. The Niemeyer Report was accepted in its entirety and embodied in 
the Government of India (Distribution of Revenues) Order, 1936. The 
recommendations made in the report became binding on the centre and the 
provinces. Thus with the passing of the necessary order, implementation of 
the decision on the separation of finances between the centre and the 
provinces was completed. 
Finally, the importance, both of the decision examined above and its 
implementation for future centre-state [52] financial relations should be 
noted. Centre-state financial relations in the first decade after 
independence show the influence of both, the financial provisions of the 
1935 Act and of their implementation. 
2.9 Centre-State Financial Relations after Independence 
The constitution of independent India retained the financial 
provisions of the 1935 Act, and the same broad division of revenues set out 
in the Act was continued. This gave the centre the elastic sources of 
revenue such as customs and excise and also larger resources than it 
[51] Vakil and Patel, Finance under Autonomy, pp5-6. 
[52] All the units in independent India were designated as states. 
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needed, so that the states remained financially dependent on the centre. 
This financial dependence was in line with the political dependence of the 
states on the Union as laid down in the constitution. Since the more 
flexible-sources of revenue were allotted to the centre, the constitution 
made provisions for grants-in-aid to the states and for their obligatory 
participation in the net proceeds from income-tax. They could also be 
allotted a share in some excise duties. The Constitution followed the 
precedent set by the Government of India Act, 1935, in that both grants-in 
aid. and the share of the states in income-tax and the basis on which it was 
to be distributed among them were to be determined by an Order of the 
President. The President was to take into consideration the 
recommendations of a Finance Commission appointed for this purpose before 
issuing the necessary orders. The constitution provided for the setting up 
of a Finance Commission, a body independent of the government, every five 
years, to determine both, grants from the centre, and the share of states 
in specified taxes. The principles on which grants-in-aid were to be made, 
the states'. share of income-tax and the principles on which it was to be 
divided among the states as laid down by Niemeyer were closely followed 
both in the interim arrangements made just after independence and in the 
reports of the first two Finance Commissions. 1533 
2.10 Conclusion 
In the present chapter, implementation of the decision on the 
separation of revenues between the centre and the provinces has been 
examined. It was necessary in analysing implementation, to begin with the 
process by which the decision was made, to find out if the time taken over 
the decision was short or long and whether there was controversy over the 
making of the decision. The financial provisions under the 1935 Act 
represent the decision that was to be implemented. The actors involved in 
implementation were identified and an account of how the decision was 
implemented has been given. The extent to which the evidence from this 
case study supports the model and propositions is examined later in the 
concluding chapter. These issues will be examined after analysis of the 
[53] Chanda, Federalism in India, pp156-163 and pp188-215. 
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next two case-studies of implementation. 
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Chapter 3 
Provincial Autonomy 
3.1 Introduction .,. 
The decision to grant the provinces of British India autonomy and fully 
responsible governments by abolishing dyarchy, was one of the major 
decisions incorporated in the 1935 Act. The background to this decision, in 
particular the granting of a measure of autonomy to the provinces through 
the system of dyarchy under the Government of India Act, 1919, has been 
briefly sketched at the end of Chapter 1. In studying implementation of 
this decision it is necessary, first, to examine the making of this 
decision, in particular the amount of time taken, and if the decision time 
was long to examine whether this led to controversy. The propositions put 
forward in Chapter 1 suggest that these are important factors that may 
affect the implementation process. 
3.2 Making of the decision on provincial autonomy. 
The time taken over the decision on provincial autonomy was long, as 
the process was begun, as it was with all the decisions incorporated 
within the 1935 Act with the appointment of the Simon Commission [1] in 
November 1927. It was not completed till almost eight years later when, in 
' August 1935, the Act passed into the statute books. 
[1] Coupland, R. (1942) The Indian Problem 1833-1935, London, Oxford 
University Press, p97. Spear suggests it was begun even earlier with 
the Muddiman Committee. This committee however only suggested minor 
amendments to the Government of India Act, 1919. The process to bring 
about major changes was begun with the appointment of the Simon 
Commission. See Spear, P. (1965) The Oxford History of Modern India 
1740-1947, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p365. 
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The Simon Commission was appointed to enquire and report on the working 
of the existing constitution and to recommend any changes that it thought 
were necessary. The Commission's Report suggested many changes. For the 
provinces, it recommended that the existing system of dyarchy 'Should be 
replaced by full responsible government. All departments including law and 
order and finance should be administered by ministers responsible to 
provincial legislatures. There were to be no 'reserved' subjects to be 
administered by the Governor. "It is our intention that in future each 
province should be as far as possible mistress in her own house. Thus 
independent life will be given to the provinces which will form the 
nucleus of the new federal structure. " The only check on the powers of 
provincial ministries was to be provided by powers granted to the 
governors enabling them to override the ministries on specified matters. 
Provincial autonomy was to be "mitigated by the power of intervention 
vested in the Governor for such purposes as the protection of minorities 
and the preservation of order". The Commission recommended that there 
should be no transfer of responsibility at the centre, that relations 
between the executive and legislature should remain unchanged, and that 
responsible government should be tried first in the provinces before it 
was introduced at the centre. [2] 
The appointment of the Simon Commission led to protests in India as its 
members were drawn entirely from the two houses of Parliament and not a 
single Indian was appointed as a member. The Legislative Assembly passed a 
resolution refusing to cooperate, and its lead was followed by all the 
provincial councils (with one exception, the Central Provinces). The 
report of the Central Committee and the reports of the committees 
appointed by the Provincial Legislative Councils came out in favour of the 
abolition of dyarchy and the grant of full responsible government to the 
provinces. These reports indicate that there was support among a section 
of British Indian politicians for the scheme of provincial autonomy. 131 
[2] Report of the Indian Statutory Commission Vol II, Cmd 3569, =1930. See 
Part I, General Principles of Proposals. 
[3] Report of the Indian Statutory Commission Vol III, Cmd 3572,1929-30; 
and Report of the Indian Central Committee, Cmd 3451,1928-29. 
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The Government of India too was in favour of the provinces being made 
autonomous. An important despatch set out the views of the Government of 
India on the proposals made by the Simon Commission. The despatch conveyed 
the agreement of the Government of India with the recommendations of the 
Simon Commission for the reconstitution of provincial governments. It 
accepted that dyarchy had been a transitional device on the road towards 
complete responsibility and that it should be abolished: "we are prepared 
to see provincial administration in all subjects entrusted to responsible 
ministers". The provincial governments too, the despatch stated, were 
unanimous that a great step forward should be taken. There were 
differences in the views of the provincial governments; but these were 
about details, not about the main issue of provincial autonomy. Thus 
members of the Government of India, both at the centre and in the 
provinces, supported provincial autonomy. [41 
While the Simon Commission was proceeding with its inquiry, nationalist 
demands expressed in India showed that though Indian nationalist opinion 
was at variance with that of the government on other issues, it was in 
agreement with it on the issue of provincial autonomy. An All Parties 
Conference under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru produced a report that 
asked for full responsible government, both in the provinces and at the 
centre. The Aga Khan led the majority of Muslims in producing a- Muslim 
answer to the Nehru Report. The Muslims demand was for a federal 
constitution with a maximum of powers to be vested in the provinces and 
with a minimum of authority to be retained at the centre. The 
recommendation of the Simon Commission for autonomy for the provinces was 
one which fitted in with ideas expressed in both reports. [5] 
In Britain, it was clear, as preparations were made for the first Round 
Table Conference, that the delegates from the Liberal Party under Reading, 
and from the Tory party under Hoare, were basing their position on the main 
[4] Government of India's Despatch on Proposals for Constitutional 
Reform, Cmd 3700,1930, pp 17-18. 
[5] Coupland Indian Problem, pp87-96. 
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recommendations of the Simon Report. [6] Even the diehards on the extreme 
right of the Conservative Party, stood by the recommendations made in the 
Report of the Simon Commission. They accepted that there should be 
constitutional advance in the provinces, but opposed any changes at the 
centre. The diehards were opposed to constitutional advances that* went 
beyond the Simon Commission's recommendations. Henry Page Croft, one of the 
leading diehards, moved a private member's motion in the House of Commons 
in February°1933, asking for a vote in favour of the Simon Commission 
Report. [7] In contrast, the Labour Party was prepared to go further 
towards meeting Indian demands than was suggested by the Simon Report. It 
is sufficient to note here that despite other differences between them, 
all the political parties in Britain were in support of the provinces 
being granted autonomy and fully responsible governments: " 
With support for the proposal for provincial autonomy both in India and 
in Britain, the Simon Commission's recommendation for the 'abolition of 
dyarchy and the establishment of responsible governments in the provinces 
found ready acceptance at the first RTC. "That the Conference-would adopt 
the Simon Commission's recommendation of full responsible government in 
the Provinces was a foregone conclusion. " [8] The work of the Conference 
was carried out by a number of committees appointed to work out details of 
issues on which agreement had been reached at the Conference. The 
Provincial Constitution subcommittee, as expected, recommended that 
dyarchy should be abolished in the provinces and that all subjects should 
be administered by a collectively responsible cabinet, subject to the 
Governors' powers of intervention. It recommended that minority interests 
should be represented in the Cabinet. Whether provincial legislatures were 
to be unicameral or bicameral was left to be decided by the individual 
provinces. [9] 
[6] Moore, R. J. (1970) "The Making of India's Paper Federation, 1927-35", in 
Philips, C. H. & Wainwright, M. D. (eds), The Partition of India, London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, p60. 
[7] Croft, H. P. (1948) My Life of Strife, London, Hutchinson & Co Ltd, p217. 
[8] Coupland, R. (1945) India. A Restatement, London,, Oxford University 
Press, p136. 
[9] Coupland Indian Problem, p119. 
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The second RTC was dominated by the communal problem namely the 
difficulty encountered in reaching agreement between Hindus and Muslims. 
There was, however, no disagreement regarding provincial autonomy. The 
Prime Minister was able to announce in his- closing statement - "we are all 
agreed that the Governors' Provinces of the future are to be responsibly 
governed units, enjoying the greatest possible measure of freedom from 
outside interference and dictation in carrying out their own policies in 
their own sphere". [10] 
By the time the third session of the RTC was held, the provincial 
constitutions were regarded as more or less settled. Discussions at this 
short session were mainly about the centre. [111 
The Simon Commission's recommendations for provincial autonomy thus had 
widespread support both in Britain and in India. At the RTC, agreement was 
quickly reached on the establishment of responsible governments in the 
provinces. The formal decision granting the provinces autonomy was not 
however made till the Act received royal assent on 4 August 1935. The time 
taken over the decision was thus long, it stretched over a period of nearly 
eight years. This was mainly due to the circumstances in which the 
decision was made, namely that it was linked to several other decisions 
and incorporated in a single Act. The length of time taken over the 
decision was not due to technical difficulties as was the case with the 
separation of finances; nor was the length of time due to differences 
between various parties which had to be resolved by bargaining and 
compromise. One important ommission in the account so far is the opinion 
in the Congress Party towards the proposed changes in the provinces. The 
Congress, apart from Gandhi's brief appearance at the second RTC, was 
absent from the discussions about India's-constitutional future and thus 
was not involved in the making of the decision. The attitude of the 
Congress party towards provincial autonomy is dealt with in greater detail 
below, when implementation is examined. 
[101 bid, p127. 
[ill ibid, P129. 
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3.3 Provincial Autonomy under the 1935 Act. 
The Governors' Provinces [12] Burma was to be separated from India, the 
North West Frontier Province was to be granted provincial status, and two 
new provinces, Orissa and Sind were created. Thus there were to be 11 
Governors' provinces in all - Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces 
(UP), the Punjab, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Berar (CP and Berar), 
Assam, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Orissa, and Sind. In 
addition to the Governors' provinces were the Chief Commissioners' 
provinces which were to continue to be administered from the centre by the 
Governor-General acting through` a Chief Commissioner. These were the 
territories of British Baluchistan, Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the area of Panth Piploda. [13] 
There were two major changes in the provinces. Firstly, they were 
granted autonomy - they were no longer subject to the 'superintendence, 
direction and control' of the central government and the Secretary of 
State, except in certain specified matters. Under the Act of 1919 some 
subjects had been 'transferred' to the provinces, now almost all subjects 
were 'transferred'. The second major change was the introduction of 
responsible government in the provinces. Dyarchy was abolished and 
replaced by a system of popular governments responsible to a popularly 
elected assembly. 
The executive authority of each province was to be exercised by the 
Governor acting on the advice of a Council of Ministers. Unlike the 
Governor-General, the Governor had no reserved departments removed from 
the control of ministers, and he had no special responsibility for the 
financial stability of his province. The Act did lay down matters in which 
the Governor was to 'act in his discretion', such as the summoning of the 
legislature and the appointment of Ministers, and others in which-he was 
to 'exercise his individual judgement', mainly in the discharge of his 
[12] Government of India Act, 1935, Part III. 
[13] For Chief Commissioners' Provinces see Government of India Act, '1935, 
Part IV. 
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'special responsibilities'. [14] These included the prevention of menace 
to the peace and tranquillity of his province, safeguarding the interests 
of the minorities, the protection of the rights of civil servants, the'good 
government of backward areas excluded from the normal administration, the 
protection of the rights of the states and their rulers, and the execution 
of orders from the Governor-General with regard to certain federal 
interests. In all such cases, Ministers could tender advice to the Governor 
but he was to 'exercise his individual judgement as to the action to be 
taken', while earlier he had been subject to the orders of the Governor- 
General and the Secretary of State. 
Provincial legislatures varied. Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United 
Provinces, Bihar, and Assam, were to have bicameral legislatures, called 
the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council, other provinces were to 
have only one chamber, called the Legislative Assembly. The size and 
composition of the legislative bodies also differed between the provinces. 
The number of members for the Legislative Assembly were - 250 for Bengal, 
228 for the United Provinces, 215 for Madras, 175 for Bombay and the 
Punjab, 152 for Bihar, 112 for the Central Provinces and Berar, 108 for 
Assam, 60 for Sind and Orissa, and 50 for the NWFP. The manner in which the 
members of the -'legislative councils were to be selected varied from 
province to province. In Bengal and Bihar a large proportion of the seats 
was to be filled in by the Legislative Assemblies of those provinces, in 
others, Legislative Assemblies had no say in the composition of the 
council. The franchise was extended on the lines -recommended by the 
Lothian Committee and 30 million people, nearly 1/6 of the adult 
population of India, became eligible to vote. The principle of communal 
representation meant that Muslims, Europeans, Christians, and Sikhs in the 
Punjab, were all accorded special representation. The Muslims in 
particular were given a majority of seats in Bengal (they were given 48% 
of the seats, a virtual majority), Punjab, Sind, and NWFP where they formed 
the largest community. [15] 
C141 Government of India Act, 1935, Section 52. 
[15] Government of India Act, 1935, Schedules V and VI. 
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For the discharge of his 'special responsibilities' and the exercise of 
his 'discretionary' functions, the Governor had powers similar to those of 
the Governor-General. He could prevent discussion of any bill, or clause or 
amendment which was likely to affect the tranquillity of the province. He 
could refuse assent to a bill, or return it for reconsideration, or reserve 
it for the consideration of the Governor-General. He could, at a time of 
emergency, promulgate an ordinance which would beývalid for 6 months, or 
pass a Governor's Act. Finally, in the event of a breakdown of the 
constitutional machine, the Governor could assume by proclamation, all the 
powers of the government. [16] 
3.4 Implementation 
In examining implementation of this decision, it is necessary to see if 
the amount of time available for its implementation was long or short; to 
set out the steps that had to be taken for the decision to be implemented; 
to ask who were the agents and target parties involved in implementation, 
and whether there was cooperation from agents or-resistance from target 
parties; to see if any interest groups got involved and if so did they have 
influence. In short, the account of the implementation of this decision 
attempts to answer those questions raised by the propositions set out in 
Chapter 1. 
The time available for implementation was fairly short. The British 
Government had announced that the 1935 Act would come into force on 1 
April 1937. All decisions incorporated in the Act, except the decision on 
federation (and the related decision establishing the Federal Railway 
Authority), were to be implemented by 1 April 1937. [17] Elections were to 
be held before this date so that popularly elected ministries could take 
office on 1 April 1937 and so inaugurate the provincial constitutions. 
The decision on provincial autonomy was a closed }decision with no 
outstanding issues left to be dealt with during implementation, unlike the 
[16] Government of India Act, 1935, Sections 75,76,84,88-93. 
[17] Coupland Indian Problem, p133. 
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first case examined. It was only necessary, after the Act had been passed, 
to hold a general election to fill the seats in the provincial 
legislatures. Once an election had been held, popular ministries would be 
formed in the provinces and the decision would be implemented. (18] 
The number of parties involved in implementation was very large. The 
Viceroy and members of the Government of India were the primary agents 
involved in implementation, but were subject to the overall control of the 
Cabinet in London. The Viceroy, as the man , on the spot in India, was given 
considerable freedom of action, but events in India during the period of 
implementation were watched with some anxiety- in London. Concern was 
expressed in the Cabinet and in Parliament when there were delays in 
implementation. There was as has been shown, support for the scheme of 
provincial autonomy in the Government of India and it could thus be 
expected to cooperate in getting the decision implemented. 
The target parties involved in implementation were the political 
parties in India. These were, the Congress Party, the Muslim League, and a 
number of political parties in the provinces. [19] It is convenient, for 
purposes of analysis, to divide the target parties into two, into Congress 
and non-Congress parties. Firstly, during the period under study, the 
Congress was the only party with an all-India organisation and following. 
Most other parties which contested the elections were regional parties, 
many of them organised by landowners to protect the interests of the 
landed classes: the Unionist Party under Sikander Hyat Khan in the Punjab, 
the Justice Party in Madras, the National Agriculturist Party under the 
leadership of the Nawab of Chhatari in the United Provinces, and 
Independent Workers' Parties in Bombay and the Central Provinces. [20] The 
only other party which could claim to be a national party, the Muslim 
League, was, before the elections of 1936-37, in a dormant condition. The 
[18] The two changes in the provinces, autonomy from the centre and the 
establishment of fully responsible governments were closely linked; 
provincial autonomy would be meaningless without transfer of 
government to popularly elected assemblies. 
[19] See Misra, B. B. (1976) The Indian Political Parties, Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, pp312-313. 
[20] Rizvi, G. (1978) Linlithgow and India, London, Royal Historical Society, 
pp23-24. 
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president of the League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, had stayed on in Britain 
after the second RTC and had distanced himself from politics in India. The 
League was mainly an upper and middle class organisation during this 
period, dominated by landlords and titled gentry, and did not have a mass 
following. Within a very short time it became transformed but during 
implementation of provincial autonomy it was organisationally weak. [21] 
Secondly, for provincial autonomy to be successfully implemented, the 
target parties had to agree to contest the elections to be held for the 
provincial legislatures, and, if elected, to accept office. The non- 
Congress parties agreed to both and thus did not resist implementation. 
The, Congress Party on the other hand though it did contest the elections, 
did not immediately accept office and forced a further period of 
bargaining and negotiation. Thus implementation in provinces in which the 
Congress Party was in a dominant position followed a different pattern 
from those in which non-Congress parties attained a majority. The two 
steps required by the target parties in cooperating with implementation of 
provincial autonomy are examined below. 
*3.5 Agreement to contest elections 
3.5.1 Non-Congress Parties 
The Muslim League, like the Congress Party, condemned the 1935 Act. At a 
session held in Bombay in April 1936, the League passed a resolution 
condemning the Act, but unlike the Congress, the League did not reject the 
whole of the Act. It criticised the safeguards, the powers invested in the 
governors which prevented truly responsible governments from being formed 
in the provinces, but, given the prevailing conditions in the country, 
recommended that the provincial scheme be given a trial. [221 Other 
political parties too had expressed dissatisfaction with the scheme of 
provincial autonomy, but they too, were willing to participate in the 
[211 bid, p21. 
[22] Coupland, R. (1943) Indian Politics 1936-1942, London, Oxford 
University Press, p8. 
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elections. [23) 
3.5: 2 The Congress Party ' 
, 
The Congress Party had condemned all aspects of the 1935 Act, as they 
had been set out in. the White Paper on constitutional reforms. The Report 
of the Joint Select Committee was declared as being, ! even worse than that 
of the White Paper'. The- Congress Working Committee demanded a new 
constitution drawn up by a . democratically. elected Constituent 
Assembly. [241 In all its public pronouncements, the Congress continued to 
express its opposition to both the major decisions, federation and 
provincial autonomy. There were, however, important differences in the 
party's attitude to the two decisions. Public condemnation of the 'the Act' 
hid- important differences' between the left and right wings of the party on 
the issue of provincial autonomy. 
The Indian National Congress was a well-disciplined national party. It 
held regular sessions to which all areas sent delegates. The delegates 
elected the-President and the All India Congress Committee (AICC) to carry 
out the party's programme which was decided at these sessions. The party's 
most powerful organ was the Congress Working Committee (CWC) and its 
members were not elected, but were chosen by the President of the party. 
Though a unified national party, there'were factions within the Congress. 
At the time of the elections to the Central Legislature in 1934, a section 
of the Congress, mainly members of the Hindu Mahasabha, led by Madan Mohan 
Malaviya and M. S. Aney had broken away and stood as the 'Congress 
Nationalists because they were totally opposed to the communal award. ' In 
the legislature, the two parties usually voted together except on communal 
questions and thus' functioned for, all'"practical purposes as one 
party. [25] Around the same time, there emerged a left wing in the party, 
with the formation of the Congress Socialist Party. [26] Unlike the 
Congress Nationalist Party, the Socialist Party remained within the 
[23] Rizvi Linlithgow, p17. 
[24] Coupland Indian Politics, p8. 
[25] Majumdar, R. C. (1969) Struggle for Freedom, Bombay, Bhartiya Vidya 
Bhavan, pp541-542. 
[26] Misra Political Parties, p284. 
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Congress. Its members were members of the Indian National Congress and-it 
subscribed to the Congress programme and constitution. Though Nehru was 
the undisputed leader of the left, he did not associate himself with' it 
formally. [27] Some years later, in 1939, when the differences between Bose 
and Gandhi came to a head, Bose resigned from the post of Congress 
President and organised a new party within the Congress, the Forward Bloc, 
to bring together the radical and left-wing elements in the party. [28] 
Thus, though the Congress was one political party, there were powerful 
interest groups within it. It was primarily the activities of one of these 
interest groups, the left wing, that led to difficulties in implementing 
provincial autonomy. 
Gandhi was aware of the ideological divisions within the Congress party 
between the conservatives led by Vallabhai Patel and Rajendra, Prasad and 
the socialists led by Jaya Prakash Narayan. He had Nehru elected Congress 
President in 1936 while the latter was still in Europe where his wife 
Kamala had died in hospital. [29] Gandhi felt Nehru would be acceptable to 
both groups. Nehru's left-wing sympathies were well-known. He was' also 
recognised as Gandhi's 'favourite son' and was thus acceptable to the right 
wing. Gandhi's suggestion was accepted as a way of avoiding controversy in 
the party. [30] 
The differences between the left and right wings of the party, came to 
the fore during implementation of the decision on provincial autonomy. 
Nehru and the left wing were opposed to any form of cooperation with the 
government. Nehru denounced the Act as "a 'new charter of slavery' and 
repeated Congress demands for the election of a Constituent Assembly. [31] 
Nehru was totally opposed to accepting office in the provinces and he had 
the support of Gandhi, but there were many on the right such as 
[27] Brecher, M. (1959) Nehru. A Political Biography, London, Oxford 
University Press, pp217-218. 
[28] Majumdar Struggle for Freedom, p571. 
[29] Gopal, S. (1975) Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography. Vol, I 1889-1947, 'London, 
Jonathan Cape, p200. 
[30] Brecher, M. (1959) Nehru, pp211-214. Tomlinson, B. R. (1976) Indian 
National Congress and the Raj 1929-1942, London, Macmillan, p56. 
1311 Coupland Indian Politics, p12. 
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Rajagopalachari and Ansari who were in favour. [32] The possibility of 
wielding power in the provinces, even though this power would be limited, 
was one which attracted many on the right of the party. [33] There were 
also differences between the right and the left on whether or not the 
party should adopt a socialist programme, but these are not dealt with 
here. The divisions were not clear-cut; for example both Nehru and Bose 
were leaders of the left but there were important differences between them 
such as in their attitudes to fascism. 1341 
That the attitude of the party towards provincial autonomy and towards 
federation was not identical despite the rhetoric condemning 'the Act' 
became clear at the Lucknow session of the Congress held in 1936. There was 
seen to be considerable support within the party for the scheme 'of 
provincial autonomy. This led, in the first instance, to the Congress party 
agreeing to contest the elections. At a meeting of the Congress Working 
Committee before the main session at Lucknow, the majority were in favour 
of office acceptance and Nehru who opposed it was isolated. [35] Nehru 
sponsored a number of radical resolutions but most were defeated at the 
subsequent session. 
"On the vital issue of the moment, the party's attitude to the 1935 
Government of India Act, Nehru suffered a defeat. The Congress rejected the 
Act 'in its entirety' and renewed the demand for a Constituent Assembly. 
But at the same time it agreed to contest the elections and, most 
important, it shelved the question of 'office acceptance'. Critics on the 
Left endorsed Nehru's views and called for an unequivocal rejection of 
office in advance, but the lure of power and prestige was too great for the 
majority. " 1361 
The right wing which was not opposed to the decision' on provincial 
autonomy was, as the Lucknow session showed, in a position of strength 
within the party. This led to the party agreeing to contest the 
[32] Gopal Nehru Vol I, p200. 
[33] Brecher Nehru, p216. 
[34] Majumdar Struggle for Freedom, pp557-558. 
1351 Gopal Nehru, Vol I, p204. 
[36] Brecher Nehru, p220. 
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forthcoming elections. The crucial question, of office acceptance was left 
to be decided at the proper time by the AICC in consultation with the 
Provincial Congress Committees. 1371 
Nehru agreed to contest the elections. They would serve a useful 
purpose by helping the party to develop mass contacts for the electorate 
had been expanded and included 30 million voters. The elections, Nehru 
felt, could be used to carry the message of the Congress to the people. 
Thus Nehru rationalised and "did not face up to the fact that electoral 
success and the opportunity of forming ministries, would in themselves 
further weaken the position of those in the party of his way of thinking. 
It would have been far easier to secure a commitment to non-acceptance 
when the lure of office was not immediate. Postponement, by the very nature 
of the situation transferred the advantage to the other side". [38] 
As Congress President, Nehru could choose the members of the new 
Congress Working Committee that was to be formed. He selected its members 
to reflect the views of the majority in the party rather than his own. He 
chose ten members from the right who were against his socialist policies 
and were inclined towards office acceptance and only four from the left. 
There were clashes between the CWC and the President, but as the elections 
drew near, there was a uniting of ranks as the party prepared itself to 
fight the elections. 1391 1 
The election manifesto issued by the AICC in August 1936 once again 
rejected 'the entire 1935 Act'. It stated that the only purpose_of sending 
Congressmen to the legislatures was to combat and seek an end to the Act 
though it did not state how this was to be done. The issue of office 
acceptance was again postponed and left to be dealt with after the 
elections. [40] 
[37] Sitaramayya, B. P. (1947) The History of the Indian National Congress, 
Vol II, 1935-1947, Bombay, Padma Publications Ltd, p12. 
[38] Gopal Nehru, Vol I, p206. 
[39] Brecher Nehru, pp224-225. 
[40] Coupland Indian Politics, pp12-13. 
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The next session of the Congress was held at Faizpur in Maharashtra in 
December 1936. Nehru was reelected President as a change in the middle of 
the election campaign would have been unwise. Nehru's presidential speech 
reflected again his views and those of the left: the Congress party was in 
favour of a Constituent Assembly, it was contesting the elections to rally 
the masses and it would not cooperate with the government. [411 The 
crucial issue of office acceptance which would be decisive in whether or 
not the Party cooperated with the government was again postponed and left 
to be discussed by the AICC immediately after. the elections. It was 
decided at Faizpur to hold a convention of elected legislators after the 
elections, who would, it 
Constituent Assembly. [42] 
3.6 Elections of 1937 
was declared, put forward a demand for a 
The elections for the provincial legislatures were held in the winter 
of 1936-37. The differences between the right and left wings of the 
Congress were put aside as the party united to fight the elections. The 
Congress had a party organisation that extended to most parts of the 
country and large numbers of volunteers willing to work for the 
party. [43] In Vallabhai Patel it had a most able campaign organiser. The 
campaign was led by Nehru who plunged enthusiastically into the task, 
carrying the Congress message to the people. He travelled all over the 
country using every available means of transport from aeroplanes to camels 
and elephants and millions of people came to hear him. [44] The electorate 
had been widened and comprised over 30 million men and women. To help 
illiterate voters, symbols and coloured boxes were used. Turnout at the 
[41] Gopal Nehru, Vol'I, p217. 
[42] Sitaramayya History of Congress, Vol II, p35. 
[43] Misra Political Parties, p314. 
[44] Brecher Nehru, pp227-229. 
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elections was high. [45] 
3.7 Results of the elections 
The elections were an undoubted triumph for the Congress Party. Out of 
a total of 1585 seats in the Provincial Legislative Assemblies, the 
Congress won 706 seats. A number of seats were reserved for 
representatives of certain communities and of some special interests. 
While the Congress did put up candidates and did win some of these seats 
such as Women's and Labour seats, the extent of the Congress success is 
better appreciated when it is realised that the total of general seats was 
only 808. In five provinces the Congress obtained clear majorities and it 
was the largest single party in two others. The table below shows the seats 
won by the Congress Party in each of the eleven provinces. 1461 
[45] Rizvi Linlithgow, p25. NB - Turnout was not 54% as stated in some 
works. The percentage of votes polled to the total number of voters 
was not equal to the percentage of the electorate which voted. There 
were some constituencies in almost all the provinces which returned 
more than one member and in these constituencies each voter was at 
liberty to poll more than one vote. See Returns Showing the Results 
of Elections in India, 1937. Cmd 5589,1937-38. 
[46] Returns Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937. Cmd 5589, 
1937-38. For a summary of results see Misra Political Parties, pp312- 
313. Figures for the exact number of seats won by the Congress in each 
province vary in historical works of that period. See Sitaramayya 
History of Congress, Vol II, p 39; Coupland Indian Politics, -p 16; 
Rizvi Linlithgow, p 26. The discrepancies are caused by the fact that 
the official results of the elections give the results for each 
constituency, but no overall summary. Misra, with a table that gives 
the total number of seats won by each party in each province, plus 
overall totals, provides the most accurate figures. - 
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Table 2: Seats won by the Congress Party in 1937 
Province Total no of Seats won by %age of Total 
seats Congress 
Madras' 215 159 74 
Bombays 175 85 49 
Bengal' 250 54 21 
United Provinces 228 134 59 
Punjab 175 18 10 
Bihar' 152 91 60 
CP and Berar 112 70 62 
Assam* 108 32 31 
NWFP 50 19 38 
Orissa 60 36 60 
Sind 60 8 12 
Total 1585 706 
*Provinces with bicameral legislatures. Upper House 
Provincial Legislative Council. 
The Muslim League on the other hand, the only other party with any 
claims to be an all-India party, fared extremely badly. In two Muslim 
majority provinces, Sind and NWFP, it failed to win any seats. It did not 
win any seats in Orissa and Bihar. It won only 1 seat in Punjab, 4 seats in 
Assam and 5 in the Central Provinces. In`Bengal it won 40 seats, but, in 
this province, 119 seats had been reserved for the Muslims. It fared better 
in the other provinces - in Madras it won 9 out of 28 Muslim seats, in UP 
26 out of 66 Muslim seats and in Bombay 18 out of 30 Muslim seats. [47] 
The poor showing of the Muslim League meant that though it was willing 
to cooperate in implementing provincial autonomy, it could' not 
significantly affect implementation. The Congress Party in contrast was in 
a position of strength in 7 provinces and thus it had the ability to 
resist implementation in these provinces. Despite differences between its 
right and left wings, 'the party had been united in fighting the elections. 
[47] Returns Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937. Cmd 5589, 
1937-38, and Misra Political Parties, pp312-313. 
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This was only the first step in the decision being implemented. The next 
step was to accept office and form popular ministries. Before turning to 
events in these 7 provinces, it is necessary, to examine very briefly, the 
issue of office acceptance in the 4 provinces in which the Congress was- 
not in a dominant position. 
3.8 Office Acceptance 
3.8.1 Non-Congress Provinces 
Bengal - No party had obtained an absolute majority. Though the 
Congress with 54 members was the largest single party, its members did not 
form a united bloc as several had been returned from special groups. No 
single party was in a position to form a ministry and a coalition 
government was formed under A. K. Fazlul-Huq, leader of the Krishak Proja 
Party. The coalition included the Muslim League, the Independent Scheduled 
Caste Hindus and the Independent Caste Hindus. [48] Though the government 
remained in power till December 1942, it was not a strong or stable 
government and the internal strains and dissensions came to the fore on 
several occasions. The government could not rely on the support of the 
Scheduled Castes but was able to get support from the- Europeans and 
continue in office. Later there were divisions among the Muslims which 
ended with the League breaking away from the coalition. [49] 
Punjab = Allocation of seats among the different communities had proved 
difficult in the Punjab with the Sikhs claiming weightage as former rulers 
of the Punjab and because of their contribution to the Indian Army. The 
National Unionist Party obtained a clear majority winning 95 seats out of 
a total of 175, and a ministry was formed under its leader, Sikander Hyat 
Khan. His cabinet included Muslims, Hindus and 1 Sikh. The Unionist party 
had the support of one group of Sikhs and despite the breaking away of a 
small group of Independents, the government was not in danger of being 
[48] Majumdar Struggle for Freedom, p577. 
[49] Coupland Indian Politics, pp27-28. 
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defeated. Thus the the government in the Punjab was both a strong and 
stable one. [50] 
Assam - The Congress Party won the largest number of seats, 32 out of a 
total of 108, but this was well below a majority. There were 14 parties in 
all among whom the seats were distributed. An eminent Muslim lawyer, Sir 
Syed Muhammad Saadulla, was invited to form a government and managed to 
get enough support from the several Muslim parties, the Europeans, and a 
few Independents to form a government. The majority was a precarious one 
and politics in Assam remained complex and unstable during the period of 
provincial self-government. The Congress succeeded in forcing a motion of 
no-confidence in September 1938. Thereafter a ministry under a Congress 
Prime Minister was formed till all Congress governments resigned in 
October 1939, when Sir Muhammad Saadulla again became the Premier. This was 
followed by a period of Governor's rule. [511 
Sind - The chief Muslim party, the Sind United Party won 18 seats, the 
Congress 8 seats, and the remaining seats were divided between several 
Hindu and Muslim parties and a few independents. A ministry was formed 
under Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, a leader of the Sind United Party. 
The coalition he headed was an uneasy one since the Muslims in it failed 
to put up a united front. The Ministry did not survive long and was 
succeeded by another in early 1938 which managed to stay in office with 
the support of the Congress. There were further changes in the government 
during the period of provincial' self-government, and politics in Sind, as 
in Assam, remained complex during this period. [52] 
3.8.2 Congress Provinces 
Of the two steps necessary for implementing provincial autonomy, 
contesting elections and acceptance of office, the Congress Party, despite 
differences between its right and left wings had agreed to the first. The 
left wing felt that participation in the elections would help the party 
extend its popular base. It was opposed to office acceptance for fear that 
[50] ibid, p42. 
[51] ibid, pp56-58. 
[52] bid, pp65-68. 
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once in, government, the Congress would cease to be a revolutionary 
organisation and that it would become absorbed instead in the politics of 
reform. The moderates were in favour of the party contesting elections and 
also in favour of accepting office. They felt this would strengthen the 
position of the party, while refusal to accept office would allow parties 
opposed to the Congress to exploit the situation to their advantage. There 
was support too among the right wing for the idea that by accepting office 
the Congress would be able to bring about the social and agrarian reforms 
promised in the 'election manifesto. The -differences' 'between the two 
groups 1531 had been resolved by deciding to contest the elections and by 
postponing the question of office acceptance. Once the results of the 
elections were known, this important issue could not be' postponed any 
further. 
The question of office acceptance was debated by the Congress Party in 
Delhi in March 1937. At Faizpur it had been agreed to summon a convention 
of all Congressmen who had been elected as legislators. The purpose of the 
convention was meant to be to reiterate the demand for a Constituent 
Assembly and to find ways to combat the Act. However, "any such convention 
of legislators could be expected to display an eagerness for office; and 
to summon such a meeting was to promote a decision to`that effect". 1541 
Nehru argued for the left-wing that the Congress should refuse to form 
ministries and thus force the Governors to form minority ministries. The 
Congress could then defeat these ministries by a vote, of no-confidence, 
the Governors would be forced to assume powers themselves under Section 93 
of the Act and this would demonstrate the failure of the 
constitution. [55] The left-wing remained opposed to office acceptance 
despite the scale of the Congress victories. The majority however was in 
favour of office acceptance. Gandhi's inclination was to support Nehru, but 
he responded to the overwhelming mood of the party. The National 
Convention of Congress legislators was preceeded by a meeting of the AICC 
[53] For differences between the right and left wings of the party see 
Misra Political Parties, Chapter 5. 
[54] Gopal Nehru, Vol I, p217. 
[55] Rizvi Linlithgow, p32. 
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on 17-18 March. 1567, The moderates succeeded in putting through a 
resolution permitting the acceptance of office. The activities of'the left 
wing had not been entirely in vain. The resolution contained a rider, a 
condition had to be fulfilled before the Congress would signify its 
willingness to accept office. 
The strenuous opposition of the left wing to the scheme of provincial 
autonomy thus led to a condition being attached to the Congress Party's 
resolution of office acceptance. This condition proved to be a stumbling 
block that prevented provincial autonomy from being implemented for 
several months. I 
f 
On the crucial question of office acceptance, the resolution of the 
AICC meeting of 18 March stated: "And on the pending question of office 
acceptance, and in pursuance of the policy summed up in' the foregoing 
paragraphs, the All-India Congress Committee authorises and permits the 
acceptance of offices in Provinces where the Congress commands a majority 
in the Legislature, provided the Ministerships shall not be accepted 
unless the leader of the Congress Party in the Legislatures is satisfied 
and is able to state publicly that the Governor will not use his special 
powers of interference or set aside the advice of Ministers in regard to 
constitutional activities ." 
[57] 
The resolution was regarded as defeat for the radicals and a victory 
for the moderates, and it was widely expected that the Congress would 
accept office. The phrasing of the resolution was sufficiently vague and 
it was expected that the Governors would be able to find some way to make 
statements that would satisfy Congress leaders. The assurances demanded 
were put in as a face-saving device, given the vehement criticism by the 
left-wing of the-safeguards. [58] "This formula 'of conditional acceptance 
of ministerial office was a face-saving device of Gandhi, the object being 
to enable the would-be Congress Ministers to satisfy their own followers 
[56] Sitaramayya History of Congress, Vol II, pp43-44. 
[57] Gwyer, M. & Appadorai, A. (eds)(1957) Speeches and Documents on the 
Indian Constitution 1921-1947,2 volumes, London, Oxford University 
Press, pp392-393. 
[58] Coupland Indian Politics, p17. 
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without demanding from Provincial Governors specific assurances which 
they were debarred by the Constitution from giving. " [59] 
In the press and elsewhere, it was assumed that the resolution would 
allow Congress leaders to accept statements about the attitudes , of "I I 
governors and that they would not seek specific assurances which the 
, governors could not give. 
The activities of the left wing led to a ., condition 
being attached to 
the resolution on office acceptance, but this was not expected to prevent 
the formation of Congress ministries. Events took an unexpected turn when 
leaders of the Congress Party in the provinces in which they were in a 
majority asked the Governors to give assurances in identical terms: "that 
in regard to the constitutional activities of his Ministers His Excellency 
will not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of 
my Cabinet". [60] 
Instead of the vague assurances that the Congress originally seemed to 
be demanding, Governors were asked to give specific assurances in terms 
laid down by the Congress Working Committee. The governors informed the 
Congress that they could not give promises not to do, what they were 
required to do by the Act in certain circumstances. Congress leaders 
refused to accept office and instead of forming ministries, the Congress 
observed a day of hartal [611 on 1 April 1937. [62] 
With the refusal of the Congress to form ministries, the Governors had 
two options before them. They could appoint minority ministries, or they 
could declare under Section 93 of the Act, that "a situation has arisen in 
which the government of the Province cannot be carried on in accordance 
with the provisions of the Act" and, assume all powers themselves. On the 
instructions 
, of 
the Viceroy they adopted the_ former course. The 
possibility of these ministries being defeated was avoided by postponing 
[59] Misra Political Parties, pp326-327. 
[60] Quoted in Coupland Indian Politics, p17. 
[61] hartal - closing of shops and offices, suspending work, as a mark of 
political protest. 
1621 Coupland Indian Politics, p17. 
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the summoning of the legislatures. - 
The formation of these minority governments in the Congress provinces 
did not lead to provincial autonomy being implemented: "the crisis was not 
resolved thereby, it was only suspended, since the -legislatures would have 
to be summoned within six months and, when they were summoned, the position 
of Ministers in a minority, unable in particular to carry their budgets 
against the Congress majorities, would clearly become impossible". [63] 
The legislatures would have to be summoned within six months and in the 
intervening period the Viceroy hoped to be able to secure the cooperation 
of the Congress. If the Governors took over responsibility under Section 
93, it would mean accepting that it had not been possible to implement 
provincial autonomy and this he hoped to avoid. [64] 
A period of bargaining and negotiation then followed between the 
Congress Party on the one hand and the Government of India on the other. 
The Congress, though it remained united, was subject to pressures from its 
two factions on the left and the right. Negotiations for the Government of 
India were chiefly in the hands of the Viceroy though he was subject to 
pressures from articles in the, press, from members of Parliament and from 
members of the Cabinet in, Britain. These, negotiations came about not 
because of . 
the nature of the decision, which was closed with no 
outstanding details to be decided during implementation, but because of 
the activities of the left wing of the Congress Party. The need to placate 
this interest group led to the condition being attached to office 
acceptance. 
The centralisatiön of negotiations was due to Gandhi who was anxious to 
keep the party united. Gandhi sought negotiations at the centre, between 
himself and the Viceroy while Linlithgow sought to undermine the party's 
unity by trying to conduct negotiations at the provincial level.. He was 
supported in this policy by the Secretary of State. 
[631 L bid, p18. 
[641 Glendevon, J. (1971) The Viceroy at Bay, London, Collins, p51. 
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"What the Working Committee of the Congress-were particularly anxious 
to secure was a central solution as distinct from solutions arrived at as 
a result of separate negotiations carried on in the Provinces which, if 
successful, would tend to undermine their authority over the organisation 
as a whole. On the other hand I attached importance to negotiations being 
entered into wherever possible between the Governors and the leading 
Congressmen in the Provinces. " [65] 
If the Congress could be persuaded to accept office in at least some of 
the provinces, the unity of the party would be undermined. The national 
leadership under Gandhi and Nehru was adopting a radical line, but there 
were right wing leaders in the provinces who might take a more moderate 
stand. 
Before the AICC met at the end of March 1937 the Provincial Congress 
Committees had been asked to report their views on office acceptance. "Of 
the eighteen Congress provinces who replied, thirteen expressed themselves 
as fully in favour of office acceptance, eleven of them with no mention of 
any special conditions. Among the leading Congressmen of the six British 
Indian provinces (thirteen Congress Provinces) in which the Congress had 
secured a clear majority in the elections, there was little doubt about 
whether office should be accepted. Of these provinces, only Maharashtra 
and the U. P. voted against a ministry, while in C. P. for example rumours 
filtering down about conditional acceptance came as 'a great shock'. " [66] 
In Madras in particular, the Congress leaders, Rajagopalachari and 
Satyamurti were very keen to accept office and Rajagopalachari did have 
private talks with Erskine. [67] Gandhi was aware of the weakness of the 
Congress in the provinces and kept negotiations firmly in the centre. 
Despite the eagerness of the Congress in Madras and other provinces to 
accept office, the party remained united and no separate deals were made 
in any of the provinces. "The Congress was not a congeries of autonomous 
provincial parties but a tightly disciplined national organisation. " [68] 
[65] Zetland (1956) Essayez, London, John Murray Ltd, p221. 
[66] Tomlinson Congress and the Raj, p62. 
[67] Rizvi Linlithgow p38. 
[68] Hodson, H. V. (1969) The Great Divide, London, Hutchinson, p63. 
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The Viceroy's refusal to give the assurances demanded by the Congress 
was constitutionally correct. He may also have been suspicious of Gandhi's 
motives in asking for these assurances. He may have feared that giving in 
to Congress demands would lead to a tremendous increase in the prestige of 
the Congress as it would be generally construed as a victory for the 
Congress over the British Government. Not only did the Viceroy refuse to 
give the assurances demanded, he resisted pressures put upon him in the 
ensuing months to give in to Congress demands, demands which had 
originated with the left wing. In the period of controversy that followed, 
the Viceroy came under pressure from several sources including the Cabinet 
in London. 
"The Viceroy now began a long battle of attrition with Congress..... 
Although he was completely supported in his attitude by the Governors and 
the Government of -India, there were to be times when he would feel very 
much alone as far as his relations with the Government at home were 
concerned. " [69] 
On 30 March 1937, Gandhi issued a press statement [70] on the refusal 
of the Governors to give the assurances demanded by the Congress. Gandhi 
had, at that time, withdrawn from active politics, but was still the 
dominant force in the Congress Party. [71] 
"..... I am the sole author of the office-acceptance clause of the 
Congress resolution and the originator of the idea of attaching a 
condition to office acceptance. My desire was not to lay down any 
impossible condition. On the contrary, I wanted to devise a condition that 
could be easily accepted by Governors. There was no intention whatsoever 
to lay down a condition whose acceptance would mean any slightest 
abrogation of the Constitution. Congressmen were well aware that they 
could not, and would not, ask for any such amendment. " 
He went on to explain that the clause was meant to help the Congress 
achieve its objective of creating a situation in which all power would be 
[69] Glendevon Viceroy at Bay, p51. 
[70] Gwyer & Appadorai Speeches and Documents, Vol I, pp393-394. 
[71] Tomlinson Congress and the Raj, p46. 
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transferred. Gandhi said that Samuel Hoare and other ministers had stated 
that ordinarily Governors would not use their special powers, and all the 
Congress was demanding was that the governors give'a specific undertaking- 
to this effect. 
Certainly Gandhi had inserted the clause to placate an important 
interest group in his party, and it is quite likely that he did not expect 
it to prevent the Congress from forming ministries. The governors refusal 
to give the specific assurances left the party with no option but to 
refuse to accept office. 
Gandhi's statement brought no response from official quarters but there 
were letters to the Times from Lord Lothian, who had been a member of the 
Round Table Conference and Chairman of the Franchise Committee and thus 
spoke with some authority on Indian affairs. He may have been requested by 
the India Office to do so. [72] If he was so requested, this was an early 
indication that there was a difference between London and Delhi on how the 
issue ought to be handled. Lord Lothian pointed out that the Governors use 
of safeguards would, in practice, be controlled by public opinion. The 
history of responsible government showed that a governor's decision to 
differ from his Ministers depended on whether they could count on the 
support of the electorate in the event of a dissolution. If there was a 
difference between a Congress ministry and the governor, the matter would 
ultimately be referred to the electorate and since the Congress would be 
sure of being reelected, a deadlock would result. Aware of this, governors 
would be unwilling to use the safeguards or to resort to the special 
powers conferred on them. E73] 
Lord Lothian's letters to the Times led to a modification of the 
Congress demand. The Congress now demanded that if the governor overruled 
his ministers, he must dismiss them. If the ministers retained the support 
of the majority of the legislature, this would mean dissolution of the 
legislature and fresh elections. 1741 A CWC resolution of 26-29 April 
(72] Rizvi Linlithgow, p41. 
[73] Coupland-Indian Politics, p18. 
1741 ibid, pp 18-19. 
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stated: 
"this Committee has grave objection to Ministers having to submit to 
interference by Governors with the alternative of themselves having to 
resign their office instead of the Governors taking the responsibility of 
dismissing them. " 1751 
The Congress demand was modified but it still sought some assurances 
without which it was not. prepared to accept office. 
Others joined in the controversy and opinions on the deadlock were 
expressed both in India and in England. Professor A. B. Keith, a leading 
constitutional historian, 
was critical of the government's attitude, while Tej Bahadur Sapru felt 
that the Congress demand was unreasonable. [76]. Sapru suggested that the 
Viceroy should call a conference with Congress leaders. [77] Gandhi 
proposed that the matter should be referred to a legal tribunal. [78] 
The Viceroy made no moves to break the deadlock and this policy of 
deliberate inaction began to cause anxiety in Britain. This was conveyed 
to the Viceroy by the Secretary of State: 
"A body of opinion here which it would be unwise to discount entirely 
is becoming anxious at continued deadlock and is inclined to take the line 
that Government having made the constitutional position clear ought to 
endeavour to find means of giving Congress opportunity of reconsidering 
situation which they apparently will not do in the absence of any move on 
the part of Government..... " [79] 
The, body of opinion referred to included members of the Cabinet, 
several of whom had special knowledge of India. Among the members of the 
Cabinet were Lord Halifax, formerly Lord Irwin, Samuel Hoare, the former 
Secretary of State for 'India, and John Simon who had been head of the 
[751 Gwyer & Appadorai Speeches and Documents, Vol It pp394-395. 
[76] Rizvi Linlithgow, p42. 
[77] Glendevon Viceroy at Bay, p54. 
[78] Rizvi Linlithgow, p43. 
[79] Quoted in Glendevon Viceroy at Bay, p54. 
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Statutory Commission on Indian Reforms. [80] Lord Halifax in particular 
was in favour of some gesture that would strengthen the position of the 
moderates in the party. He felt the Congress ought to be given a chance to 
make its position clear and he approved of Sapru's suggestion for a 
conference with Congress leaders. Halifax was of the view: 
"that we are not attaching sufficient importance to the psychological 
aspect of the case; that a stonewalling policy shows a lack of imagination 
and will get us nowhere; that while a strong case can be made out on purely 
logical grounds for such a policy, most people's actions are not governed 
by reason but by sentiment, and that this appreciation of human action is 
applicable with special force to Indians of the type of Gandhi. " [81] 
The Secretary of State supported the idea that some move should be 
made. He suggested that Linlithgow should make a statement that the 
Government would not use its reserve powers in a strict or legalistic way, 
nor would it use them to hinder social reforms and that it would adopt a 
sympathetic attitude to reforms proposed by the Congress. [82] 
Linlithgow's response to these requests to make some conciliatory moves 
was a firm no. He gave several reasons why he felt concessions to the 
Congress were out of the question. Given the accepted, policy of provincial 
autonomy, it was undesirable to centralise discussions under the Viceroy - 
this was precisely what the Congress wanted. He realised that several 
people wished him to intervene, but this would appeal to the Congress as 
the best way of escape from the tangle into which they had put themselves. 
It would give Gandhi an opportunity to reestablish his personal position 
and to enhance the prestige of the Congress. He was aware of the arguments 
of the other side, but after closely observing the position and carefully 
weighing the facts, he had decided it was not yet time for him to 
intervene. It was, in his opinion, wisest to allow matters to take their 
course until either the minority ministries were defeated or the Congress 
[80] Moore, R. J. (1970) "British Policy and the Indian Problem 1936-1940" in 
Philips, C. H. & Wainwright, M. D. (eds) The Partition of India, London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, p80. 
[81] Zetland Essayez, p220. 
[82] Glendevon Viceroy at Bay, p54. 
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party made a move. [83] 
The Secretary, 
_-of 
State accepted the Viceroy's judgement and agreed that 
thebest policy in the circumstances would be to let events take their 
course. The matter was discussed by the Cabinet shortly thereafter. On 9 
May 1937, the Secretary of State was able to write to the Viceroy that he 
was pleased at the outcome of the Cabinet meeting. When he had asked for 
the members' support 'for the policy which you and I in most whole-hearted 
agreement were pursuing', even Halifax had acquiesced, though reluctantly, 
and among the Cabinet 'there was not a dissentient voice'. [84] The Viceroy 
was assured of the support of the Cabinet as he sought to bring in' the 
Congress on his terms. Some of the support though, was reluctantly given 
and did not last. 
While the Cabinet gave its support to the Viceroy's policy of 'wait and 
see', other voices were raised in criticism. On 2 May an article appeared 
in the Statesman (an English owned newspaper), headed "Indian Impasse 
Deplored - Unofficial anxiety - Viceroy's silence unhelpful". It' reported 
that members of Parliament in Britain were critical of the Government of 
India's attitude to the deadlock. According to the article, '-the opinion in 
Parliament was that the legislatures should be summoned in the Congress 
Provinces, otherwise the Government of India would incur some share of 
responsibility for any further deterioration in the situation. [85] 
The Government of India's policy was criticised in a House of Lords 
debate. Lord Snell, the leader of the Labour opposition stated that it 
seemed to him that the deadlock was more due to a clash in temperaments 
than to fundamental differences between the two sides. He felt the time 
had come when both sides should make another effort to reach agreement. 
The Government could try and remove any misapprehensions which might exist 
concerning its intentions. It should, in his opinion, give an'assurance 
that the reserved powers of the Governors would not be used 
unnecessarily. [861 
[83] ibid, pp54-55. 
[84] Zetland Essayez, pp220-222. 
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Speaking for the diehards during the debate, Lord Lloyd warned against 
any interview with Gandhi. This caused the Viceroy to comment in a letter 
to the Secretary of State: "Don't forget to remind them [the diehards], if 
I get into trouble, that they all supported provincial autonomy! " [87] 
Despite these criticisms, Linlithgow remained firm in his policy and 
decided that he would not invite Gandhi for talks to try and resolve the 
issue. Hi response to demands for action was to ask the Governors to, 
intensify their efforts to make contact with Congress leaders in the 
provinces, and to make further speeches giving explanations without giving 
the specific assurances demanded by the Congress. He himself could have 
made a speech on the issue but he felt it would be better to wait till it 
was nearer the time for the legislatures to meet as then the Congress 
would be under greater pressure to accept office. [881 
Within the Congress party, the right wing, which had all along been in 
favour of office acceptance, but had stayed out in a show'of unity, began 
to show signs of unease at the continuing stalemate. Rajagopalachari 
approached the governor of Madras, Erskine, with a new formula. He proposed 
that in the event of a disagreement between a governor and his ministers, 
the governor should ask for the latters' resignation. Erskine's reaction 
was that this was exactly the same as the demand that the governors should 
dismiss the ministers. Erskine felt that the Congress wanted that the 
responsibility for the fall of a ministry should always seen to be that of 
the governor and thus he rejected the new formula. [891 
At the beginning of June, Gandhi made a speech in which he said he 
himself was very anxious that the Congress should take office. ' The 
Congress had earlier demanded that a governor should dismiss his ministers 
in the event of a serious disagreement, but he would accept 
Rajagopalachari's formula that the governor should ask for the ministers' 
resignations instead. [90] 
[87] ibid, p57. 
[88] ibid, pp57-58. 
[89] bid, p59. 
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"The-situation was beginning to develop. The fundamental objection of 
Congress to the Constitution had been in no way weakened by recent events, 
but it was evident that there were Congressmen eager to take office. 
Congress's original demands in the matter of the special powers had been 
modified, if only very slightly. Suggestions were being made in some 
Congress speeches that the great need was for proof of British 
friendliness. " [91] 
Another article appeared in the Times [92] "asking that the 
legislatures be summoned soon, before the situation deteriorated. It 
praised the Viceroy's policy of silence, but'felt that the time had come 
for him to take the initiative. Rajagopalachari too'was asking Erskine for 
a conciliatory gesture on 'the part of, the government. He pointed out that 
Gandhi was holding out'an olive branch by changing his stance and if this 
new demand was met, Congress would take office. A conciliatory policy would 
strengthen the position of the moderates, while a policy of confrontation 
would mean that the initiative would pass to the radicals within the 
party. [93] 
The Viceroy now felt the time had come to make a statement. On 22 June 
Linlithgow issued a statement which was, -as the 'summary below shows, 
conciliatory in tone rather than in -content. The assurances demanded by 
the Congress, even the modified ones were not conceded in any way.. The 
statement was a lengthy one and only the main points made in it are 
referred to below. [94] 
The Viceroy acknowledged the misapprehensions felt in certain quarters 
about the relation of Governors to their ministers, misapprehensions that 
had been made abundantly clear in the public discussions of that issue. He- 
felt that these discussions together with the actual working of the 
constitution in the provinces during the last three months had helped to 
remove the existing misapprehensions and misunderstandings. 
[911 ibid, p61. 
[921 11 June 1937. 
[93 1 Glendevon Viceroy at Bay, pp61-62. 
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Referring to the Congress-demand for, assurances-regarding the reserve 
powers of the Governors he said: - 
"Three month's experience of the operation of the Constitution, short 
as I agree that that period is, has conclusively shown from the practical 
point of view that, any legal difficulties in regard to the grant of such 
assurances apart, those assurances are not essential to the smooth and 
harmonious working of the Constitution....... Those three months have shown 
equally, and beyond question, that the apprehensions which have been 
entertained - and I readily accept the sincerity of those apprehensions 
even if I see no foundation of fact for them - that Governors would seek 
occasions for, interfering with the policy of their ministers, or for the 
gratuitous and uncalled for exercise of the special responsibilities 
imposed upon them by the Act to impede or challenge, ministers in the day- 
by-day administration of the Province, have no shadow of 
justification. " 1951 
The special responsibilities of the Governors, he said had been 
restricted to the narrowest limits possible. They did not entitle a 
governor to intervene at random in the administration of the province. He 
made it clear though that these powers would be used to protect minorities 
or interests they were meant to safeguard. 
"In the discharge of the Governor's special responsibilities it, is 
indeed incumbent upon him, to act otherwise than on the advice of his 
ministers if he considers that the action they propose will prejudice the 
minorities or areas or other interests affected. " [96] ' '` 
Referring to the question of resignation or dismissal of, ministries, he 
welcomed the suggestion made by Gandhi that only when an issue between a 
Governor and his ministers constituted a serious disagreement should the 
question of severing their partnership arise. When. such a serious 
disagreement did arise, it would be more consistent with constitutional 
practice if the ministries resigned. 
[95] ibid, p221. 
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"What I am concerned to make clear is that without any threat to those 
[special] interests, or any sacrifice of them, a Governor and his ministers 
can, in my judgement, hope within the provisions of the Act, to operate the 
Constitution in the normal manner which the Act envisages, and to avoid, 
save in circumstances which I find it not easy to contemplate, fundamental 
differences of opinion such as to endanger the relation between the 
Governor and his ministry in that very limited area in which certain 
special obligations and responsibilities are imposed upon a 
Governor. " [97] 
The above summary of the main points of the Viceroy's statement is 
sufficient to show that no attempts had been made to meet Congress demands 
and that the Viceroy had stuck to his intention of not giving way*upon any 
single point. [98] 
"In fact no constitutional ground had been surrendered. Lord Linlithgow 
had not accepted Lord Lothian's doctrine that a conflict between a 
Governor and his Ministers should be resolved by an appeal to the 
electorate, nor did his view that only a conflict on a major issue would 
justify an open breach imply that on other issues the 'safeguards' would 
not operate at all. " [99] 
Press reaction to the Viceroy's statement was favourable but it was the 
Congress Party's response that would be crucial. The Congress Working 
Committee was to meet at Wardha from 5-8 July and a fresh resolution on 
the question of office acceptance was expected. 
In the interval between the Viceroy's statement and the Congress 
response, the Cabinet in London, lost its nerve. [100] A turning point 
seemed, to have been reached in relations between the Congress and the 
Government. The Secretary of State who had so far supported the Viceroy, 
'became overawed by the situation'. [101] On 28-June he wrote to the 
----- --------- 
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Viceroy that it was possible that Congress would still refuse to accept 
office on the grounds that the government was refusing to meet them on a 
small matter. If that happenned the government would be heavily criticised 
in Britain. He himself would be under pressure-from Lothian, from Halifax 
and other like-minded members of the Cabinet. If the Congress continued to 
withhold its cooperation, the left-wing would become dominant while if the 
Congress did cooperate, Indians would become absorbed in administration 
and the gulf between Britain and nationalist India would diminish. When so 
much depended on the question of dismissal versus resignation, Zetland 
argued, it was not right to be rigid. [102] He warned Linlithgow that if 
the Congress did not take office, Halifax would probably persuade the 
Cabinet to insist upon a peace offer being made to the Congress before it 
authorised the Government of India to assume authority in the provinces 
under the emergency powers set out in Section 93. [103] (Governors could 
assume all powers in the provinces under Section 93 with the Concurrence 
of the Viceroy, but the proclamation had to be laid before Parliament. ) 
"Linlithgow was aghast at the letter's contents. He received it on 6th 
July, at the very moment when the Congress were making their decision. He 
had made up his mind that he could not agree to any arrangement with 
Congress which could be seen as being made at the expense of the 
minorities. He had thought his Secretary of State completely supported 
him. Now, at this very moment, he found Zetland was contemplating what he 
felt would amount to a stab in the back. He wired at once that if he was 
ordered to yield he would resign. " [104] 
The question of Linlithgow's resignation did not arise. If the united 
front the governments in Delhi and London had presented was developing 
cracks, that presented by the Congress Party so far was in danger of being 
split apart unless it changed its stand. 
"By the Working Committee meeting of 5 to 7 July, it had become obvious 
even to Nehru and Gandhi that they could hold out no longer against the 
[102]Glendevon Viceroy at Bay, pp64-65. There'is no mention of this letter 
in Zetland's memoirs. 
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pressure from the local and provincial leaders -to accept office. The 
feeling among local Congressmen was 'very strong' on this issue, even in 
Nehru's home town of Allahabad, while five of the six P. L. A. Party leaders 
in the majority provinces also stressed the necessity of acceptance. 
Within the Working Committee, Nehru, Dev and Patwardhan still held out in 
opposition, but the majority felt that, although the required assurances 
had not been given, the weight of opinion within the Congress should be 
respected and offices accepted. " 11051 
At the Congress Working` Committee meeting, Gandhi came under pressure 
from the right-wing to signify acceptance. Members of the right wing such 
as Bhulabhai Desai spoke in favour of office acceptance. Seeing that the 
overwhelming opinion was in favour of office acceptance, Gandhi persuaded 
Nehru who was opposed, to remain silent. [106] The CWC agreed to accept 
office unconditionally. The resolution stated that the statements made by 
the Secretary of State and the Viceroy since the last CWC meeting, fell 
short of the assurances demanded. 
"The Committee feels, however, that the situation created as a result of 
the circumstances and events that have since occurred, warrants the belief 
that it will not be easy for the Governors to use their special powers. The 
Committee has, moreover, considered the views of the Congress members of 
the Legislatures and of Congressmen generally. 
The Committee has therefore come to the conclusion and resolves that 
Congressmen be permitted to accept office where they may be invited 
thereto. But it desires to make it clear that office is to be accepted and 
utilised for the purpose of working in accordance with the lines laid down 
in the Congress manifesto and to further in every' possible way the 
Congress policy of combating the new Act on the one hand and of 
prosecuting the constructive programme on the other. " 11071 
It was undoubtedly the majority view within the Congress Party in 
favour of office acceptance that led to the CWC resolution. If the 
[105]Tomlinson Congress and the Raj, p63. 
[106]Glendevon Viceroy at Bay, p67. 
[107]Gwyer and Appadorai Speeches and Documents, Vol I, pp396-397. 
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Congress persisted in its policy of confrontation, it could not be certain 
of continued support from it own members. 
"Lord Linlithgow certainly wanted the Congress to take office, but so 
now did the great majority of Congressmen. For three months they had 
observed the Act in operation, they had seen that the power it gave to 
Ministers was real power, and whatever may have been said in March, they 
did not really want to be prevented now by a dispute about the 'safeguards' 
from using that power to carry out the social programme which had been put 
so forcibly and successfully to the electorate. " [108] 
As the account above has shown, the right wing of the Congress had 
always been in favour of office acceptance and it was in a majority within 
the party. [109] For three months it had been prevented from attaining its 
objective but could not be held back any longer. The CWC seized on'the 
conciliatory tone of the Viceroy's speech to announce a change. 
"The majority were so anxious for a quick decision that they were 
unwilling even to refer the matter to the AICC. As Jawaharlal ruefully 
commented, the question was being considered the wrong way; not what are 
the reasons for accepting office, but office must be taken and therefore 
reasons have to be found for it. " [110] 
Tomlinson suggests that the emergence of the Congress Socialist Party 
was seen as a challenge to their authority by the right wing who used the 
issue of office acceptance to counter the challenge from the left wing. 
"Because the Congress Socialists and Nehru attacked the vague 
expectations of Council Entry this issue became a trial of strength 
between the two groups in 1936. Council Entry was no more part of Gandhi's 
ideal than it had been of the Socialists' plan. But the direct Congress 
Socialist threat to the position of the 'Gandhians' in the Working 
Committee made them turn to Council Entry and to office acceptance as a 
means of winning back the support of provincial and local Congress 
[108]Coupland Indian Politics, p21. 
[109]The proportion of right-wingers to left-wingers was approximately 
3: 1. See Pandey, B. N. (ed)(1979) The Indian Nationalist Movement, 1885- 
1947. Select Documents., London, Macmillan, pp161-162. 
[110]Gopal Nehru, Vol I, p220. 
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leaders, who had little enthusiasm for the orthodox Gandhian constructive 
programme. " [111] 
Shortly after the CWC resolution, the interim ministries in, the 
provinces in which the Congress had won a majority of seats resigned, and 
leaders of the Congress Party were invited to form governments. Congress 
ministries took office in the provinces of Madras, Bombay, United 
Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces, Orissa and the North West Frontier 
Province. [1121 Provincial autonomy was implemented in all the 11 
Governors' provinces of the new constitution. 
3.9 Conclusion 
The above account of the implementation of provincial autonomy 
illustrates clearly the importance of the role played by target parties in 
implementation. The role of the target parties was crucial, for provincial 
autonomy could not be implemented unless the target parties, the political 
parties in India, agreed first, to contest the elections and secondly, if 
elected, to accept office. All the political parties had the ability, 
though in varying degrees, to resist implementation. Of these only the 
Congress party chose to resist implementation for a period of three 
months. The Congress Party's resistance stemmed from the activities of an 
interest group within the party, the left-wingers. It was the need to 
placate this interest group that led to the condition being attached to 
office acceptance and this led to a period of bargaining and negotiation 
that the closed nature of the decision had not led one to expect. The 
Viceroy came under considerable domestic pressures to make concessions to 
the Congress but he resisted these firmly and was prepared to resign if he 
was forced to make them. One can conclude that provincial autonomy was 
implemented because the decision, enjoyed widespread support among 
decision-makers, implementers and target parties. There was support 
11 ]Tomlinson, Congress and the Raj, p55. 
[112]The NWFP was a special case in that elections were won by the Red 
Shirts under Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The Red Shirts allied themselves 
closely with the Congress and during the 1937 elections, fought and 
won them in the name of the Congress. See Coupland Indian Politics, 
p121. 
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specially from the main target party, the, Congress party. This led to the 
formation of Congress Ministries though no concessions to the Party's 
demands were made by the Viceroy in his statement of 22 June. Shortly 
thereafter Congress ministries were formed, and popularly elected, 
responsible governments were thus in existence in all the 11 provinces of 
British India. 
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Chapter 4 
Federation. Making of the Decision 
4.1 Introduction 
The decision to establish an all-India federation was one of the two 
major features of the 1935 Act. In studying implementation of this 
decision, it is necessary to begin, as was done with the two earlier cases, 
with an account of how the decision was made. The focus is on the length of 
time taken over the decision, and the amount of controversy there was over 
the decision. The propositions put forward in Chapter 1 suggest these are 
important factors that can affect implementation. The decision on the 
separation of finances between the centre and the provinces had been a 
long time in the making because of the complexity of the issues involved; 
that on provincial autonomy had also covered a long period, but this had 
not led to controversy as it was widely acceptable to the involved 
parties. As the account below shows, the decision on federation was a long 
time in the making, and involved considerable controversy, for there was 
opposition to it from a number of parties. 
4.2 The Simon Commission and the Dominion Status Declaration 
The process was begun as it was with the other two decisions 
incorporated in the Act examined in the earlier chapters, with the 
appointment of the Simon Commission. [1] The appointment of the Commission 
began a reexamination of the Montford Reforms and resulted, eight years 
later in the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935. The fact that 
not a single Indian was made a member of the Simon Commission was deeply 
[11 Coupland, R. (19142) The Indian Problem, London, Oxford University Press, 
p 17. 
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resented in India. The Congress resolved to boycott the Commission and 
when members of the Commission toured India they were met with hostile 
demonstrations. The Commission's original terms of reference - were to 
examine the working of the constitution of 1919. This would have 
restricted its review to the provinces and would have excluded the 
princely states. However Simon proposed an extension of the terms of 
reference to include relations with the states and this was accepted. 
Irwin is credited with being responsible for the change [2] for the 
Viceroy had been approached by some of the princes, who, alarmed by recent 
statements on British policy towards the states, had expressed a 
willingness to participate in discussions on constitutional reforms. 
While the Simon Commission proceeded deliberately with its inquiry, 
political developments proceeded apace in India and nationalist demands 
were being expressed which showed that the opinion of the majority of 
Indians was at variance with that of the-government. A few Indians had 
agreed to cooperate with the Simon Commission [3] but the rest were 
putting forward demands that could not be ignored. An All-Parties 
Conference under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru, met in 1928 and set 
about drafting an alternative constitution for India. The Report, commonly 
called the Nehru Report, called for full responsible government, that is, 
for Dominion Status to be conferred immediately and not at some distant 
future date. [4] Two proposals of the Nehru Report, for separate 
electorates to be abolished, and for a strong centre with little 
decentralisation of central powers, were unacceptable to the Muslims. An 
All-India Muslim Conference produced a Muslim reply to the Nehru Report. 
Muslim demands were that any future constitution should be a federal one 
with the maximum of powers to be vested in the provinces, that separate 
electorates should be continued and that it was essential that Muslims be 
given their due share in the Central and provincial cabinets. [5], The 
Congress for its part, had resolved to seek 'complete independence' at 
[2] Moore, R. J. (1970) "The Making of India's Paper Federation", in 
Philips, C. H. & Wainwright, M. D. (eds) The Partition of India, London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, p58. 
[3] See Chapter 3. 
[4] Coupland, Indian Problem, pp87-94. 
151 bid, p96. 
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Madras,, in 1927. At its. meeting in Calcutta in December 1928, the'Congress 
demanded Dominion Status within a year and if this was not -granted, it 
resolved to launch civil disobedience. [61 
The boycott by almost all sections of Indian opinion of the Simon 
Commission as well as the increasing urgency of nationalist demands led 
the Viceroy, Irwin, to fear that any constitution based on the Simon Report 
would be rejected. Discussions with moderate Indian politicians made-Irwin 
aware that they did not share in the extremist opinions of the radicals 
and that they would cooperate with the Government, if the Government on 
its part made some conciliatory moves. It was not possible to offer any 
immediate reforms while the Simon Commission was proceeding with its 
inquiry, but an announcement clarifying the government's ultimate policy, 
would help detach this moderate body of opinion from the radicals, who, as 
the Congress resolutions indicated, were becoming steadily more 
hostile. [7] 
Irwin went to England to confer with the British government' -'and 
received the consent of the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and the 
--Secretary of State, Wedgwood Benn, to the making of his declaration on 
Dominion Status. Irwin made his declaration on 31 October 1929: 
"I am authorised on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly 
that in their judgement it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the 
natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is 
the attainment of Dominion Status. " 
The declaration went on to state that after the publication of the 
Simon Report, His Majesty's Government "will propose to invite 
representatives of different parties and interests in British India and 
representatives of the Indian States to meet them, separately or together 
as circumstances may demand, for purpose of conference and discussion in 
regard both to the British-Indian and All-Indian problems. It will be 
their earnest hope that by this means it may subsequently prove possible 
[6] Moore, R. J. (1974) The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, pp39-40. 
[7] ibid, pp45-46. 
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on these grave issues to submit proposals to Parliament which may command 
a wide measure of general assent". [8] 
Irwin was able to make his declaration despite opposition from some 
Liberals and Conservatives. Simon in particular was of the view that any 
such statement would undermine the proposals put .. forward. by -his 
Commission. 
_[9] 
The opposition was to reappear and gather force in the 
months and years ahead. 
"The controversy over Irwin's declaration was, in fact, the great debate 
over the demission of power to the non-white nations of the British 
empire. The avowal of Dominion Status as the purpose, of the Raj 
represented the decision that the Empire was to become a, Commonwealth of 
equals. Irwin had the insight, the imagination, the sensitiveness and the 
statesmanship to realise that there could be no other lasting, basis for 
the relationship between the metropolitan power and her. erstwhile 
dependencies. " [10] Irwin's declaration was partially successful and 
gained support from the Hindu Liberals who agreed to attend the 
conference. The Congress, under Gandhi's leadership demanded assurances 
that the government would support their demand for immediate Dominion 
Status before it would agree to attend. When no such assurances were 
forthcoming, the Congress boycotted the the conference and launched a 
civil- disobedience. movement beginning with Gandhi's dramatic march to the 
sea at Dandi to illegally manufacture salt. [11] The Congress was declared 
illegal and thousands of its members were sent to jail. 
The report of the Simon Commission was published in May 1930. [12] 
Though overtaken by events the recommendations of the Commission 
regarding changes at the centre are important, as members of the right 
[8] Philips, C. H. (ed)(1962) The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947: 
Select Documents, London, Oxford University Press, pp286-287. 
[9] For a detailed account of the opposition to the declaration and of 
how it came to be made, see Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, pp51-94. 
[10] Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, p89. 
[11] The civil disobedience movement differed from the earlier non- 
cooperation move'nent in that it involved the undertaking of such 
actively revolutionary acts. ", 
[12] Report of the Indian Statutory Commission. Cmd 3568 & 3569,1929-30. 
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wing of the Conservative Party based' their opposition to the federal 
scheme that eventually emerged, on the basis of the recommendations of 
this Report. The Report recommended changes in the provinces - namely that 
provincial autonomy should be strengthened by further devolution from the 
centre and by the extension of ministerial control over the whole field of 
administration. [13] At the Centre on the other hand the Report proposed 
that no substantial changes be made. No responsibility was to be 
introduced at the Centre till it had been tried first in the provinces. The 
Report stated that the only type of constitution in which both the 
provinces and the states could be brought together was a federation. The 
view of the Commission was that immediate, federation was not possible, but 
'the ultimate constitution of India must be federal'. Keeping in mind this 
ultimate objective, it recommended that the existing central legislature 
should be reconstituted on a federal basis. The two houses of the Central 
legislature were to be indirectly elected by the provincial assemblies and 
not directly by electoral constituencies. [14] Thus the report of the 
Simon Commission was a continuation of earlier policy which was to extend 
responsibility in the provinces, but to withhold it at the Centre. The 
introduction of responsible government at the Centre was to await 
developments in the Provinces, while "the final federation'of all-India 
was depicted as a still more distant consummation". 
A lengthy despatch sent by the Government of India gave the opinion of 
the Viceroy and his colleagues on the proposals put forward in the Simon 
Report. It agreed with the major recommendations of the Report that there 
should be a full transfer of power in the provinces but that there should 
be none at the centre. It agreed too with the view of the Simon Report that 
federation was to be the ultimate objective, but that it was a 'distant 
ideal'. It differed from the Simon Report on the reconstitution of the 
Central legislature on federal lines, and felt that the existing system of 
direct elections was more acceptable in India. The despatch suggested that 
except for key matters such as defence, foreign affairs, the protection of 
minorities etc, the Government of India should rule in accordance with the 
(13] Dealt with in Chapter 3. 
[14] Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol II, Recommendations. 
Cmd 3569,1929-30. 
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desires of the Indian legislature and thus be 'responsive' though not 
'responsible'. [15] 
Nationalist opinion was further inflamed by the Simon Report and by its 
denial of responsibility at the Centre. However the Viceroy did manage to 
persuade the Liberal Hindus that the government was not bound by the 
proposals of the Simon Report, and that the conference would be an 
opportunity for British and Indian delegates to freely discuss India's 
constitutional future. [16] 
"Assuredly, the Round Table Conference was not to be limited to the 
consideration of the Simon report. It was to be a free discussion of 
India's constitutional future. Nevertheless, as the British delegates 
prepared themselves it was clear that the non-governmental teams, the 
Liberals under Reading and the Tories under Hoare, the latter of whom were 
to be the chief makers of the new constitution, were basing their position 
on the leading principles of the Simon report: provincial autonomy, 
reconstruction of the central legislature on federal lines, no central 
responsibility and the eventual creation of an all-India federation. " [17] 
Thus as the various parties prepared to meet to discuss the changes to 
be brought about by the new constitution, the political parties in Britain 
were of the view that there should be no transfer of responsibility at the 
centre in the new constitution. 
"On the British side, therefore, the only practical question of the 
moment seemed to be whether, pending the far-off federation, to keep the 
Central frame of government essentially unitary, ... or to readjust it on 
federal lines as advised by the Simon Commission. 
Most of the Indian members of the . 
Conference, on the other hand, wanted 
a more concrete and immediate response to the claim for Dominion 
[15] Government of India's Despatch on Proposals for Constitutional 
Reform. Cmd 3700,1930. 
[16] Spear, P. (1965) The Oxford History of Modern India 1740-1947, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, Pp351-352. 
1171 Moore, "Paper Federation", p60. 
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Status. " [ 18 1 
At the first session of the RTC however, the distant federation became 
an immediate reality as the Indian delegates united behind a demand for a 
measure of responsibility to be granted immediately at the centre. 
4.3 The First Round Table Conference 
4.3.1 Delegates to the Conference 
At the first RTC which opened on 12 November 1930 there were 16 
delegates from Britain representing the 3 British political parties, and 
led by the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. There were 58 delegates from 
British India, who had been invited to attend by the Viceroy. They included 
representatives of all parties except the Congress - Liberals, Muslims, 
11 
Hindu Mahasabha, Sikhs, Depressed Classes and others. Finally there were 16 
delegates from Indian India representing the states. [19] The absence of 
the Congress meant that 'the largest and most vigorous organism in Indian 
politics' [20] was not represented. One historian has appropriately 
commented - "A Round Table Conference to evolve a constitution 
for India 
without the participation of the Congress was like enacting Hamlet without 
the Prince of Denmark. " [21] 
The policy of the Hindu Liberals was one of gaining constitutional 
advance through cooperation with the government. The Muslims too saw 
advantages in negotiations, as they had gained vital concessions from the 
government in the past, specially in the matter of separate electorates. It 
is the presence of the delegation from Indian India that requires some 
explanation. Earlier schemes for constitutional reform had been confined 
to the provinces and had left untouched the position of the states. The 
Simon Commission, it is true, had put forward the possibility of the two 
[18] Coupland, Indian Problem, p114. 
[19] bid, p114. 
[20] ibid, p113. 
[21] Menon, V. P. (1956) The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, 
London, Longmans, Green & Co Ltd, p29. 
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India's coming together eventually in some sort of federation but that was 
seen as a possibility for the distant future, not one for immediate 
consideration. The princes presence was crucial and transformed the 
situation for it brought about a united demand from all the Indian 
delegates for a change at the centre, a change the British delegates were 
not contemplating making. 
4.3.2 Role of the Princes 
As stated earlier, the Government of India conducted relations with the 
states separately from its relations with the provinces. [22] Relations 
with the states were conducted through the Political Department which was 
directly under the charge of the Governor-General. Earlier schemes of 
constitutional reforms had concerned only British India. The Montford 
Reforms had included recommendations about the states, but these had not 
involved the bringing together of the two Indias. The Montford Report had 
recommended that relations with all states be conducted directly by the 
centre, thus ending the practice by which relations with some states had 
been conducted through provincial governments; it had also recommended 
that a Chamber of Princes be set up so as to end the isolation of the 
states from one another and to provide a forum for discussion between the 
princes and the Government of India. [23] The Montford Report had made no 
recommendations on constitutional developments in the states. 
Several factors combined to make the princes willing to take part in 
discussions for constitutional reforms. In the first place,. they could not 
remain isolated from the growth of the democratic movement in British 
India for, as the Montford Report had foreseen "hopes and aspirations may 
overleap frontier lines like sparks across a street". An Indian States' 
Peoples Conference had been formed in 1927 to seek the establishment of 
representative institutions in the states, and it received indirect 
support from the Congress. [24] Some states were subject to direct attacks 
[22] See Chapter 1- Dual nature of control. 
[231 Menon, Story Indian States, pp15-17. 
[24] Coupland, Indian Problem, p91. 
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but most to attacks against them in the press. [25] 
The second factor that predisposed the princes towards participation 
in the discussions was their, dissatisfaction with the issue of 
paramountcy. The Government of India, acting through the Political 
Department, retained the right to interfere in states' affairs whenever it 
considered it necessary. The princes had long sought a limitation on the 
exercise of paramountcy. [26] Events on the eve of the first RTC only 
served to alarm the princes further on this sensitive issue. 
Clarifications on the question of paramountcy when they came, served to 
reinforce it, not limit it as the princes had hoped. The Nizam of Hyderabad 
in seeking the restitution of the territory of Berar to Hyderabad, claimed 
equality of status with the Government of India. In his reply, the Viceroy, 
Reading, reaffirmed the supremacy of the Crown, rejected Hyderabad's claim 
of equality and stated categorically the right of the British Government 
to intervene in the internal affairs of the states. [27] An Indian States 
Committee had been appointed under Sir Harcourt Butler to inquire into the 
relationship between the rulers and the paramount power, at the same time 
as the Simon Commission was appointed. [28] The report of the Committee 
rejected the rulers' view that the states possessed all sovereign powers 
except those transferred with their consent to the Crown. The Committee 
refused to define or put limits on the concept of paramountcy and stated 
that - "paramountcy must remain paramount; it must fulfil its obligations, 
defining or adapting itself according to the shifting necessities of the 
time and the progressive development of the states". [29] The Committee 
did accept the rulers view that paramountcy was not transferable from the 
Crown to an Indian government responsible to an Indian legislature, and 
this was met with disapproval by Indian nationalists. All these factors 
combined to make the princes welcome Irwin's Round Table Conference 
initiative. In the RTC the, princes saw an opportunity to have, their 
constitutional position clearly defined. 
[25] Ramusack, B. N. (1978) The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire, 
University of Cincinnati, pp194-195. 
[26] Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, p27. 
[27] Philips, Select Documents, pp429-431. 
[28] Menon, Story Indian States, pp21-24. 
[29] Quoted in ibid, p23. 
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4.3.3 The Demand for Federation 
Negotiations between the Indian delegates began on the ship carrying 
them to the conference, and continued in London. By the time the conference , 
opened, the delegates had reached agreement amongst themselves and were 
able to present a united front. 
The initiative for the federal scheme came from the princes. It had 
been started in Hyderabad by the Resident, Terence Keyes, who warned of the 
dangers to Hyderabad if it became surrounded by democratic Hindu 
provinces, as it would be under the Simon scheme. Geographically 
surrounded by self-governing provinces, the southern states, Hyderabad, 
Mysore and Madras would, he argued, find themselves at the mercy of these 
provinces. [30] Other states too were aware of the dangers to their 
11 
sovereignty if the Viceroy became responsive to a British Indian 
executive. The rulers were aware that it would be possible to obtain 
better terms in the present than in the future when they might be faced 
with a united and self-governing India. 1311 z., 
The initiative for federation from the princes was taken up with 
enthusiasm by Sapru and pursued vigorously by him. [32] Sapru had hoped to 
reach agreement with the Muslims and present a united Hindu-Muslim demand 
for Dominion Status with safeguards. But communal accord was not possible, 
not then and not in the years to come. He thus accepted the federation 
scheme. In his opening speech at the conference he called for an all-India 
federation and central responsibility. In speeches that followed, the 
princes expressed their willingness to join an all-India federation. The 
Muslims had long favoured a loose scheme of federation so that they too 
responded positively to the proposal. Thus at the first RTC a united 
demand was presented by the Indian delegates which called for a radical 
change at the centre, while the governments, both in London and in Delhi 
were contemplating constitutional advance in the provinces alone. 
[30] Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, p136. 
[31] For details of various federal schemes that were mooted, see Moore, 
Crisis of Indian Unity PP132-144. 
[32] bid, p145. 
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The princes motives in accepting federation were that they hoped to get 
by indirect means what they had failed to get by direct approaches to the 
Government of India, a limitation of paramountcy and thus, implicitly, an 
enlargement' of their sovereignty. They were, observers at the RTC agreed, 
more concerned with escaping from the dictation of the Political 
Department than with the proposed federation. "To many of them, federation 
seemed to be a device that would drastically reduce the power of the 
Political Department in states that were federal units and consequently 
were enjoying direct access to the central executive and 
legislature. " [33] Few realised that federation too would involve some, 
loss of sovereignty. Some even thought they would derive financial 
benefits by joining a federation. [344] 
4.3.4 Acceptance of Federation 
The princes participation in the proposed federation made the scheme 
more acceptable to the British delegates who had come to the Conference 
with little thought of yielding responsibility at the Centre. Labour was 
in favour and the Liberal delegates under Reading, who had feared a demand 
for Dominion Status gave their support to the grant of central 
responsibility with safeguards, within an all-India federation. The 
Cabinet recommended that apart from sensitive subjects such as defence, 
foreign affairs and finance, which could be reserved, the rest could be 
transferred to Indian hands and thus dyarchy would be introduced at the 
Centre. There was agreement between British and Indian delegates that a 
period of transition was necessary during which some powers would remain 
in British hands. 1351 
At this point Simon pointed out to Hoare the danger of accepting a 
federation with the princes in it, a withdrawal of the the princes, and a 
claim by British India alone for the grant of central responsibility. 
"Simon advised Hoare: 'Try to get out of the Conference general 
resolutions in favour of federation of all-India and provided that all- 
[33] Ramusack, Princes of India, p201. 
[34] Menon, Story Indian States, p28. 
[35] Moore, "Paper Federation", pp61-62. 
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India is federated, then a cautious acceptance of Government corresponding 
to responsible Government'. Here was the origin of the princes' 'veto' oný- 
British India's constitutional development, the central provision of the-! 
federal section of the Act of 1935. " 1361 4 
Implementation of federation would require, as a first necessary- 
condition, the accession of the princes. 
While the developments at the first RTC were readily accepted by the 
Labour and Liberal parties, there was opposition within the Conservative 
Party that needed to be overcome. The Conservative Party had based its 
position on the Simon Report and thus was opposed to the granting of 
responsibility at the centre. Hoare realised that it would be difficult to 
move the Party from its attachment to Simon's irresponsible 'strong centre' 
but felt too that the Conservative Party could not be isolated as the 
other parties showed a willingness to meet Indian demands. It would, he 
felt, be better for the party to accept a change at the centre but to limit- 
it to a minimum. In a memorandum to the Conservative Party Business 
Committee, Hoare stressed that Britain need yield only a semblance of 
responsible government. It could keep real power in its own hands by, 
keeping control over the army and over finance and by giving the Viceroy a 
range of overriding powers. He pointed out to his party members that they 
could insist that the granting of responsibility could be made conditional 
on the federation being in existence. Such a federation would take years 
to be established and in the interim the status quo would continue. 1371 
The Conservative Party cautiously accepted the federal scheme but an 
interest group within it was opposed to changes at the centre and was to 
remain opposed. 
The main issue having been decided, the work of the Conference was 
carried out by a number of subcommittees. The most important of these was 
the Federal Structure Subcommittee, with Lord Sankey as Chairman, which 
drew up a provisional scheme of federation. There were other subcommittees 
such as the Sind, Defence, and Services subcommittees. One subcommittee 
1361 Moore, "Paper Federation", p62. 
1371 Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, p155. 
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alone failed to reach agreement, the Minorities subcommittee. No solution 
was found to the Muslims demands that their communal rights be safeguarded 
in any new constitution, and the communal problem was left to be settled 
later. 
The first session of the RTC closed on a-note of accord and general 
agreement among the delegates except on the communal question. Agreement 
on the all-India federation with safeguards had however been reached 
without consulting the main political force in India, the Congress Party; 
public pronouncements on the issue had revealed that Congress demands went 
far beyond what Britain was prepared to concede. In contrast, the diehards 
in the Tory party led by Winston Churchill were of the opinion that even 
the small transfer of responsibility agreed to at the conference went too 
far. The princes for their part had accepted federation without 
considering the implications this would have for their states. There was 
consensus at the first RTC on establishing a federation but the 
foundations on which the consensus rested were unsound. 
4.4 The Second Round Table Conference 
After the close of the first session of the Round Table Conference, 
Sapru, on'his return to India, acted as peacemaker between the Congress 
leaders and Irwin. Nehru remained hostile, but Gandhi showed a willingness 
to enter into talks with the Viceroy. A series'of meetings between Gandhi 
and Irwin took place and resulted-in'the Gandhi-Irwin pact. Gandhi agreed 
to call'off civil disobedience and to participate in discussions at the 
Round Table Conference. The Viceroy agreed to the release of all political 
prisoners except those convicted of crimes of violence. [38] At a 
subsequent Congress session in Karachi, Gandhi obtained Congress 
ratification of the pact and he was appointed the sole Congress delegate 
to the conference. Gandhi had agreed to consider the federal scheme 
evolved at the first RTC, but he regarded the scheme as a provisional one. 
He retained the right to negotiate on issues agreed at the RTC such as 
reservations and safeguards. Gandhi was well aware that the left wing of 
[38] Spear, History Modern India, p352. 
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the Congress Party was strongly opposed to measures by which Britain would-; 
continue to hold power at the centre. 1391 
qh 
At the second session of the Conference "it was hoped that through his 
[Gandhi's] mediation some compromise might be attained between the policy 
of the Conference - if the scheme which had emerged from its first session 
can be so described - and the policy of the Congress. " [40] 
No compromise was however possible as Gandhi rejected the idea of a 
period of dyarchy at the Centre. He demanded that Indians be given control 
over defence and foreign affairs and that responsible government at the 
Centre (as in the provinces) be established immediately. [41] The Congress 
demand was for the essence of dominion status to be granted immediately. 
Britain on the other hand had come prepared to make changes at the 
provincial level, not at the centre, but had agreed to federation and a 
formula of responsibility with safeguards. The gulf between Congress 
demands for changes at the Centre and those the government was prepared to 
concede became apparent. 
Not only was the gulf extremely wide, changes in the government in 
Britain made it unlikely that it would be bridged. Before the second 
session of the RTC met, the Labour Government in Britain had been replaced 
by a National Government. Ramsay MacDonald was still Prime Minister, but 
the Conservatives were in a majority and Samuel Hoare had become Secretary 
of State. [42] Hoare was cautious in his attitude toward federation and 
concerned about opinion in the Tory Party. From the beginning he had put it 
to them that Britain need only concede a semblance of responsible 
government. There was, as a result, not so much any change of policy on the 
part of the government as in the 'tone of approach'. 
"The language of positive achievement and conscious movement towards a 
goal was replaced by cautious provisos, anxious care in devising 
[39] Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, pp184-185. 
[40] Coupland, Indian Problem, p124. 
[411 bid, p125. 
[42] Butler, D. & Sloman, A. (1980) British Political Facts 1900-1979,5th 
edition, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, pp 18-22 and p 207. 
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safeguards, and absorption in schedules and tables. " [43] 
Gandhi also failed to reach accord with the Muslims and the communal 
issue remained unsolved though it was to this that most of the time at the 
Conference was devoted. With little achieved, Gandhi -returned to 
India. [u4] 
During Gandhi's absence, a no-rent campaign had been started in the 
United Provinces, and a militant organisation, the Red Shirts had become 
active in the NWFP and had made common cause with the Congress. On his 
return Gandhi found that conciliation had given way to confrontation. 
Irwin, who had been responsible for persuading the Congress to participate 
in the Round Table discussions had been succeeded by Willingdon. 
Willingdon was unwilling to be as conciliatory as Irwin. The new Viceroy 
would consider further talks with Gandhi only if he denounced his Congress 
colleagues. This Gandhi could not do and by early 1932 Gandhi and several 
other Congress leaders were back in jail. [451 The Congress was to take no 
further part in the negotiations for federation. 
Despite the renewal of civil disobedience in India, preparations went 
ahead for the final stages of the conference. Three committees, the 
Franchise Committee under Lord Lothian, the Federal Finance Committee 
under Lord Eustace Percy and the States' Inquiry Committee under Mr J. C. C. 
Davidson visited India and drafted reports. Since no agreement had been 
reached between the communities on the communal question, the government 
decided to proceed unilaterally. The Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, 
announced a scheme for communal representation known as the Communal 
Award, by which separate electorates were retained for the minority 
communities. There were to be separate electorates for the Muslims, even in 
Bengal and the Punjab where they were in a. numerical majority. 'Weightage' 
was conceded to Muslims in Provinces in which they were in a minority, and 
to the Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab. The extension of separate 
electorates to the Depressed Classes,, who were now recognised as a 
[43] Spear, History Modern India, p353. 
[44] Coupland, Indian Problem, p126. 
[45] Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, p248. 
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minority community, was opposed by Gandhi and the Communal Award was 
modified by the Poona Pact. [461 
4.5 The Third Round Table Conference and White Paper 
After the expert committees had drafted their reports, the government 
had the necessary information to prepare an India Bill. Hoare was in 
favour of proceeding unilaterally in framing proposals in the form of a 
White Paper to be put before Parliament. The Hindu Liberals, aware of the 
stiffening of the government's attitude, declared this to be too 
authoritarian a way of proceeding and demanded a third conference. The 
Viceroy, Willingdon, faced with the hostility of the Congress, thought it 
essential to keep the support of the moderate Liberals. In November 1932, a 
third session of the RTC was held in London. [47] 
The third session of the RTC was attended by only 46 delegates. The 
Congress was once again absent. The princes too stayed away and were 
represented by their ministers. There were representatives of Hindu 
Liberals, Muslims, the various minorities in India, and representatives of 
the British Government. 
By this time, the provincial constitutions were more or less settled. 
Discussions at the third session were concerned with details of the 
organisation at the centre, in the light of the reports of the Franchise, 
Finance and States' Inquiry Committees. It was agreed to extend the 
franchise and to ensure that a substantial proportion of women received 
the vote. Elections to the Federal Upper Chamber were to be-indirect, its 
members were to be elected by Provincial legislatures, while elections to 
the lower house were to be direct. On the question of residuary powers, 
there was a difference between the Hindus and Muslims, with the Hindus 
wanting them to be allocated to the centre and the Muslims wanting them to 
go to the provinces. This was resolved by giving the Viceroy the power to 
decide in cases as they arose. The safeguards were discussed and the 
------------ 
[46] Coupland, Indian Problem, p128. 
[47] Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, pp253-261. 
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special powers and responsibilities-of the Viceroy and the Governors were 
precisely defined. [48] 
"The conference achieved little by way of agreed solutions to the 
outstanding constitutional problems. " [49] It did clear the way for the 
stages necessary to parliamentary legislation. The first stage was the 
preparation of a White Paper embodying the government's proposals to be 
presented to Parliament. A joint committee of both houses would examine 
the proposed legislation, then, finally, a bill would be prepared and 
placed before Parliament. 
With the end of the Round Table Conference, the process of consultation 
with parties in India came to an end. When the conference opened, the 
British Government had not been contemplating changes at the centre, but 
only in the provinces. Developments at the first session of the conference 
had resulted in bringing federation from the distant future to a more 
immediate possibility. British delegates then accepted that a new 
constitution would bring changes both in the provinces and at the Centre, 
but made federation conditional on safeguards. This change was bitterly 
opposed by a section of the Conservative party. A change in government led 
to the Conservative party becoming the dominant party in Britain so that 
emphasis was placed on the safeguards in the federal scheme. The Congress 
Party on the other hand was opposed to the proposed safeguards and 
objected to a period of dyarchy at the centre. After a brief appearance at 
the second session of the Conference, the Congress Party had resumed civil 
disobedience as a path more likely to lead to an attainment of its goal. 
There was a consensus on the establishment of an all-India federation at 
the Round Table Conference but there was considerable opposition to it, 
both in Britain and in India, outside the Conference. As the general 
agreement reached at the conference took concrete shape in the form of an 
Act to be placed before Parliament, more opposition arose. This came from 
the princes who became alarmed when they began to realise the implications 
of federation. [50] 
[48] Coupland, Indian Problem, p129. 
[49] Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, p288. 
[50] The change in the princes attitude to federation is dealt with in 
Chapter 5. 
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In March 1933, the White Paper, which contained the official proposals 
for Indian Constitutional Reform, was published. It contained an outline 
of the new constitution to be submitted to Parliament. The scheme 
incorporated in the White Paper had evolved during discussions at the RTC 
and thus went beyond the recommendations of the Simon Commission. While 
the provinces were to be granted autonomy as recommended by the report of 
the Commission, there were to be changes too at the centre. A federal 
government was to be established with a measure of responsibility. A 
condition was laid down for the establishment of the federation, namely 
that rulers representing not less than half the population of the states 
and entitled to not less than half the states' seats in the upper house 
were to have acceded before the federation could be established. 
4.6 Dissidence within the Conservative Party 
4.6.1 Opposition to policy towards India 
In India, the main opposition to the proposals that emerged from the 
Round Table Conference came from the Congress, but it had little 
opportunity for making its opposition to federation felt at this stage. It 
was however the principle party involved in implementation and its role is 
considered in the next chapter, as is the role of the princes. The 
dissidents in the Conservative Party on the other hand, had ample 
opportunity to oppose the scheme of federation as it went through the 
various parliamentary stages. They attacked the principle of central 
responsibility at every stage. Their activities were not confined to 
Parliament and they tried to mobilise opinion within the Conservative 
Party against the proposed changes at the Centre. Though they failed to 
prevent the passing of the Act, they did succeed in delaying its passing 
two years beyond the target date set by Hoare. E511 
The dissidents in the Conservative Party formed an important interest 
group that was opposed to the scheme of federation - "the dissidents were 
[511 Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, p297. 
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all united in resisting any grant of responsibility at the centre". [52] 
It is. necessary to examine the role of- this interest group, to trace 
opposition of the diehards [53] to changes at the centre, and to examine 
whether it was carried through to implementation of federation. 
Irwin's declaration on dominion status, had the support of the leader of 
the Conservative Party, Stanley Baldwin, but opposition to the reference 
to dominion status was, expressed by several prominent members of the 
party. Leading Conservatives, Peel, Salisbury and Birkenhead criticised 
the declaration in a debate in the House of Lords. Newspapers which 
supported the views of the party, the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph 
were also critical of the declaration. Stanley Baldwin made it, clear in a 
debate in the House of Commons that he had given his personal support to 
the declaration but had not pledged the support of his colleagues in the 
Conservative Party. [54] 
The first session of the Round Table Conference, it has been seen, 
brought unexpected developments -a demand from the Indian delegates for, 
an all-India federation. Hoare argued in favour of accepting the demand at 
Business Committee meetings of the Party where policy towards India was 
discussed. Though Hoare stressed the safeguards, Churchill was opposed to 
any changes at the Centre. 1551 Hoare was of the view that with the other 
parties supporting federation, the Conservative Party could not be 
isolated by insisting on the Simon scheme with no changes in the central 
government. 
In a debate in the Commons, on the results of the first session of the 
RTC, Hoare, aware of the opposition in the party to the question of 
responsibility at the centre, was careful not to commit himself to it. He 
[52] Ghosh, S. C. (1972) Decision-Making and Power in the British 
Conservative Party, Calcutta, Oceania Publishing House, p29. 
[53] Ghosh classifies the dissidents in the Conservative Party into 
Members of Parliament, die-hards in the Lords and retired officials, 
but makes it clear that the classification is not rigid - for 
example, some MPs were also diehards. Since the diehards were the most 
active and vociferous in opposing policy towards India, all 
dissidents are commonly referred to as diehards. 
[54] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, Chapter VI. 
[55] ibid, p118. 
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cautiously stated that agreement had been reached on the need to establish 
an all-India federation but stressed that details such as safeguards 
remained to be settled. Nevertheless Churchill attacked' the RTC and 
suggested that the only immediate steps to be taken should be along the 
lines indicated in the Report of the Simon Commission. Baldwin then 
personally intervened in the debate, argued that Churchill did not 
represent the views of the party, and pledged that if the Conservative 
Party came to power, he would work for the establishment of a federal 
system in India. The breach between Baldwin and Churchill became open and 
shortly thereafter, Churchill resigned from the Shadow Cabinet. [56] It 
was accepted that there was a definite difference of opinion in the 
Conservative Party on policy towards India. 
The Gandhi-Irwin talks after the first RTC were attacked by the 
dissidents and Churchill expressed anger at the Viceroy, the 
representative of the King-Emperor, negotiating on equal terms with a 
'half-naked fakir'. Churchill declared war on Baldwin and his India policy 
and announced his intention to marshal British opinion against it. He was 
supported by other diehards in the party such as Lloyd and Page- 
Croft. [57] 
At the second RTC, when there was a failure to reach accord between 
Hindus and Muslims , the dissidents in the Conservative Party were. quick 
to seize on this to ask for a postponement of constitutional reforms. 
Churchill suggested to Hoare that provincial autonomy should be conceded 
but that changes at the centre should only come after Indians had reached 
agreement amongst themselves. [58] 
The government had stated that there would be a debate after the White 
Paper was published. Before its publication, Page-Croft moved a private 
members' motion for a vote in the Commons in favour of the Report of the 
Simon Commission. He made clear his opposition to the policy adopted at 
the RTC. His view was that changes at the centre meant the end of British 
[56] ibid, pp132-135. 
[57] ibid, pp141-143. 
1581 ibid, pp156-158. 
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rule and influence in India and he expressed concern that the safeguards 
would not be real. 1591 
In March 1933, the White Paper, setting out the proposals for 
constitutional change was published. On 30 March there was a debate in the 
House of Commons on the White Paper. Page-Croft spoke against the 
proposals, implored the house not to go ahead with the White Paper and 
again gave his opinion that the safeguards would not be effective. [60] 
Page-Croft was responsible for initiating the moves that led to the 
formation of the India Defence League in March 1933. It consisted of 
members of the House of Commons who were opposed to the proposed changes 
at the centre. [611 
In accordance with agreed procedure, after publication of the White 
Paper, Samuel Hoare moved a motion for the appointment of a Joint Select 
Committee to examine and report on the proposals of the White Paper. The 
diehards caused a debate upon this that lasted for 3 days thus giving 
'unmistakeable warning' of their'determination to continue fighting to the 
bitter end. [62] Hoare tried to persuade some of the diehards to become 
members of the Joint Select Committee but Lloyd and Page-Croft both 
refused. Page-Croft felt he could not be a member and endeavour to rouse 
the country against the White Paper. [63] 
The Joint Select Committee met from April 1933 to November 1934. There 
was a break in the proceedings of the committee for several weeks in the 
spring of 1934. It is convenient to deal with this break here, though the 
proposals of the Joint Select Committee are dealt with later, as it formed 
part of the attack by the Conservative opponents of policy towards India. 
This brought into the picture, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, a 
pressure group associated with the Conservative Party. 
[59] Croft, H. P. (1948) My Life of Strife, London, Hutchinson & Co Ltd, pp216- 
219. 
[60] ibid, pp225-226. 
[61] bid, pp222-223. 
[62] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, pp159-160. 
[63] Croft, Life of Strife, pp226-227. 
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4.6.2 Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
The Manchester Chamber of Commerce was an important pressure group 
associated with the Conservative Party. [64] India was then the largest 
market for the Lancashire cotton textile industry, and any increase in the 
import duties of cotton in India was bound to severely affect the 
industry. 
After the granting of fiscal autonomy to India by the Fiscal Autonomy 
Convention of 1919, [65] the industry had had to concede the Government of 
India's right to levy import duties on cotton. The absence in the White 
Paper of safeguards for the Lancashire cotton trade had caused some 
anxiety. During the first half of 1933, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 
which represented the interests of the Lancashire cotton industry (the 
Chamber was in fact dominated by the cotton trade), made representations 
to Hoare to secure modifications of India's fiscal autonomy, but Hoare made, 
it clear that the government could not interfere. 
The Chamber then decided to seek safeguards from the Joint Select 
Committee. The Chamber prepared evidence to be put before the Committee, 
stressing the need for safeguards to protect its cotton trade, and for the 
imposition of restrictions on India's tariff autonomy. However, the Chamber 
changed its mind at the last moment on the advice of a Textile Mission 
that had been sent to Bombay by the Chamber. The, textile mission found that 
a favourable atmosphere was being created in India and that if the 
evidence that had been prepared by the Chamber was presented before the 
Joint Select Committee, it would have a detrimental effect on the 
negotiations. The Chamber then decided to modify its evidence before the 
Joint Select Committee. 
Churchill accused Hoare of tampering with the evidence of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce. He complained that the Chamber had altered 
its evidence to the Joint Select Committee after pressure from Hoare and 
[64] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, Chapter IX, gives a detailed account 
of the involvement of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in this 
issue. 
[65] See Tomlinson, B. R. (1979) The Political Economy of the Raj 1914-1947, 
London, Macmillan, pp 60-61. 
160 
Derby.. He complained that this amounted to breach of parliamentary 
privilege since it amounted to tampering with witnesses who were to give 
evidence before a, committee of both houses. The matter was referred to the 
Committee of Privileges and there was a break in the proceedings of the 
Joint Select Committee while the. matter was investigated. The Committee of 
Privileges cleared Hoare, for it concluded the Chamber had modified its 
evidence on the basis of advice received from the mission in India. 
"On the face of things the question of breach of privilege was a 
technical one. In fact, what was involved was the White Paper policy, .... 
Churchill, by a masterly use of parliamentary procedure, sought to 
undermine the White Paper policy. If he could establish his charges, Hoare 
would have to resign from the Secretaryship of State for India and Derby 
from the, Joint Select Committee, and a large part of the evidence already 
given would have been so suspect that perhaps nothing less than a 
reconstitution of the Committee would have restored public 
confidence. " [66] 
4.6.3 Rank and File of the Conservative Party 
The dissidents also tried to mobilise the rank and file of the 
Conservative Party against the government's policy towards India. Once the 
White Paper had been referred to the Joint Select Committee, there was no 
further opportunity for discussion in Parliament till a Bill was laid 
before the House. The dissidents had failed to get the support of the 
majority of Conservative MPs. They now turned their attention to the 
members of the party. The opponents of the government's India policy had by 
now organised themselves into the India Defence League and they made a 
tremendous effort to gain support in the party. Some of their activities 
are mentioned here. 
At the Birmingham Conference in October 1933 (Annual Conference of the 
National Unionist Association), Page-Croft wrote a pamphlet, "The 
Salvation of India", attacking the government's policy, and tried to have 
[66] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, p163- 
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it widely circulated. [67] At the Conference, "the members of the India 
Defence League. concentrated on the, safeguards; by. making the safeguards 
sufficiently extensive, they could undermine the scheme of responsibility 
at the centre. A proposal put by the India Defence League was 
overwhelmingly defeated at the conference. [68] 
At the Bristol Conference in October 1934, Page-Croft tabled a 
resolution condemning the White Paper policy even though "It looked as if 
the fight for India was lost. " [69] To everyone's surprise, including 'Page- 
Croft's, the resolution was defeated by a very narrow margin, by 543 votes 
to 520. [70] The voting reflected the apprehensions that many 
Conservatives felt about India, apprehensions that the dissidents had 
worked upon over the years. 
-, When the report of the Joint Select Committee was published in November 
1934, it was clear that it had taken note of -theapprehensions of the'rank 
and file members of the Conservative Party, for it included a stiffening` 
of the safeguards. At a meeting of the Central Council to consider the 
Report of the Joint Select Committee, the dissidents were defeated and the 
Report was overwhelmingly endorsed by the Party. 1711 'ý' 
"Thus ended the fight to secure the support of the Party machine in the 
country. " [72] 
4.6.4 Motives for opposition 
The motives of the opponents of changes at the centre in India and the 
grant of a measure of responsibility may be briefly, examined. Opposition 
to the scheme of federation-from the right wing of the Conservative party 
was based on the fear that it would lead to India being lost to. the Empire. 
This the diehards were determined to prevent. 
[67] Croft, Life of Strife, pp232-233. 
[68] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, pp193-195. 
[69] Croft, Life of Strife, p240. 
[70] bid, p240. 
[71] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, p202. 
[72] Croft, Life of Strife, p241. 
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Churchill undoubtedly felt a deep sentimental attachment towards the 
Indian Empire, and to the power and glory that the possession of India gave 
to the British people. [731 Page-Croft writes that he could not "tamely 
stand by and see the end of British rule in India, which is the keystone of 
the Imperial arch! " 1741 
Speaking in a debate in the Commons, Page-Croft said: "The only 
organised political force in British India at the present moment is 
Congress, and if we blunder, into self-government today we hand over the 
government of that great country to a political machine which is intent 
upon secession from the Empire, ....... 
The National Government received an emphatic mandate to save the 
nation. They received no mandate to break up the Empire. " [75] 
Thus many diehards opposed federation because they felt it would weaken 
Britain's hold over an Empire that they were committed to keeping. "Some of 
this opposition was grounded on the desire that the meteor flag of England 
should still terrific burn above the citadels of India. " 1761 
Not all the opposition though was based on the desire to maintain 
Empire. The antagonism between Churchill and the Conservative leader 
Baldwin, was well known. In attacking policy towards India, many of the 
dissidents, particularly Churchill' and the Press Lords were impelled by 
their antipathy towards Baldwin. Churchill used the India issue to attack 
Baldwin's leadership. ' [771 
"Most of those who supported the Empire Crusade or denounced Indian 
Reform really had other things in mind, and their public statements are in 
a code which has to be broken into Its true meaning: concern to hold power 
for the party and to win power in the party for the authors of the 
[73] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, pp29-30. 
[74] Croft, Life of Strife, p216. 
[75] ibid, p220. 
[76] Gallagher, J. (1982) The Decline Revival and Fall of the British Empire, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p122. 
[77] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, pp25-26. 
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statements. " [78] 
Thus while some opponents of the government's policy were motivated by 
considerations of Empire, others such as Churchill used the issue to 
challenge Baldwin's leadership. 
4.7 Joint Select Committee and the India Bill in Parliament 
After the publication of the White Paper in March 1933, a Joint Select 
Committee of both houses of Parliament was appointed under the 
chairmanship of Lord Linlithgow to examine its proposals. It was in 
session for a period of eighteen months, with a break in its proceedings 
when Churchill made his allegations of breach of privilege against Hoare. 
Of the members of the Committee, Salisbury, one of the leading diehards, 
proposed that central responsibility be abandoned, while those not so much 
on the right such as Derby, Zetland and Austen Chamberlain sought to make 
the centre more conservative. The Committee substantially retained the 
proposals set out in the White Paper, but it did make some changes. It 
substituted indirect elections by provincial legislatures for seats 
allotted to the provinces in the lower house, the federal assembly, thus 
advocating indirect elections for both houses. These changes made the 
centre closer to that envisaged by the Simon Report. 1791 
The Joint Select Committee also incorporated in its report a stiffening 
of the safeguards. This was to allay the apprehensions of the bulk of the 
Conservative Party. Governors were given the power to take control of any 
branch of government necessary to combat terrorism. The consent of the 
governor was required for any legislation affecting the police. Included 
among the Governor General's special responsibilities was the prevention 
of measures that would subject British goods imported into India from 
Britain to discriminatory treatment. [80] 
[78] Gallagher, Decline Revival Fall, p119. 
[79] Moore, "Paper Federation", p75. 
[80] Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power, pp202-203. 
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The report was drafted by the Chairman and adopted with only a few 
minor amendments. Major amendments, which were virtually alternative 
drafts of the Report were proposed, but rejected. These came from the 
representatives of the Labour Party and those of the diehards. [81] The 
view of the Labour representatives was that the proposals did not go far 
" enough in meeting Indian demands; while the diehards thought they went too 
far. These two viewpoints represented the two extremes. The Labour Party 
representatives wished to go much further in meeting Congress demands 
which were for the grant of virtually complete responsibility at the 
centre. The diehards, it has been seen, were opposed to any responsibility 
at the centre being transferred to Indian hands. 
.A Bill incorporating the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee 
was introduced in Parliament on 19 December 1934. Debates on the bill 
lasted 43 days in the House of Commons and for` 13 days in the House of 
Lords. 1821 At every stage, the passage of the bill was opposed by the 
diehards led by Churchill in the Commons and by Salisbury in the Lords. 
Page-Croft, one of the most active dissidents, writes that he. made no less 
than 280 short speeches during the committee stage of the Bill. (831 As 
the Bill proceeded through its various stages, the diehards had to concede 
that they would not be able to prevent it from becoming law, the majority 
in both houses was in favour of the Bill. On 4 August 1935, the Bill 
received the Royal assent. 
4.8 Federation under the 1935 Act 
Part II of the Government of India Act, 1935 [84] (Part I was 
Introductory) dealt with the creation of an all-India Federation. 
It stated that the Federation of India could only come into being when 
an address. to the Crown by Parliament asked for a proclamation to this 
[81] Coupland, Indian Problem P133. 
[82] bid, p133. 
[83] Croft, Life of Strife, pp251-252. 
[84] Government of India Act, 1935 (1938) New Delhi, Government of India 
Press. 
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effect. At the very beginning, it set out aýcondition which was to be 
fulfilled before Parliament could make such a request to the Crown. The" 
condition was that rulers representing not less than half the total 
population of the Indian states and entitled to one half of the seats 
allotted to them in the Upper House of the Federal-legislature, the 
Council of. States, had executed Instruments of Accession. [85] This was 
the veto granted to the princes. Unless a sufficient number of' them 
acceded, federation could not be established. 
A state was to accede to the Federation by executing an Instrument of 
Accession empowering the Federal Government and Legislature to exercise 
authority over it in accordance with the Act. The authority of the 
Federation over the states was confined to matters set out in the Federal 
list [86] and there could be limitations on the exercise of this authority 
as set out in a ruler's Instrument of Accession. [87] 
To further safeguard the rights of the states, a new post was created, 
that of the Crown Representative. In federal matters, as members-of the 
federation, the states were to deal with the Governor-General, but in non- 
federal matters they were to deal with the Crown Representative. The Act 
permitted one person to hold both posts. [88] 
Executive authority in the Federation was to be exercised by the 
Governor-General in association with a council of ministers. The Ministers 
were to be appointed by the Governor-General and they were to hold office 
during his pleasure. [89] The Governor-General had 'special 
responsibilities' in which he was to exercise his individual judgement as 
to the action to be taken. These special responsibilities included the 
prevention of any, grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of India, the, 
safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the minorities, the 
safeguarding of the financial stability and credit of the Federal 
Government and the prevention of discriminatory or penal action against 
[85] bid, Section 5. 
[86] bid, Seventh Schedule. 
[87] bid, Section 6. 
[88] ibid, Section 3. 
189] bid, Sections 9 and 10. 
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the import of British goods into India. [90) 
The Governor-General was to act in his discretion in all matters 
related to defence, external affairs and ecclesiastical affairs. In these 
reserved matters ministers did not have the right to advise the Governor- 
General who was to be assisted instead by three Councillors appointed by 
him. [911.. Dyarchy which had been abolished in the provinces by the 1935 
Act, was thus to be introduced at the Centre. 
In relation to matters in which the Governor-General was required by 
the Act to act in his discretion or to exercise his individual judgement, 
he was to continue to be under the supervision and control of the 
Secretary of State and responsible to Parliament. [921 In all these 
matters Britain continued to exercise control and Indians were excluded. 
These were the safeguards to which the Congress was opposed, 
The Federal Legislature was to be bicameral. The Upper House, the 
Council of State, was to consist of 156 representatives from British India 
and not more than 104 representatives of the Indian States. The Council of 
States was to be a permanent body, not subject to dissolution but with one- 
third of -its members retiring every three years. [93] Of the British 
Indian representatives, 6 were to be nominated by the Governor-General and 
10 were given to the Anglo-Indiang European, and Indian Chrlstian 
communities in British India as a whole. The remaining 140 seats were 
distributed among the Provinces, mainly on a population basis and were to 
be filled by direct elections. [941 Representatives of the states were to 
be appointed by the rulers and the seats were allocated to individual 
states or to groups of smaller states. [95] 
The Federal Assembly was to have 250 representatives from British India 
and not more than 125 representatives from the Indian States. The Federal 
[90] ibid Section 12. 
[91] ibid, Section 11. 
[92] Lbid, Section 14. 
[93] bid, Section 18. 
[94] bid, First Schedule. 
[95] ibid, First Schedule, Part II. 
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Assembly was to have a maximum life of 5 years. [96] The representatives 
of British India were to be indirectly elected. The representatives of the 
States were to be appointed by their rulers. The allocation of seats among 
the states was set out in the First Schedule. ` 
In both chambers, in the election of British Indian representatives, 
separate electorates were maintained. In both the Council of State and the 
Federal Assembly, British Indian seats were distributed according to 
communities and interests. Muslims, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Christians, 
landholders, commercial groups and women, all had separate electorates, 
while the scheduled castes had a reserved "quota among the general 
seats. [97] 
The scope of Federal legislation was limited to the subjects enumerated 
in the Federal and Concurrent lists. [981 Residuary powers were not 
allotted to the centre or to the provinces but the Act authorised the 
Governor-General to determine which legislature was to deal with a 
particular subject as and when the issue arose. [991 There were a number 
of restrictions on the exercise of legislative powers by the Federal 
Legislature. After a Bill had been passed by both Chambers, the Governor- 
General could give his assent to the Bill, return it for reconsideration 
to- the Legislature, withhold his assent or reserve the Bill for the 
signif ication of His Majestyts pleasure. C 1001 The" Governor-General was 
given special legislative powers. In matters in which he was to exercise 
discretion or to act in his individual judgement, if he felt it was 
essential to make provision by legislation, he could enact on his own 
authority a permanent legislation called the 'Governor-General's Act'. Such 
a measure would become law after one month even if rejected by the 
legislature. * Any such measure enacted by the Governor-General, on his own 
authority had to be sent to the Secretary of State and laid before 
Parliament. [1011 
[96] ibid, Section 18. 
[97] ibid, First Schedule. 
[98] bid, Section 100. 
[99] bid, Section 104. 
[ 100 ]bid, Section 32. 
[101]ibid, Section 44. 
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Annual financial statements were to be presented to both chambers. The 
Legislature could discuss but not vote on matters such as the salary of 
the Governor-General, expenditure relating to defence, ecclesiastical, and 
external affairs. The estimates of other expenditure were to be submitted, 
in the form of demands for grants to the legislature, but the Governor- 
General had the power to restore any grant rejected by the legislature on 
the grounds that it affected the discharge of his special 
responsibilities. C 1021 
4.9 Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that there "was 
considerable controversy about the decision to establish an all-India 
federation, one of the two major decisions incorporated in the 1935 Act. 
While the main political parties in Britain acquiesced in the scheme of 
federation, an interest group within the Conservative Party, the diehards, 
was totally opposed to any changes at the centre. This group made its 
op position felt at every stage, attacked the Government's policy through 
newspapers sympathetic to its views and tried to gain support from the 
rank and file of the Conservative Party. The diehards were a minority 
within the Party and thus failed to prevent the decision from being taken, 
but their opposition left its mark. The delays in the passing of the Act 
because of the opposition of the diehards to changes at the centre have 
been generally recognised. 
There was opposition to federation too, from the Congress Party. The 
government had rejected the conditions laid down by the Congress, and the 
Congress had refused to attend the Round Table Conference. Instead, the 
conciliatory policy towards the Congress adopted by Irwin had been 
replaced by strong tactics to crush civil disobedience in India. With the 
Conservatives in power, this policy of repression found support in Britain 
(it satisfied the Tory demand for strong government). The Congress made 
its opposition felt by staying away from the conference table. The scheme 
of federation which was finally embodied in the Act had been evolved 
[102]ibid, Sections 33,34 and 35. 
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without the participation of the Congress. The Congress was however, the 
main political force in India and would be the principle party involved in 
implementation. 
The princes attendance at the Round Table Conference had led to . 
the 
federal scheme being adopted. Their initial enthusiasm rapidly faded when 
the realities of joining a federation began to become clear. From being 
enthusiastic at the beginning of the first RTC, they became indifferent 
and by the time the Bill was in Parliament they had become hostile. 11031 
Yet the princes had been given a veto over the establishment of 
federation. Their agreement was going to be necessary if federation, was 
going to be implemented. 
One party had supported federation throughout from its initial 
conception at the first RTC till it was incorporated in the 1935 Act. This 
was the Hindu Liberals, led by Sapru, who had played a dominant role in the 
making of the decision on federation. They were a small party with little 
popular support and thus could play only a small part in implementation. 
Finally, there were the Muslims. With Muslims and Hindus unable to reach 
agreement on the communal issue, the government had proceeded unilaterally 
and conceded the Muslim demand to continue the scheme of separate 
electorates. In the provinces, they were in a position of supremacy in the 
4 provinces in which they were in a majority, and in the others they 
enjoyed separate electorates and weightage. [1041 At the federal level, 
though the Muslims demand for a loose federation was not met (the Muslim 
demand had been for residuary powers to be granted to, the the provinces), 
they were given weightage so that together with the princes, they could 
prevent Congress domination at the Centre. The Muslims thus supported the 
decision on federation as it stood. 
In his declaration on Dominion Status Irwin had expressed the hope that 
the RTC would lead to proposals being submitted to Parliament which would 
'command a wide measure of general assent'. Instead, as the account above 
11031The princes attitudes are considered in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
[104]Dealt with in Chapter 3. 
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shows, the passage of the proposal to establish an all-India federation, 
from initial suggestion to embodiment- as a formal decision, had been 
marked by controversy and delay. Despite the consensus at the first RTC, 
there was little support for the decision by the time the long period of 
decision-making finally came to an end on 4 August 1935. 
<r 
e: , 
4 
171 
Chapter` 5 
Federation. Implementation. 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with the making of the decision on 
federation. In examining implementation, it is necessary, as in the two 
cases examined earlier, to attempt to answer the questions raised by the 
propositions set out in Chapter One. It is necessary to see if the amount 
of time available for implementation was long or short; to ask if the 
decision was an open or a closed one; to identify the agents and target 
parties involved in implementation, and to examine whether there was 
cooperation from agents or resistance from target parties. The involvement 
of organisations and interest groups is also examined, in particular, the 
manner in which they became involved and whether they had influence. In 
short it is the propositions that guide the following account of the 
efforts to implement federation. 
5.2 Time available for implementation and nature of the decision 
Unlike provincial autonomy and the other decisions which were to be 
implemented by 1 April 1937, [11 no date was set by which the proposed 
federation was to be established. An attempt had been made at the third 
session of the Bound Table Conference, to set a date by which the princes 
should enter a federation, but it had been unsuccessful. Sapru, one of the 
main advocates of federation, had suggested that an accession deadline 
should be written into the bill. If a sufficient number of princes had not 
joined within one year, he had suggested, a British Indian federation 
Coupland, R. (1942) The Indian Problem 1833-1935 London, Oxford 
University Press, P'133. 
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should be established. The proposal had been rejected by Hoare who did not 
wish to confront -the princes with an ultimatum. [21 There was no target 
date by which federation was to be implemented. 
The decision on federation was an open one with much remaining to be 
done at the time of implementation. The provinces accession to federation 
was to be automatic, but the accession of the princely states was to be 
voluntary. The Sankey report had stated that each state would enter 
federation through a separate convention in which its special rights would 
be protected, and that, moreover, the princes would decide the method by 
which their representatives to the federal legislature would be 
chosen. 131 The reasons for the different treatment of the states and the 
provinces in the proposed federation were set out in the Report of the 
Joint Select Committee: 
"The main di fficulties 
'are 
two: that the Indian States are wholly 
different in status and character from the Provinces of British India, and 
that they are not prepared to federate on the same terms as it is proposed 
to apply to the Provinces. On the first point the Indian States, unlike the 
British Indian Provinces,, possess sovereignty in various degrees and they 
are, broadly speaking, under a system of personal government. Their 
accession to a Federation cannot therefore take place otherwise than by 
the voluntary act of the Ruler of each State, and after accession the 
representatives of the acceding State in the Federal Legislature will be 
nominated by the Ruler and its subjects will continue to owe allegiance to 
him On the second point the rulers have made it clear that while they are 
willing to consider Federation now with the Provinces of British India on 
certain termst they could not, as sovereign States, agree to the exercise 
by a Federal Government in relation to them of a range of powers 'identical 
in all respects with those which that Government will exercise in relation 
to the Provinces on whom autonomy has yet to be conferred. " [41 
[21 Moore, R. J. (1974) The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940p Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, P267. - 
131 Ramusack, B. N. (1978) The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empireq 
Columbus, Ohio State University Press, p206. 
[41 Gwyer, M. and Appadorai, A. (eds)(1957) Speeches and Documents on the 
r- .- Indian Constitution 1921-1947 London, Oxford University Press, p-7*P. 
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The dual nature of control by which Britain governed India, meant that 
the States were in a different relationship to the Government of India, 
from that of the provinces, and their'accession was to be voluntary. Thus 
it was necessary in implementing federation to secure the accession of the 
princes. 
Not only was the accession of the princes to be voluntary, they were 
given a veto over the proposed federation. An all-India federation could 
not be established till a sufficient number of princes had voluntarily 
acceded. At a conference in Bombay before the third session of the'RTC, the 
princes had passed a resolution that 51% of the states must agree to join 
before a federation could be established. [51 The Act included this as a 
precondition. Federation could only be established when rulers of states 
representing not less than half the aggregate population of the states and 
entitled to not less than half the seats to be allotted to the states in 
the upper chamber of the federal legislature had acceded. [61 
The princes accession was to be voluntary, they were given a veto over 
federation, and the specific terms on which the princes were to accede 
were left to be decided after the Act had been passed. ý The Act laid'down 
that a state was to accede to the federation by executing an instrument of 
accession. This instrument would empower the federal government, 
legislature, and court, to exercise authority over the state in accordance 
with the Act. This authority could only be exercised in respect of matters 
accepted by the ruler as federal in his instrument of accession and 
subject to such limitations as were specified in it. Once an instrument of 
accession had been executed and had been accepted by the Crown, it would 
permanently limit the ruler's sovereignty to the extent to which he had 
acceded to the federation. 171 The rulers were expected to accede on the 
first 47 of the 59 items of the federal legislative list and it was hoped 
that the terms of accession would be uniform for all the states. 181 Thus 
[51 Ramusack, Princes of India, p2l 7. 
[61 Government of India Act, 19350938) New Delhi, Government of India 
Press, Section 5. 
171 Lbid, Section 6. 
[81 Menon, V. P. (1956) The Story_ of the Integration of the Indian States, 
London, Longmans Zreen & Co Ltd, PP34-35. 
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much remained to be done even after the passing of the Act, in this 
respect, the decision on federation was an open one. It was necessary, 
before the decision could be implemented, to conduct further negotiations 
with the princes to determine the terms on which they would be prepared to 
accede. 
The number of parties involved in implementation of federation was 
extremely large. The task of implementing the decision was the 
responsibility of the Government of Indiag primarily that of the Viceroy, 
Linlithgow, who personally took charge of the federal negotiations. These 
negotiations, because of the nature of the decision, were centred on the 
princes. The prominent role of the princes in federal negotiationst led as 
a matter of course, to the involvement of the bureaucracy responsible for 
conducting relations with the states, the Political Department of- the 
Government of India. The Viceroy regularly consulted the Secretary of 
State and the India Office during the course of the negotiations. 
The target parties in India were, firstly, the princes. Their accession 
w as a necessary condition if federation was to be implemented. The 
princely states however, covered only 1/3 of India. In the remaining 2/3, 
in British India, the dominant political force was the Congress Party 
which had conclusively demonstrated its strength by its successes in the 
elections of 1937. The Congress was undoubtedly the principle target party 
and without cooperation from the Congress Party, it would not be possible 
to implement federation. Other target parties were the Muslim League, 
which represented the largest minority group, the Muslims, and the Hindu 
Liberals, who had played a prominent part at the Round Table Conference. 
There were, in addition, several other smaller political parties, but they 
operated mainly at the provincial, not the all-India level. 
5.3 Change in the Princes attitude to Federation 
Difficulties.. had been encountered on a number of issues regarding the 
princes and federation. These difficulties were put off at each stage of 
the lengthy process by which the decision on federation had evolved. It 
was only by leaving the decision open, that federation was made acceptable 
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to the princes. Thus not only was the decision an open one, it had 
deliberately been left open, by postponing resolution of problematic 
issues at each stage. 
There was, first of all, an issue of supreme importance to the princes, - 
paramountcy. To ensure the success of the Round Table Conference, Irwin got 
the princes to agree not to raise all their grievances in London - "he got 
them to agree that they would not bring up the issues of paramountcyt 
intervention, or related disputes in- London if efforts would be made in 
Delhi to reach some agreement on these matters". [91 The princes agreed to 
postpone discussions on this issue but it was still one of vital 
importance to them. The reason they did not pursue the matter on their 
return was that Irwin's term of of f ice was nearly at an end. By the time 
the new Viceroy, Willingdon had arrived, divisions had appeared among the 
princely ranks and they had become preoccupied with rivalries amongst - 
themselves. [101 The issue of paramountcy remained as a grievance as far 
as the princes were concerned. The dilemma faced by the British Government 
was that if the princes demands regarding paramountcy were conceded, they 
would become internally independent and they would not need to join a 
federation. Yet some of the princes would insist on a satisfactory 
definition of paramountcy as a precondition for joining a federation. [111 
, To further ensure the conference's success, the Viceroy, Irwin, 
supported by the Secretary of State for India, Benn, did not allow states' 
peoples. groups to send representatives to the first RTC as he was sure 
such a step would alienate the princes. This was another problem that was 
to come up again at a later stage. The states' peoples movement grew in 
strength and when it received the support of the Congress Party, became a 
force that could not be ignored. Del 
[91 Ramusack, Princes of Ind P199. 
C 101 Ashton, S. R. (1982) British Policy Towards the Indian States 1905-1939, 
London, Curzon Press, P137. 
1111 Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, ppl57-158. On paramountcy, as on other 
issues, there were differences amongst the princes. See Ashton, 
British Policy, ppl43-145. 
[121 Phadnis, U. (1968) Towards the Integration of Indian States 1919-1947 
Londont Asia Publishing-House, p90. 
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The first Round Table Conference was indeed a success, but after an 
initial endorsement of federation, the princes attitude rapidly underwent 
a change. Firstly, old jealousies and rivalries reappeared to destroy the 
united front the princes had presented at the first session of the 
conference. Secondlyt the realisation that federation would involve loss 
of sovereignty and financial sacrifices, brought about a change in the 
rulers' attitude to federation. They began to lay down conditions which 
would have to be met before they would accede. 
Soon after the first Round Table Conference, the ruler of Bhopal defeated 
the Maharaja of Patiala in an election for the office of the Chancellor of 
the Chamber of Princes. Since the rulers of Bhopal and of Bikaner were 
emerging as leading proponents of federation. Patiala reacted to his 
defeat by attacking the federal scheme. He produced a rival scheme 
labelled 'confederationt by which the states were to form their own 
federation before entering into a constitutional relationship with 
British India. The Maharaja of Patiala "was primarily motivated to take 
this stance because of his overweening jealousy of Bikaner and 
Bhopal. " 1131 
Confederation was the first recoil of the princes from federation. 
Patiala's stance encouraged the diehards to approach him in their efforts 
to oppose federation, as will be shown later in the chapter. Patiala drew 
support from the smaller states who were afraid that they would not 
receive adequate representation in the federal legislature. The larger 
states on the other hand began to fear that they would not obtain seats in 
proportion to their size and importance. In Hyderabad, the Nizam began to 
demand a satisfactory solution to the Berar question as a precondition to 
accepting federation. 
At the second Round Table Conference, the princes were no longer united. 
The states also realised, as a result of a special subcommittee's 
examination of federal finance, that their financial contributions would 
be increased. It also became evident to them, that with federal officials 
operating within their states, there would be some loss of sovereignty. 
1131 Ramusack, Princes of India p210. 
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A prominent dissenter from federation was the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar 
who was in dispute with the Government of _ 
India over, the retention of 
customs receipts from a port in his state. As a result of this dispute, he 
denounced federation and his position was strengthened when he was elected 
Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes. (141 From his influential position 
he began to point to the difficulties that the federal scheme would 
involve. The bigger states such as Hyderabad and Mysore who had initially 
supported federation, began to cool towards the scheme as negotiations 
dragged on. 1151 
In September 1932 Willingdon met the princes to try and gain agreement 
on certain outstanding issues. The princes on their part again demanded a 
definition of paramountcy and stated that without this they would not; join 
a federation. Difficult decisions on the financial aspects of the states 
joining a federation and on the allocation of seats among the states in 
the federal legislature were postponed and left to be settled at a future 
date. [16] 
At the third Round Table Conference, the princes were represented by 
their ministers alone. Difficult decisions were again avoided and 
postponed. These included decisions about the size of the two houses and 
the proportion of seats to be allotted to the states, as well as decisions 
on the states contributions to federal finance. In the financial field, 
difficulties were caused by the fact that some states still paid tributes 
and some states enjoyed financial advantages such as the right to retain 
customs receipts. States which paid tributes demanded that these be 
abolished while states which enjoyed financial immunities were reluctant 
to give them up. The Davidson Committee had concluded that no uniform 
solution that would cover all the states was possible, and that separate 
arrangements would have to be made with individual states. "In the cases 
of the major tribute and customs states, it was already evident that the 
period after the Act had been passed would be one of prolonged bargaining 
[141 Ashtonq British Policy pp140-141. 
1151 Ramusack, Princes of India, p218. 
[161 ibidp p218-219. 
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and negotiation. " 1171 
At the end of the Round Table Conferences, the conclusions that had 
been reached were embodied in a White Paper. No specific procedures by 
which the states would join the federation were laid down. Each individual 
ruler would be asked to sign an Instrument of Accession in which he would 
transfer power in specified matters to the federation but limitations 
could be placed on the exercise of federal power in these matters. The 
White Paper further proposed that the Act should be passed prior to the 
the states accession so that the final character of federation would be 
clear to the princes and this gave them further scope for procrastination. 
The princes for their part, were glad to put off final acceptance of a 
scheme that, as its financial and other implications began to become clear, 
was proving unattractive to them. After the White Paper was published, an 
informal meeting of the Chamber stated that the White Paper neither 
fulfilled_all the conditions, nor included the safeguards demanded by the 
princes. It thus declared the proposals to be unacceptable. [181 
As to the size of the Chambers, the White Paper proposed that the states 
be given 104 out of 260 seats in the Upper Chamber, and 125 out of 375 
seats in the Lower Chamber. Hoare had favoured smaller chambers, and these 
would have made negotiations with the princes easier. Willingdon had 
opposed small chambers since a large number of states would not be 
represented, but this in turn made negotiations more difficult. A 
complicated formula was adopted that allotted these 104 seats among the 
states (which numbered almost 600), some on a fixed basis, some on a 
rotational' one. It became necessary for the Goverment of India to 
negotiate with 144 individual states. [191 
The Joint Select Committee endorsed most of the recommendations of the 
White Paper, but laid particular emphasis on the voluntary character of 
the accession of the states to federation. [201 The Report of the Joint 
Select Committee was seen by the princes as an improvement on the White 
[171 Ashton, British Policy p147. 
[181--'Phadnis, Integration Indian States, P72. 
[191 Ashton, British Policy, ppl5l-152. 
[201 Lbid, ppl5l-152. 
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Paper in some matters, but they demanded clarification of other issues. 
They also made it clear that they would give a final opinion only after 
they had examined the Bill and the Instrument of Accession by which they 
were to ' join the federation. [211 When the Bill was introduced in 
Parliament, the princes found it unacceptable and demanded substantial 
modifications. Their criticisms of the Bill were expressed at a meeting of 
rulers and states' ministers held at Bombay in 1935. One of the reasons 
given by the princes for finding the Bill unacceptable was that it failed 
to include a satisfactory definition of paramountcy, This was an issue to 
which the princes never ceased to 'seek a solution. The Secretary of State 
replied that paramountcy waý a side issue and could not be defined in the 
Bill, and he rejected too the princes claim to be treated as equals with 
the Crown. (221 Many of the objections raised at this meeting suggested 
that the princes, once they were faced with the reality of federation, were 
not willing to let the Federal authorities exercise those minimum powers 
within their states which were essential in any federal system. 
Thus the princes had accepted the idea of an all-India federation on 
the false assumptions that they would get a satisfactory resolution of 
paramountcy and that it would enable them to escape from the dictation of 
the Political Department. They did not realise that federation too would 
involve loss of sovereignty. Once these points began to become clear, they 
turned away from the scheme. 
"The .... princes seemed to have very little conception of what 
federation actually involved. Sir Walter Monkton, who became the Nizam's 
legal adviser, commented in October 1935 on how few princes recognised 
even the most basic principle that federation involved a loss of 
sovereignty. " [231 
As difficulties arose in gaining the princes acceptance of the evolving 
federal scheme, they were postponed at each stage. Even when the Act was 
passed, the precise terms on which the princes were to accede had not been 
[211 Phadnis, Integration Indian States P72, 
[221 Coupland, R. (1943) Indian Politics 1936-1942, London, 'Oxford 
University Press, pp2-3. 
[231 Ashton, British Policy p152. 
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decided, but had deliberately been left open. They were left to be 
determined through negotiations between the Viceroy and the princes. By 
the time negotiations began with the princes with a view to securing their 
accession, the princes were far from being the proponents of federation 
they had been at the first RTC. Yet their accession was a necessary 
condition without which federation could not be established. 
The dissidents in the Conservative Party it has been shown, made their 
opposition felt in several-ways. They opposed the proposals in Parliament; 
They tried to mobilise opinion in the rank and file of the Conservative 
Party against handing over power at the centre; they were prepared to use 
unfair means such as the attack on Hoare for breach of privilege. These 
were tactics to prevent the proposals from becoming law and in this they 
failed. However, yet another avenue of action was open to them. This was to 
try and prevent federation from being implemented. The veto given to the 
princes meant that the rulers of the princely states had been given the 
power to wreck the proposals. After their initial enthusiasm for 
federationg the princes had lost interest as the implications of 
federation began to, become clear. The diehards were quick to seize on this 
and adopted yet another tactict they tried to influence the princes to 
reject the proposals. [241 
One of the diehards, Colonel Courtauld toured India early in 1934 to 
try and persuade the princes not to join the federation. The moving force 
behind these tactics was H. A. Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post, and 
the Post's Indian agent, Madhava Rao, organised the tour. The diehard 
deputation concentrated on Patiala for they were convinced the Maharaja 
could be made to come out against federation. Patiala was given assurances 
that-, when the Conservative Party came to power he would receive several 
honours if he opposed the reforms. At the end of his mission Courtauld 
produced a letter signed by several princes that set out their objections 
to the White Paper. 
[241 For diehard approaches to the princes see DoudsqG. J. 0979) 
"Government and Princes: India 1918-1939. ", Ph D Thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, pp483-498. 
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A second diehard embassy also arrived in India in June 1934 to continue 
the efforts of the first. The India Defence League strove through their 
connection with Patiala, to impress on the princes their unique position 
which allowed them to wreck the proposals. Through the columns' of the 
Morning Post the diehards made allegations of official pressure on the 
princes to accept the federal proposals and they also made allegation of 
official bribery. 
Patiala was sent a letter from 42 Peers ýand Commoners urging him to 
, adopt an anti-federation stance 
(July 1934). Later, in- 1935, another 
diehard, Rothermere, sent a circular cableýto some, of the princes asking 
them to reject the Bill as it would only lead to their own 
destruction. [251 
"Hoare and his colleagues in the India Office could only view with 
increasing alarm the unstinted efforts of the Page-Croft lobby to wreck 
the bill and its enterprise in carrying the fight to India itself and the 
lairs of malleable Maharajahs. " [261 
The fact that the princes were not to accede till after the bill had 
been passed meant that Tory diehards could continue their efforts to 
prevent the princes accession, and thus prevent implementation of 
federation, even after the proposals had been embodied in an Act of 
Parliament. 
5.4 Negotiations with the princes 
The princes were one of the principle target parties involved in 
federation. The voluntary character of their accession as well as the veto 
, given to them meant that the princes' ability to resist 'implementation was 
considerable. Their accession was a first necessary condition to be 
fulfilled if the decision to establish a federation was to be implemented. 
It was thus with the princes that negotiations began when attempts were 
made to establish an all-India federation. 
[251 ibidt Appendices 5 and 7. 
[261 ibidv p498. 
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The Act received royal assent on 4 August 1935, and the Viceroys 
Willingdon, wanted to make a start on negotiations with the prnces by 
October 1935. However Willingdon's term of office was nearly at an end, and 
Lord Linlithgowts appointment to succeed him as Viceroy had been announced 
in August 1935. [271 The Secretary of State, Zetland, felt it would be 
better to give the new Niceroy a free hand and leave him to decide on how 
the approach to the princes should be made. [281 On 18 April 1936, 
Linlithgow took over as Viceroy. Thus there was an initial delay in 
attempts to implement federation which was caused by the changeover in 
Viceroys. 
Linlithgow had initially planned a formal meeting with the princes in 
October 1936. His idea was to discuss, federation with them collectively 
and to settle the outstanding issues that still remained. There wereq as 
shown earlierl several issues that needed to be resolved. Howevert the 
possibility that those rulers who were opposed to federation would use 
such an opportunity to create difficulties made the Viceroy change his 
plans and he decided t hat it would be better to approach the rulers 
individually. [291 
Though no time limit was set by which federation was to be established, 
Linlithgow was aware that there was need to make haste in bringing about 
the princes accession. 1301 If federation was not inaugurated quickly, he 
felt the parties opposed to it, would utilise the time to gather strength 
and work against federation. The Congress party in particular had 
expressed its opposition 1311 and could not be expected to stand by idly 
if negotiations were prolonged. Linlithgow kept setting dates by which he 
hoped to inaugurate the federation, but they lacked any kind of sanction. 
[271 Rizvi, G. (1978) Linlithgow and India, London, Royal Historical Society, 
pl. 
(281 Moore, R. J. (1970) "The Making of India's Paper Federation, 1927-193511, 
in Philips, C. H. and Wainwright, M. D. (eds) The Partition of India 
London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, P76. 
[291 Glendevon, J. (1971) The Viceroy at Bay, London, Collins, p29. 
1301 Lbid, PP30-31. 
1311 See Chapter 3. The Congress denounced the entire Act, but it was 
federation to which the party was opposed. 
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The Viceroy asked the Political Department to cut short the time that 
had been allotted for negotiations with the princes. The Political 
Department had originally been of the view that the terms on which the 
princes would consider accession would be known by the end of 1938. The 
Viceroy felt this was too long a period and the Political -Department came 
up with a new timetable for negotiations. The states were to raise all 
objections and limitations by March 1937. The Government of India would 
take four months to consider the states' replies. Discussions between the 
Secretary of State, the Government of India and the states were to be 
completed by December 1937. The states would be presented with a draft 
Instrument of Accession by January 1938 and would be given four months to 
consider the offer. By mid-1938 it would then be known how many of the 
princes had decided to accede. Linlithgow approved this new timetable and 
hoped it would be possible to inaugurate the federation by April 
1938.1321 
Having decided to approach the rulers individually, the Viceroy 
, appointed three special representatives to tour the states, to explain the 
federal proposals to the rulers and to try and get them to accede. The 
states were divided into three groups, each to be visited by a special 
representative. The emissaries chosen were A. C. Lothian, Francis Wylie and 
Courtenay Latimer. They were to be accompanied by A. J. Raisman of the 
Finance Department, to advise on financial matters in states where 
financial issues were particularly important or involved, and by Conran 
Smith of the Reforms Office to advise on constitutional matters. 1331 The 
three representatives toured the states in the winter of 1936-37. 
The three special representatives were to explain the federal scheme to 
the rulers and make clear its implications for the states. Linlithgow was 
in favour of giving the emissaries the authority to give rulings on 
certain questions put to them, on the effect of accession to federation, 
without having to refer to the government, but the Secretary of State was 
against it. He felt the princes might feel they were being rushed and take 
1321 Glendevon, Viceroy at Bay Chapter 3. 
1331 Lothian, A. C. (1951) Kingdoms of Yesterday London, John-Murray, ppl47- 
148. 
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fright. He urged the Viceroy to let this series of visits by the emissaries 
remain exploratory. While he accepted Zetland's viewg Linlithgow warned 
again that time was not on their side - "the federal picture as it had been 
building up showed-the Viceroy eager to force the pace and the Secretary 
of State restraining him". 1341 Another historian agrees with this 
assessment - "Far from delaying the federation, it was Linlithgow who 
determined the tenor of the British negotiations with the princes and 
drove forward the attempt to inaugurate the federation. " 1351 
However, after the special emissaries had submitted their report, which 
indicated the concessions demanded by the princes prior to their 
accession, another year and a half passed before a revised- draft 
Instrument of Accession was prepared. The special emissaries submitted 
their report to the Government of India in April 1937. By August 1937, the 
views of the Government of India on how to gain the accession of the 
princes were referred to the India Office for approval. 
"The crucial issues then remaining for decision were comparatively few, 
but it was not until early in 1939 that final agreement was reached 
between the Government of India and the Secretary of State, and the 
Viceroy was able to make known to the Princes the terms for their 
accession. " 1361 
In the i. ntervening period, the Secretary of State and the Viceroy 
corresponded at length on the extent to which the rulers demands could be 
met. Linlithgow may have been aware of the dangers involved in prolonging 
negotiations, but much of the delay was caused by the lengthy 
consultations between Delhi and London. A process that was expected to be 
completed in 4-6 months according to the revised timetable for 
negotiations, took in fact, much longer. The relevant issues were discussed 
in detail in correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State 
from iugust 1937 to January 1939, which led to a considerable delay before 
the revised offer was put to the princes. 
1341 Glendevong Viceroy at Bay, p42. 
1351 Rizvi, Linlithgow, p88. 
136] Lothian, Kingdoms of Yesterda, p149. 
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It was necessary, because of the nature of the decision, to bargain with 
the princes to gain their accession. The special emissaries, after 
completion of their tours, indicated that the princes would be willing to 
accede if the financial terms of their accession could be made more 
attractive. It was on these financial matters that correspondence between 
Delhi and London was concentrated. 1371 
The problem was that some states drew substantial amounts of revenue 
from certain items of taxation in the federal field, from customs, 1381 
sugar and matches excise, and corporation tax. 1391 These states had made 
it clear to the Viceroy's emissaries that they would not be willing to join 
the federation unless they were given the right to retain existing 
1371 A copy of the correspondence between the Government of India and the 
India Office on this issue is to be found in the papers of Sir P. J. 
Grigg (1890-1964), Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. 
Hereafter referred to as PJGG. 
1381 Customs - Several maritime states such as Baroda, Junagadh, Travancore, and Cochin, had developed ports in their states. They 
levied duties on articles imported through their ports at the same 
rate as that levied at British Indian ports. In return they were 
allowed to keep some or all of the proceeds from these duties. The 
agreements varied between the states and even included Kashmir. The 
state of Kashmir did not tax goods passing through the state by the 
Central Asian trade route, thus establishing free trade between India 
and Central Asia. In return for this loss of revenue it was given the 
right to import goods free of customs duties at British Indian ports. 
See Varadarajan, M. K. (1939) The Indian States and Federation London, 
Oxford University Press, pp108-111 and p175. 
1391 Matches and Sugar Excise - In 1934, the Government of India found it 
necessary for the first time to impose excise duties on matches and 
sugar. The states were then in a position to flood British India with 
untaxed products. Thus agreements were made between the states and 
the Government of India as follows; matches - each state was to 
impose an excise duty at the British Indian rate and the proceeds 
were to go to a common pool and were to be divided between the 
Government of India and the states (on a consumption basis); sugar - 
the states were to impose an excise duty at the British Indian rate 
and were to retain the proceeds. 
Corporation Tax - There was no provision in the Act for any 
distribution of the proceeds of a federal corporation tax between the 
centre and the federal units. No such federal tax was to be levied in 
any state during the first ten years of federation. There were at 
that time a few states such as Mysore which were taxing the incomes 
of corporations and would be affected if deprived of the proceeds of 
this tax. 
See PJGG Case for the Opinion of the Law Officers, Government of 
India Act, 1935, India Office, January 1938. 
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revenues from these sources. The emissaries were of the view that these 
were vital 'items in gaining the accession of the states. They enunciated 
the principle of status quo, by which the rulers would be allowed to retain 
the revenue from these sources, even after'accession. The Viceroy accepted 
the emissaries assessment that if federation meant an immediate sacrifice 
of revenue, the princes would be unwilling to acc ede. He felt the principle 
of status quo should be conceded for these fiscal items. [401 
The Viceroy initially sought tý have the decision on federation 
reopened, for he made an attempt to meet the states demands by seeking to 
have the Act amended. He wrote to the Secretary of State of the states' 
demand for retention of revenues from certain items of taxation which fell 
in the federal field. The Viceroy was of the opinion that it would not be 
possible'for the states to retain these revenues under the provisions of 
the Act' as it -stood, and so he was in favour of amending the Act. He was 
certain that if proposals were put to the states based on the existing Act, 
they would be rejectedg and thus he strongly advocated the passing of an 
amending bill. [413 
The Secretary of State accepted the Viceroy's assessment that unless 
the states were granted a financial status quo with regard to certain 
excise duties, they would not accede, but he regarded it as unfortunate 
that this involved an amendment of the 1935 Act. In any case, he wrote, it 
was a matter on which he would have to consult other members of the 
Cabinet. [421 
The Secretary of State then discussed the matter with the Prime 
Ministerg Neville Chamberlain, who expressed strong objections to amending 
the Act. The reasons given by him for refusing to consider an amending bill 
to make the Act more acceptable to the princes, are sigdificant. 
"He was unwilling to contemplate a Bill involving any likelihood of 
controversy particularly if there was any probability of its reviving the 
[401 Menon, Story Indian States, P38. 
[411 PJGG Letter from Linlithgow to Zetland, dated 19 August 1937. 
[421 PJGG Letter from Zetland to Linlithgow, dated 4 September 1937. 
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former divisions in our own party. " [431 There was to be no amendment of 
the Act for fear of reviving the controversy in the Conservative Party. 
Zetland suggested that the princes should be given temporary compensation 
for loss of these revenues which could be ended after a specified number 
of years. The Prime Minister said he would regard such a compromise as a 
satisfactory solution. [441 
The refusal in London to amend the Act, led the Government of India to 
seek other ways to meet the princes' demands. The Political Department came 
up with a fresh suggestion, namely that the necessary financial 
concessions could be made by means of limitations in the princes' 
Instruments of Accession. [451 The proposals put forward by the Political 
Department were very briefly, as follows. Limitations were proposed in 
respect of matches and sugar excise and corporation tax that would allow 
the relevant states to retain these revenues. For salt, the practical 
solution was that the states should not accede; the existing complicated 
arrangements meant that the position of the states conformed reasonably to 
federal requirements. For customs, the Finance Department was opposed to 
any arrangement by which maritime states could join the federation while 
retaining the right of levying their own customs duties at their ports. 
The Political Department therefore suggested that the states' rights to 
levy customs duties be purchased either for a fixed annual sum or for a 
fluctuating payment based on fixed principles. The states themselves would 
perform the functions of administration but would be subject to inspection 
and supervision. If however negotiations with the states on customs duties 
were unsuccessful, the Political Department wanted the states to be 
allowed to federate for customs on the basis of a limitation based on 
existing agreements, but one which would also provide for inspection by 
the federal authorities. (461 
[431 PJGG Letter from Zetland to Linlithgow, dated 6 October 1937. 
[441 ibid. 
[451 Under Section 6(2) of the Act, a ruler was required to specify in his 
Instrument of Accession the matters with respect to which the federal 
legislature could make laws for his state and the limitations, if any, 
to which this power was to be subject. 
[461 PJGq Proceedings of meetings held in the Political Secretary's Room, 
22 and 24 November, 1937. 
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The Finance Department was opposed to all the financial concessions 
being'proposed by the Political Department [471 but objected most to the 
proposals regarding customs duties. The Finance Department was of the view 
that it was better that "the State should not accede at all in respect of 
Sea Customs, rather than that there should be an illusory accession as 
unsubstantial as that which has been proposed". [481 If the maritime 
states concerned did not enter into new agreements rendering possible the 
application of federal 
customs -law 
in their territories, the Finance Department was of the view 
that the only acceptable alternative was non-accession for customs. [491 
The proposals put forward by the Political Department were conveyed to 
the Secretary of State. The states were not to be asked to accede for Salt. 
They were to accede for matches and"sugar excise and corporation tax with 
the limitations proposed. As regards customs, there were two views. The 
Political Department felt that the states should be permitted to accede 
for customs with a limitation on the lines suggested. The Finance 
Department objected that the limitation gave only the right of inspection 
without any power to enforce ratification of abuses. Failing a limitation 
which gave the federation the necessary authority to enforce action shown 
to be necessary by inspection, the Finance Department preferred that the 
states should not accede for customs. Such non-accession rendered doubtful 
the admissibility of the states to federation and indeed the view of the 
Finance Member was that failing a commutation agreement or a more 
substantial accession than that provided by the proposed limitation these 
states should not be permitted to federate. It was left to the Secretary of 
State to choose between these views, though the Viceroy made it clear that 
he preferred to accept the suggested limitation to non-accession for 
customs. [501 
On being informed of the discussions regarding the contents of the 
Instrument of Accession to be put to the princes, the Secretary of State 
[471 PJGG Letter from Grigg to Laithwaite, dated 8 December 1937. 
[481 PJGG From Finance Department to Latimer, dated 4 December 1937. 
(491 ibid. 
[501 PJGG Telegram from Linlithgow to Zetland, dated 12 December 1937. 
189 
submitted the proposals regarding matches and sugar excise and 
corporation tax to the Law Officers. The Law Officers were to decide if the 
limitations could be properly regarded as limitations within the meaning 
of Section 6 of the Act, and if the limitations were consistent ., with the 
scheme of federation embodied in the Act. [511 
The Law Officers examined the proposals and concluded that the 
limitations regarding matches and sugar excise could be implemented 
within the Act, The proposals regarding Corporation Tax were however 
inconsistent with the Act and would require an amending bill, 1521 
After the Law Officers had given their opinion, the Secretary of State 
replied to the proposals put to him by the Government of India. The 
limitations regarding matches and sugar excise could be accepted, but it 
was not possible to meet the claims of certain states with respect to 
corporation tax. As for customs duties, the Secretary of State approved of 
the plan to buy out customs rights. If, however, the maritime states 
refused to have customs rights extinguished by purchase, he felt that the 
limited accession that was proposed would not be defensible. It would be 
better that such states should be admitted to federation without accession 
for items 19 and 44 (of the federal legislative list) [531 which dealt 
with customs. [541 
There was further correspondence on the difficult question of customs 
duties. In June 1938, Linlithgow went to England on leave, without 
agreement having been reached-on the concessions to be made to the states. 
Only after personal discussions did the Secretary of State and the Viceroy 
reach agreement on the offer to be made to the princes. They decided to 
accept the proposed limitations for matches and sugar excise and agreed 
not to press for any time limit by which these were to expire. Maritime 
states, it was decidedg should not accede for items 19 and 44 if no 
adequate arrangements for inspection and issue of orders could be made. 
1511 PJGG Case for the Opinion of the Law Officers. 
1521 PJGG Law Officers' Opinion dated 9 February 1938. 
1531 Government of India Act, 1935, Seventh Schedule. 
[541 PJGG Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 21 February 
1938. 
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Non-accession of maritime states on this basis would avoid the nee essity 
for resolving'the serious legal difficulties which were presented by the 
proposed limitation. The matter was to-be put before the Cabinet on'27 July 
1938. Zetland hoped no one would be hypercritical of the concesýiO'ns to 
the princes over customs, ' excise and salt'. [551 
The secretary of State wrote to the acting Viceroy, Lord Brabourne, of 
the result of this meeting. 
"The Instrument of Accession came before the Cabinet on the 27th and I 
was authorised to proceed with our offer to, the, Princes. There was some 
criticism of the proposal to permit, the Princes to continue to retain any 
part of the proceeds of the excise duties from, Sam Hoare. He argued in 
factq as I have argued for a year or moreq that on merits the proposal is 
unjustifiable. Unhappily we are in the hands of the Princes and we cannot 
deal -with the matter on its merits. So far as I am concerned I have 
accepted Hopie's [Linlithgowls] assurance that without this concession the 
Princes will not come in, and once that view of the situation is accepted 
there is really no more to be said. Sam Hoare was also quite clearly afraid 
that when once we come to grips with the Federation ! 'issue we shall find 
eith er the Princes, or, if the Princes come in, Congress, refusing to play 
and"he is anxious to postpone the evil day as long as possible. Hence a 
plea by him that we should not try to force the pace. Since my view is that 
the longer we delay the more disinclined both parties will be to play, this 
plea did not appeal to me and I said so. I was supported by the P. M. and the 
Cabinet approved my proposals and passed on not without a sigh of relief 
to other matters. The average member of the Cabinet looks upon Memoranda 
by the Secretary of State for India as tiresome but -inevitable 
intrusions! " [56]. 
A draft Instrument of Accession was then drawn up, setting out the 
matters with respect to which the federal legislature was to make laws for 
the states and the limitations for particular states. Deliberations on 
limitations that could be permitted within the framework of the Act had 
1551 PJGG Telegram from the Secretary of State to Crown Representative, 
dated 19 July 1938. 
1561 PJGG Letter from Secretary of State to Viceroy dated 2 August 193& 
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stretched over more than one year. In an accompanying letter to be sent to 
the princes, the Viceroy explained the reasons for the long delays since 
the states' replies to his letter of August 1936, in which they had 
indicated the concessions they regarded as necessary for their accession. 
Many aspects, he wrote, had had to be considered and some legal advice too 
had been sought. 1571 
The revised Instrument of Accession was placed before the princes in 
January 1939. The states were given six months to consider the offer. The 
rulers were asked to indicate their attitude to the offer, to state 
whether they would be prepared to execute the Instrument of Accession 
within'the terms indicated. They were to be asked to actually sign the 
instrument of accession only after replies had been received from all the 
states. [581 
The princes appointed a Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Akbar 
Hydari to examine the revised offer. The Committee reported in April 1939 
and declared that the revised draft was unsatisfactory. It suggested 
fundamental amendments and declared no steps towards accession should be 
taken until these changes had been made. 1591 
In June 1939, [601 a meeting of princes at Bombay passed a resolution 
endorsing the Committee's report. 
"The Conference of Princes and Ministers assembled at Bombay, having 
considered the revised draft of the instrument of accession and connected 
papers, resolves that the terms on the basis of which accession is offered 
are fundamentally unsatisfactory in the directions indicated in the 
report of the Hydari Committee of Ministers and confirmed by the 
recommendations of the Gwalior Conference and are therefore unacceptable. 
At the same time, the Conference records its belief that it could not be 
the intention of His Majesty's Government to close the door on all-India 
[571 PJGG Telegram from Crown Representative to the Secretary of State, 
dated 9 November 1938. 
[581 Glendevon, Viceroy at Bay p106. 
[591 Phadnis, Integration Indian States, p109. 
[601 Ashton, British Policy p63. 
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federation. " [611 
After the Bombay meeting, negotiations continued between the princes 
and the'Government of India mainly with a view toýsecuring the accession 
of some major states such as Kashmir, Baroda and the maritime states of 
Kathiawar, all of whom wanted their customs rights to be safeguarded. If 
these states could be persuaded to accede, it was hoped, others would 
follow suit. 'Little progress was made in these negotiations [621 by the 
time World War II broke out. With 'other -more urgent matters needing 
attention, the Viceroy announced the suspension of negotiations. 
"Federation remains as before the objective of His Majesty's 
-Government; but you will understand, .... the compulsion of the present 
international situation, and the fact that, given the necessity for 
concentrating on the emergency that confronts us, we have no choice but to 
hold in suspense the work in connection with preparations for federation, 
while retaining federation as our objective. " [631 
I 
The Viceroy spoke of negotiations. being suspended, not ended, but the 
developments of the next few years, ensured that they were not revived. 
With the Viceroy's announcement to both houses of the Indian Legislature, 
attempts to implement federation came to an end. 
5.5 Princes failure' to cooýerate 
The Viceroy and the Government of India, in particular, the Political 
Department, it has been shown, were willing to go to considerable lengths 
to make concessions to gain the princes accession. At first the Viceroy 
had. sought to amend the Act, but when it was found that the Act could not 
be amended, the Government of India had searched for ways to make the same 
concessions through limitations. This led to delays so that it was January 
1939 before the revised Instrument of Accession was put before the 
[611 Quoted in Menor4 Story Indian States, p4l. 
[621 Lbid, pp41-42. 
[631 Linlithgow (1944) Speeches, Vol 2, Simla, Government of India Press, 
pp140-141. 
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princes. Despite efforts stretching well over a year to meet the princes, 
demands they rejected the Instrument of Accession. 
Several explanations have been offered of why the princes rejected the 
revised Instrument of Accession. One explanation put forward is that the 
princes rejected the federal scheme in June 1939 because it did not 
adequately protect their non-federal treaty rights. By the terms of the 
1935 Act, all treaty rights not affected by federation were to be 
protected by the Governor-General through the use of his reserve powers. 
Federal subjects were included in the Instrument of Accession and any 
infringements of these could be taken to the Federal Court. However for 
subjects from which the federal administration was to be excluded, states 
would have to rely for protection on the reserve powers of the Governor- 
General. The reluctance of the Governors to resort to the use of their 
reserve powers, led the princes to fear that the Governor-General too 
would exhibit the same reluctance to use his reserve powers. The princes 
demanded the inclusion of all their treaty rights in the Instrument of 
Accession so that they would be protected by the Federal Court. When their 
demand for the adequate protection of non-federal treaty rights was not 
met, they rejected the Instrument of Accession as being unacceptable. [64] 
Another explanation is that they failed to put up a united front. 
"Federation would have been a viable political reality only if a majority 
of the princes chose to join and then, once a part of such an arrangement, 
chose to act as a bloc on crucial issues. Throughout the discussions in and 
surrounding the Round Table Conferences, most princes seemed unaware of 
these considerations and preoccupied by petty rivalries and short-term 
interests. " [651 
Another explanation, suggested by the above account, is that attempts 
to make concessions proved ineffective, because by the time the Act was 
passed, the princes no longer supported the federal scheme. Negotiations 
could'have been successfully concluded only if the princes were willing to 
cooperate in the first place. That the princes were no longer in favour of 
[641 Ashton, British Polic PP171-172. 
[651 Ramusack, Princes of India p222. 
194 
federation was. clear to one of the Viceroy's special emissaries in his 
meetings with their representatives. 
"My party had to deal with several of the more prominent figures of the 
Round Table Conference; e. g. Sir V. T. Krishnamachari in Baroda, Sir Akbar 
Hydari in Hyderabad, Sir Mirza Ismail in Mysore, Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Iyer-in 
Travancore and Col. Sir Kailash Haksar in Gwalior, but the enthusiasm these 
distinguished Indians had professed for federation in England had largely 
disappeared by the time of our visit, and in every case they endeavoured to 
attach unacceptable conditions to accession. Sir Akbar in particular was 
disappointing, as in England he had played a leading pro-federation part 
at the Round Table Conferences, but at our discussion he endeavoured to 
ride out on side issues, the real truth being that he no longer had the 
support of his Ruler, but did not want either to admit this, or to be 
blamed -for, going back on his former advocacy of federation. Sir Mirza 
Ismail wanted to make acceptance of the abolition of the Mysore tribute a 
prerequisite of federating, a condition which was obviously unacceptable 
when provision had been made for the gradual elimination of the tributes 
in the federation scheme itself. In fact each State attempted to make its 
own special bargain, which, if conceded, in view of the number of States 
involved, would have resulted in utter confusion. " [661 
Among the many implications of federation the princes had not bothered 
to consider when accepting the scheme at the first Round Table Conference, 
were the financial effects of federation. The Report of the Davidson 
Committee, appointed to examine the financial p; oblems arising in 
connection with the states, had made them realise that federation would 
involve financial sacrifices. In negotiations with the Viceroy, they 
sought to retain those fiscal rights which would be lost to them if they 
joined a federation. The princes had employed a battery of lawyers and 
were "more concerned to keep their 'privy purses' intact than to speculate 
on the intricacies of federal constitutions. " [671 
[661 Lothian, Kingdoms of Yesterday pp148-149. 
[671 Wylie, F. (1970) "Federal Negotiations in India, 1935-9, and After", in 
Philips and Wainwrighto The Partition of India p520. 
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The rulers concentrated on trying to retain as much of their revenues 
as they could, and showed little awareness of the larger consequences of 
their actions. 
"If federation means an immediate sacrifice of revenue it will have no 
attraction whatever to the states. The only thing which could make them 
take a different view would be fear of the consequences if they did not 
federate. It may be that if the Rulers were as enlightened as they should 
be, that fear would be widespread among them. There is however no 
indication of its existence in fact, and I know of no reason for 
anticipating that it will emerge in the near future. " [681 
The princes showed no fear of the consequences if they did not accede 
to the federation but remained in their 'medieval dreamlands, hoping that 
the status quo would continue indefinitely. That the status quo could not 
continue, that it was better for the princes to join the federation and 
thus assure for themselves a voice in future constitutional developments 
was evident to others, but not to the princes themselves. 
"By, and large the Rulers would not realise that the status quo, so far 
as they were concerned, could not continue, and that the alternative to 
federation was not the maintenance of the status quo, but something much 
worse, and that with the democratic tide flowing so strongly they would be 
better off 'in the house out of the rain than outside under their own 
umbrellas'. " [691 
That the princes failed to realise the opportunities offered to them is 
not surprising. The princes were a distinctly unenlightened body of rulers 
who, with a few exceptions, ruled their states in a despotic, irresponsible 
way. Safely ensconced as autocratic rulers under the protection of the 
paramount power, they made no moves to improve the administration in their 
states. It was not uncommon for the princes to use the revenues of their 
states for their personal gratification. Within their states they were 
surrounded by an atmosphere of adulation and tradition that made them 
1681 Linlithgow to Zetland, quoted in Ashton, British Policy p167. 
[691 Lothian, Kingdoms of Yesterdab p147. 
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incapable of adjusting to changing conditions. 1701 
The princes were preoccupied with petty jealousies amongst themselves: 
"as the princes could no longer vie with each other for supremacy in a 
military sense they now expended their., energies and played out their 
rivalries in an artificial and pretentious world of protocol and 
symbolism The number of guns to their salutes, their precedence at 
ceremonial gatherings, the manner in which they conducted relations with 
the imperial power and their capacity to accumulate additional honours and 
titles were all of vital importance to the princes as they jostled with 
each other for position and status. " 1711 
For a brief period the princes had accepted the federation scheme but 
they soon became preoccupied, as before, with petty jealousies and became 
concerned to protect their positions within their own states regardless of 
developments outside their borders. 
"After an initial interest in federation, the princes came to reject 
the opportunities so generously extended to them. Although there had been 
much rhetoric about the need for Joint cooperation with British India for 
many years preceding the Round Table Conferences, there had been no 
disciplined thinking in princely circles about what would be demanded of 
them in any cooperative arrangemento .... Most of the princes in London who 
agreed on the desirability of federation had little understanding of the 
demands likely to be made on federating units or of the techniques needed 
by anyone aspiring to political power within such a constitutional system 
Not realising the always narrowing rage of political options open to them, 
the princes were not ready to compromise when this last opportunity to do 
so was presented to them" [721 
1701 See FitzetK. (1956) Twilight of the Maharajas London, John Murray, pp 
93,102-103,108,168-169. Coen, T. C. (1971) The Indian Political 
Service, London, Chatto & Windus, Chapter 13, gives several examples 
or gross misrule by princes. 
[711 Ashton, British Policy, p4. For princes' excessive concern with issues 
such as proceduret see Ramusack, Princes of India pp89-90. 
[721 Ramusack, Princes of India pp227-228. 
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The princes rejection of the revised Instrument of Accession put to 
them in January 1939 was a result of their having joined the ranks of the 
opponents of federation. After initially accepting the scheme they had 
become opposed when it became clear that federation was not a 'one-way 
street' bringing only benefits for the princes. They failed to realise that 
the scheme offered an unprecedented opportunity to shape the future of 
their states. They continued as they had before, behaving in an 
irresponsible wayp preoccupied with petty rivalries amongst themselves. It 
is thus not surprising that attempts to negotiate with the princes, to try 
and gain their accession by making concessions, failed. Yet thL- veto 
granted to the princes meant that their signatures on the Instrument of 
Accession was a first necessary step if federation was to be implemented. 
5.6 Diehard influence on federal negotiations 
There was, it is generally accepted, an alternative way to gain the 
princes accession. This would have been to refuse to make concessions and 
to subject them instead to some pressure to accede. One of the Viceroy's 
special emissaries, Sir Francis Wylie, was convinced that this would have 
been the only effective way to get results, that negotiations were bound 
to fail. 
"In retrospect, however, I'would 'say that, if they were left to their 
own devices, there was never the slightest chance of getting rulers 
representing fifty per cent of the population of the princely states to 
sign instruments of accession before the second world war broke out in 
September 1939. The only way, so far as the British government were 
concerned, if they genuinely wanted to expedite the creation of the 
federation, would have been to take the princes by the neck and compel them 
to come in. " [731 
While Wylie was writing after the event, the Viceroy was not unaware at. 
the time, that the princes needed to be pushed in the right direction 
"what they need is a definite lead -I would not myself see an entire lack 
1731 Wylie, "Federal Negotiations", p521. 
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of advantage in a degree of pressure". 174] 
This was however, one course of action that the Conservative government 
in Britain was convinced should not be adopted, for it was afraid it would 
rearouse the diehards. 
As early as September 1935, Paul J Patrick (Political Secretary at the 
India Office) told Lothian that the prevalent view at the India Office was 
that "we need not lay ourselves open to any criticism of forcing 
Federation on the princes. " (751 Zetland expressed the same opinion when 
he wrote to Willingdon (in January 1936) that the India Office wanted to 
"avoid any risk of the Government being accused of having unduly hurried 
their decision about federating". 1761 
The approach suggested by the India Office was influenced by the 
realities of British politics, the need to give no excuse to the diehards 
to revive old controversies. The realities of the Indian situation were 
quite different, the princes themselves showed no awareness of the urgency 
of the existing situation - "relatively few have shown signs of a full 
appreciation of the fundamental importance of the British Indian 
situation in relation to their own position and the future of their 
dynasties. " [77] 
, 
Francis Wylie's account of what happenned when he visited two important 
states, Baroda and Kashmir, speaks volumes for the princely attitude to 
federation. "The Gaekwar himself was away racing in Bombay and anyway 
cared for none of those things. In Kashmir where the discussions took 
place in the presence of a bored and sulky Hari Singh the whole matter 
took on, even for me, an air of complete unreality.,, 1781 
When the Viceroy wanted to give his emissaries authority to' give 
rulings on certain questions, Zetland felt this would not be wise. He 
expressed the fear that the princes might feel they were being rushed and 
[74] PJGG Letter from Linlithgow to Zetland, dated 19 August 1937. 
1751 Ashton, British Policy p162. 
1761 jbid, p162. 
1771 PJGG Letter from Linlithgow to Zetland, dated 19 August 1937. 
1781 Wylie, "Federal Negotiations", p521. 
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might take fright. In his opinion, the princes were 'shy birds', 'more haste 
would result in less speed', and he urged that the visits remain 
exploratory. 1791 Already fearful of being accused of rushing the princes 
into federation, Zetland had received further warnings from the diehards. 
He wrote to Linlithgow that he had been warned by Lord Salisbury and his 
friends that their acquiescence in the passing of various Orders-in- 
Council associated with provincial autonomy was not to be taken as an 
indication of their attitude to federation which they regarded as the more 
dangerous part of the self-government scheme embodied in the 1935 
Act. [801 When Linlithgow sought an amendment of the Act to accommodate 
the princes' demands, Zetland replied that such a course of action was not 
possible because of the reaction it was likely to provoke among the 
diehards, and in this, as seen earlier, he had the support of the Prime 
Minister. 
Thus in a situation where it was necessary, if federation was to be 
implemented, to subject the princes to some degree of official pressure, 
none was forthcoming. While the Viceroy was aware of the princes lack of 
enthusiasm for the scheme he was not allowed to compel them in any way. 
"Zetland certainly applied a brake from home for fear of a diehard revolt, 
and he viewed the inauguration of a federation as a process requiring some 
years to complete. " [811 
The reason for the brake being applied by the Secretary of State was 
undoubtedly the deadhand exercised by the diehards in the Conservative 
Party. The princes needed to be jostled towards federation, but it was made 
clear to Linlithgow, that the diehards at Westminister were on the lookout 
for evidence of pressure being put on the princes to accede, and that they 
would not hesitate to protest should they find any. Throughout the period 
in which, the decision on federation had been discussed, the diehards in 
the Conservative Party had alleged that the princes did not really want 
federation and that they were being coerced into it. In debates in 
Parliament, at meetings of the Conservative Party, in the sections of the 
1791 Ashton, British Policy p164. 
[801 Glendevon, Viceroy at Bay p43. 
[811 Moore, "Paper Federation", p76. 
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press supporting them, the diehards had accused the government of forcing 
the princes towards'accepting a federation that they did not themselves 
want. To put pressure on the princes at this stage might well lead to a 
revival, Of a controversy that had once threatened to split the 
Conservative Party. The Secretary of State was fearful of party unity, and 
in this he had the support of the Prime Minister. 
I'At'the heart of the sensitivity of the British Government to styles of 
negotiations with the Princes, was the fear that the diehards would 
reemerge' to divide-the Conservative party once more should a whiff of 
controversy taint the Federal transactions. " [821 
By mid-1939, when the princes seemed to 
. 
have turned away from 
federation, the Viceroy requested the Secretary of State to make a 
declaration of intent in Parliament regarding federation. Zetland's answer 
revealed once again, anxiety over diehard reaction. He felt such a move - 
"would very easily stimulate the diehards speeches would almost 
certainly be' made -by" Salisbury, Rankeillour, Lloyd, and probably others, 
which ' could be calculated to encourage the Princes in their 
resistance. " [831 
The controversy within the Conservative Party regarding federation at 
the time the decision was taken, spilled over into the period of 
implementation. It needed only an occasional warning from the diehards to 
make the Secretary of State act with extreme caution during the period 
when attempts were made to implement the decision. 
The leaders of the group within the Conservative Party opposed to any 
change in the structure of the Government of India - "acted vigorously to 
I stymie negotiations over accession to federation. They constantly appealed 
to the fears of the princes that federation precluded any meaningful 
existence as rulers, and they utilised the Joint Select Committee's 
promise that accession must be voluntary to make it difficult for the 
Government of India to exert overt pressure upon the princes to move them 
toward federation. Since the head' of the India Office was a member of 
[821 Douds, "Government and Princes", P551. 
1831 ibid, p551. 
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Parliament, he and his subordinates were more subject, and more 
responsive, to threats from Parliamentary opponents of federation. " [841 
The opposition of the diehards during implementation was exercised in 
the form of a deadhand that was nonetheless effective. The Secretary of 
State conveyed to the Viceroy the need to proceed 
-with 
caution in dealing 
with the princes. The Viceroy acquiesced, and valuable time was lost in 
finding ways-to make concessions to the princes, concessions that had 
little chance of success since the princes had by then joined the ranks of 
. 
the opponents of federation, and were unwilling to cooperate in its 
implementation. 
One aspect of the negotiations over federation has received little 
comment,, the fact that the Viceroy allowed himself to be held in check from 
London in the matter of negotiations with the princes. [851 The Viceroy's 
acquiescence is surprising for it contrasted sharply with his earlier 
behaviour. In implementing provincial autonomy too, he had been subject to 
domestic pressures, from members of the Cabinet, to make concessions to the 
Congress to get them to accept office, but at that time he had stood firm 
and had even threatened to resign over the issue. 
A clue may be found in the ideological connection between the diehards 
and the Viceroy. Linlithgow, though not a diehard, was himself a 
Conservative. [861 He was concerned about diehard reactions to his 
policies and hoped that those adopted by him would not be disapproved of 
in those quarters. 
"He asked the Secretary of State for a summary of the reactions of the 
Morning Post and diehard press generally to the federal policy which he 
had announced. He wanted to be kept in close touch with the atmosphere in 
right wing quarters at home. " 1871 
[841 Ramusack, Princes of India p226. 
[851 On Linlithgow's acceptance of the Secretary of State's suggestion to 
let the emissaries' visits remain exploratory, one historian briefly 
comments "Linlithgow surprisingly acquiesced. " See Rizvi, Linlithgow, 
p62. 
[861 Rizvi, Linlithgow, p 2. 
[871 Glendevon, Viceroy at Bay pP35-36. 
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While the Secretary of State was bound to be influenced by the demands 
of British politics, ' - "it is not parliamentary, but Indian policy which I 
should regard as paramount at the moment although I am bound to attach 
importance to the former" [883 - so too, because of his Conservative 
background, was the Viceroy. He asked about diehard reactions to his 
policies and hoped that those he adopted would not be disapproved of in 
those quarters. The Secretary of State repeatedly stressed the need to 
proceed in negotiations so as not to revive dissensions within the 
Conservative Party. It was a view with which the Viceroy concurred. The 
Viceroy accepted the need to prevent the Conservative Party being racked 
once again by divisions. The Viceroy's Conservative background was an 
important factor in determining the tenor of negotiations with the 
princes. The Government of India sought to make concessions with a view to 
securing the princes accession. and no attempts were made to compel them in 
acceding to federation. 
5.7 The Political-Department of the Government of India 
Since implementation of federation required as a first step, the 
accession of the princes, negotiations were conducted between the 
Government of India, the princes and the India Office with a view to 
securing their accession. The bureaucracy responsible for conducting the 
Government of India's relations with the princely states, the Political 
Department wast as a matter of courset involved in the negotiations. Two 
points about the Political Department's role in the federal negotiations 
should be noted. 
First, the Viceroy chose to approach the princes initially, through his 
specially appointed emissaries, thus deliberately bypassing the Political 
Department, the bureaucracy specifically under his charge for dealing with 
relations with the states. After the emissaries had submitted their 
reports, and efforts began to meet the princes demands, the Political 
Department could not be kept out of the picture and was very much involved. 
[881 PJGG Telegram from Secretary of State to Crown Representative, dated 
25 March 1938. 
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Secondly, the Political Department made no attempt to give the princes 
a lead, a lead without which there was little chance of the princes 
acceding. , 
"Instead of putting a brake on the never-ceasing demands of the rulers 
and stressing the advantages to be gained by their entering the 
federation, the Political Department seemed to spend its time more in 
emphasising the loss the rulers would suffer if they were to federate and 
in instituting a search for expedients wherewith to make good or mitigate 
that loss. The result was a tendency to give in to the rulers all along the 
line. " [891 
Both points are surprising because the Political Department was in a 
position of considerable influence vis-a-vis the states. As agents of the 
paramount power, political officers enjoyed great authority and influence 
in the states under their charge. The paramount power gave the states 
guarantees of protection from external invasion and also from agitations 
within the states. Thus on the one hand the princes resented the authority 
of the Political Department which could and did intervene in their 
states, [901 on the other hand they realised their dependence on the 
Department - "in spite of all their criticism of the Political Department, 
it was evident that the Princes adopted a line of action after consulting 
the Political Department". [911 
It was not unusual for rulers of states to ask for advice from 
Political Officers. Every state had a Chief Minister (Dewan or Wazir) and 
in many states the rulers sought the advice and approval of the Political 
Agent before appointing a Chief Minister. Rulers would ask Political 
Officers for their advice on any important matters that arose such as 
federal negotiations and sometimes even on personal and family matters on 
which Political Agents were forbidden to give advice. [921 
[891 Menon, Story Indian States? PP39-40- 
1901 See Fitze, Twilight of the Maharajas, Chapters VI and VII, for issues 
on which t paramount power diU* -intervene. 
[911 Phadnis, Integration Indian States pl 12. 
(923 For the importance of Political Officers in the states, see Coen, 
Indian Political Servi2q. Chapter 10. 
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The dependence of the princes 'on protection by an external power, 
placed the agents of that power in a uniquely powerful position - "it 
created in the Princes a disposition to seek the favour of the agents of 
that power, from the Viceroy himself down to the most junior of Political 
officers rather than to win the devotion of their subjects; for it was to 
the Political Department that they looked not only as the custodian of 
their privileges and prerogatives and as the only organisation likely to 
initiate unwelcome action in the event of their flagrant abuse, but also 
for recommendations which might enhance their personal prestige by the 
conferment of greatly coveted honours and distinctions at the hands of the 
King Emperor. " 1931 
The Political Department could have played an important role in 
persuading the princes to accept federation - "a firm attitude on the the 
part of the Political Department .... would have facilitated the entry of 
the Princes into Federation" [941 - but significantly it did not do so. 
The reason that the Political Department did not commend the federal 
scheme to 'the princes with any enthusiasm, was, that the Political 
Department itself was not in favour of federation. While the'princes had 
initially been in favour of federation, the Political Department had been 
opposed to it from the very beginning, and its hostility had been made 
evident through the long period of decision-making. 
The first initiatives for federation had come from the- Resident 'at 
Hyderabadq Terence Keyes, but, when an informal conference was held at 
Simla in July 1930 between the Government of India and some of the princes, 
Keyes was excluded from the conference by the Political Department. Keyes 
saw this as an attempt by the Political Department to squash the idea of 
federation before it received wider recognition. [951 That there was some 
truth in his suspicions is revealed by the fact that the Political 
Department did not inform the India Office of the Nizam's willingness to 
contemplate federation, and it was not till years later that the India 
1931 Fitze, Twilight of Maharajas p169. 
[941 Phadnis, Integration Indian States p112. 
[95] Douds, "Government and Princes", P359. 
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Office realised that federation had been mentioned at that particular 
conference in Simla. [961 
In August 1929, Motilal Nehru invited some of the princes to confer 
with a committee of the All-Parties conference to discuss the future 
status of the states. The Political Department reacted with alarm, 
declared the princes would be at a disadvantage when negotiating with the 
more experienced British Indian politicians, and also revealed its 
attitude to federation - "as regards the first consideration, our 
unexpressed ideas are so far in favour of the federal ideal. Anything, 
therefore, which would assist in the attainment of this ideal should be 
normally supported. On the other hand, any federalisation is bound to take 
time. It cannot be a matter of months, it can best be a matter of years, and 
it may be indeed a matter of decades. There is therefore, no necessity for 
the taking of immediate steps to induce federalisation. " [971 
This view had been incorporated in the Government of India's Despatch 
on the Simon Commission Report - "the time has not yet come for a choice to 
be made. A federation of all-India is still a distant ideal, and the form 
which it will take cannot now be decided. " [981 
For the Political Departmentq federation was a 'distant ideal', 'a matter 
for decades'. In the meantime, the Department hoped the status quo would 
continue, that the Political officers would continue to enjoy virtually 
unchecked authority in the states to which they were assigned. 
At the first Round Table Conference, the princes' initiative made 
federation a much more immediate possibility. The princes declaration in 
favour of federation came as a surprise to the observers of the Government 
of India at the conference. 
"It was of course somewhat disconcerting that the representatives of 
the Princely Order unexpectedly and, as it subsequently appeared, with a 
[961 Ashton, British Policy, ppl32-133. 
1971 Quoted in Ramusack, Princes of India, p192. (Note by H Wilberforce- 
Bell, Under Secretaryý-P-olitical Department, dated 30 August 1939. ) 
[981 Government of India's Despatch on Proposals for Constitutional 
Reform, Cmd 3700,1930. 
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quite inadequate appreciation of the commitments involved, pronounced 
themselves at the very outset of the proceedings to be in favour of a 
Federal constitution for India, thus rendering out of date not only the 
despatch -upon which I had lavished so much time and labour, but also a 
great part of the monumental Report of the Simon Commission. " [991 
The princes, as has been stated earlier, initially favoured federation 
because they hoped it would get them away from the close supervision of 
the Political Department. For that very reason, the Political Department 
was opposed to federation. With federal agents operating in the states, 
there would be a lessening in the authority of the Political Officers. 
Thus they did not regard the scheme with approval. Haksar wrote - "if 
British India's applecart is eventually upset, the persons really 
responsible for that catastrophe will not be the Princes themselves but 
the Political Officers who will give the wrong lead with the object of 
retaining their authority. " [1001 
When the delegates to the first Round Table Conference returned to 
India, opposition to the federal scheme began to become evident. Officials 
in India displayed negative attitudes to federation, emphasising the 
difficulties that would result from federation instead of pointing to its 
advantages. [1011 Supporters of federation were aware, of the hostility 
within the Political Department to the idea of federation. Sapru warned 
Bhopal - "I have received an important letter from a high-placed friend at 
Delhi from which I gather that an insidious attempt is being made to 
persuade the Princes not to join the Federation. " (1021 Keyes wrote that 
he was disgusted with the spirit of defeatism rampant in the Government 
and at the ill-concealed hostility within it to the Federal ideal - 
"though the Government of India officially blesses Federation, the people 
most capable of throwing the machine out of gear, the Foreign and 
Political Department, will damn it by their defeatism and make it 
unworkable by insisting on staying in their cocoons unless they are put in 
[991 Fitze, Twilight of Maharajas p78. 
[100]Quoted in Douds, "Government and Princes", P382. 
[101]Fitze, Twilight of Maharajas, p78. 
[102]Douds, "Government and Princes", P408. 
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order. " 11031 
Malcolm Hailey, a senior member of the Government of India, confirmed 
this view. He wrote to Hoare on his return to India from being pn observer 
at the first Round Table Conference, that he was surprised to find that 
Simla and Delhi took a very different view of federation from those held 
by leaders of parties in England. [1041 
The first sign of the princes recoil from federation and of the 
reappearance of divisions in the princely ranks, was, as shown in the 
previous chapter, the scheme of confederation put forward by the Maharaja 
of Patiala. Allegations were made that the Political Department was behind 
the scheme. It is probable that one of the members of the Political 
Department may have been involved in the scheme. Many political officers 
considered federation to be a threat to their status, and among them was 
James Fitzpatrick, the Agent to the Governor-General (AGG) for the Punjab 
states, who had openly denounced federation. Fitzpatrick had conducted the 
official inquiry that 'had exonerated Patiala of the charges of 
maladministration brought against him, [1051 and he was thus on very 
friendly terms with the Maharaja. It is probable, given the hostility of 
the AGG to federation and his close relationship with Patiala, that he had 
had a hand in the formulation of the scheme of confederation. (1061 
The Chairman of the States Financial Enquiry Committee, J. C. C. Davidson, 
while touring India, was critical of the Government of India from 
Willingdon downwards in its attitude to ýederation. He was Of the view 
that Willingdon was indifferent, a doubtful supporter of federation, 11071 
and that the Political Department was incompetent, out of touch with the 
views of the British Government, and heartily opposed to federation. (1081 
There was a "cloud of uncertainty which masked the intentions of the 
Government 
_. 
of India, and in particular of the Foreign and Political 
11031ibid, p408. 
[1043ibid, p432. 
11053The charges were brought by the All India States Peoples Congress 
(AISPCC). 
(1061See Ramusack, Princes of India, p210. 
[1071ibid, p214. 
[108]Douds, "Government and Princes", pp431,435. 
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Department towards the Federal ideal. " [1091 
While the Bill was still in Parliament, the princes met in Bombay in 
February 1935 and declared that the Bill did not meet their demands in 
certain aspects, and that unless satisfactory amendments were forthcoming, 
they would reject the scheme. It came to Hoare's notice that a senior 
Political officer, who had been seconded to become Prime Minister of 
Kashmir, had been actively involved with the resolution. Hoare remarked on 
the impropriety of an active officer of the Political Department being 
associated thus in severe criticism of the Government of India. 
Willingdon, not the most forceful of Viceroys, replied that in his opinion, 
Colvin's secondment meant that he could act independently of the 
Government of India. [1101 
"The involvement of a senior Political, Colvin, in the notorious Bombay 
meeting was a pointer to the reactionary influence of the Foreign and 
Political Department. C 1111 Its antagonism to Federation had been exposed 
initially by Keyes, confirmed by Davidson, and repeatedly referred to 'with 
trepidation by both Haksar and Sapru. 11 [1121 Douds concludes - "One 
curious feature in the tale of Indian Federation has remained relatively 
unremarked: the powerful and latent hostility of the Government of India 
to the Federal ideal. " [1131 
The hostility of the Political Department to federation meant that 
despite the influential position of the Political Department vis-a-vis 
the princes, it failed to persuade the princes to accede to federation, and 
[1091ibidt p498. 
[1101ibidt p533- 
[1111In 1914, the Foreign Department was split in two, and renamed the 
Foreign and Political Department. The depariment was thus divided 
into two sections. There was a Political Secretary to deal with the 
princely states, and a Foreign Secretary to deal with foreign affairs 
and frontier areas. Both sections were under the direct charge of the 
Viceroy. Officers of the department could be transferred between the 
three areas, princely states, foreign posts, and frontier areas, which 
the Foreign and Political Department dealt with, at the same time, 
specialisation in one area was not uncommon. See Coen, Indian 
Political Service, pp5-6, p47. 
[112]Douds, "Government and Princes", pp544-545. 
[1133ibid, p544. 
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concentrated instead on trying to find means of making the financial 
concessions demanded by them. The Political Department did not exploit its 
influential position to help implement federation, because the Department 
was opposed to federation. Many of its officers were afraid that it would 
lead to a_ lessening of their authority in the states. The Viceroy was aware 
of this hostility and thus chose to approach the princes through his 
specially appointed emissaries. He has been criticised for thus bypassing 
the Political Department. 
"That the federal scheme failed utterly was not the fault of the 
[Political] Service. The whole business was taken out of the hands of the 
men on the spot, and handled at a higher level. Many officers have thought 
that steady, quiet persuasion by Residents and Political Agents would have 
been more successful. It seems doubtful; federation was doomed from soon 
after the If irst, f ine careless rapturet at the Round Table 
Conference. " [1141 
Quiet persuasion by local Political Officers known to the rulers, and 
from whom they often sought advice may well have succeeded, but the 
Political Department was unwilling to cooperate in this manner in 
implementing federation. There was hostility among the Department's 
members to federation because they feared it would lead to a dimunition of 
the authority they enjoyed in the states. Hoare had remarked - "it looks to 
me as if it wants a strong push from the Political Department if there are 
not to be long delays. " [1151 The Political Department failed to give a 
strong push because it was opposed to federation and there are even some 
cases of its officers working actively against federation. Of the many 
factors that prevented federation from being implemented, one was the 
opposition of týe Political Department. 
While the princes hoped the status quo would continue, so too did the 
, 
Political Department. The princes as a body were not far-sighted and were 
incapable of realising where their best interests lay. The Political 
Department was not the best agency to realise where the best interests of 
[114]Coen, Indian Political Service, p260. 
[115]Douds, "Government and Princes", p441. 
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the rulers -lay and to persuade them to act accordingly. The princes were 
intent on preserving wt 
Department was intent 
Political Department 
political advisers for 
Politicai Officers was 
iat authority and privileges they had, 
-and 
the 
on maintaining its influence over them. The 
"would not provide a large number of astute 
the princes". [1161 The general standard of 
poor. The low calibre of the members of the 
Department had been the cause of concern for many Viceroys, several of 
whom had made attempts to institute some reforms of the service. These had 
had little success and standards in the Political Service remained 
unsatisfactory. 11171 
The rulers, it has been shown, were unduly preoccupied with the number 
of guns to their salute, with their titles, and with the honours conferred 
on them. Their advisers, the members of the Political Department too, were 
inclined to spend a disproportionate amount of time on such essentially 
trivial issues. [1181 
5.8 Role of the Congress Party 
In examining the attempts to implement federation, this chapter has 
dealt so far with: the princes, who were one of the principal target 
parties; the agents, the Secretary of State and the India Office, the 
Viceroyq and the Political Department; and it has brought out the role 
played by an interest group, the diehards, who though not active during 
implementation were nonetheless able to influence the process. The veto 
given to the princes meant that their accession was a necessary first step 
in the implementation: -of federation and it was on trying to secure this 
..,., 
[1163Ramusack, Princes of India p240. 
[1173See Douds, "Government and Princes", Chapter 2, for examples of 
incompetent political officers. TC Coen, the official biographer of 
the Indian Political Service (the term was coined in 1937), and thus 
inclined to defend political officers from criticismg nonetheless 
acknowledges that the methods of recruitment and training were 
unsatisfactory. See Coen, Indian Political Service PP35-36, p44. Coen 
also gives an account of the attempts made by various Vice roys to 
reform the service. See Lbid, Chapter 6. 
[118]Fitze, Twilight of Maharajas pp84-85; Coen, Indian Political Service 
PP72-73. 
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that the efforts of the Government of India were concentrated. 
Federation however covered both the princely states of Indian India and 
the provinces of British India. The target parties in the provinces were 
the political parties, of which the Congress Party was certainly the most 
important one. The political power of the Congress Party, demonstrated by 
the 1937 elections, meant that it had the ability to resist implementation 
of federation. If accession of the princes was a necessary condition for 
the establishment of an all-India federation, so too was the cooperation 
of the Congress. 
The Viceroy was optimistic, specially after his brush with the Congress 
in the provinces over office acceptance, that the Congress party would not 
resist implementation of federation. Negotiations towards establishing 
federation centred on the princes. But during the long period over which 
they were conducted, the Congress did not remain inactive. It sought its 
own solutions to the inadequacies of the scheme of federation. 
Provincial autonomy, it has been shown in an, earlier chapter, was 
implemented because a majority within the Congress party was in favour of 
the decision and was willing to cooperate in its implementation. The 
party's attitude was different towards federation and there was widespread 
opposition within the party to the scheme. 
-The 
Congress party had not been 
involved in the making of the decision on federation, apart from Gandhi's 
brief appearance as its representative at the second Round Table 
Conference. The final form in which the decision was incorporated in the 
Act was unacceptable to the Congress Party. 
Firstly, the reservations over defence,, finance and foreign affairs, 
together with the Governor-General's special responsibilities meant that 
there was no real transfer of power at the centre. Secondly, the scheme of 
federation had been carefully designed to prevent the Congress from 
gaining control at the centre. The Act was so designed that the combined 
strength of the princes and Muslims in the federal legislature would be 
greater than that of the Congress. Since Muslims were granted separate 
electorates- and states' representatives were to be nominated by the 
rulers, the Congress was effectively excluded from both categories. The 
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relevant figures were as follows: [1191 
Table 3: Composition of Upper House under the 1935 Act 
Council of State 
General seats 75 
Muslim seats 49 
Others (incl Scheduled Castes, Sikhst Women, 
European +6 nominated by the Governor-General) 32 
Total number of representatives of Britisli India 156 
States' representatives 104 
Total 260. 
Table 4: Composition of Lower House under the 1935 Act 
Federal Assembly 
General seats 86 
Muslim seats 82 
Others Uncl Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, Christians, 
Anglo-Indians, Europeans, Women, + seats for 
representatives of commence and landholders) 82 
Total number of representatives of British India 250 
States' representatives 125 
Total 375 
While the Government of India conducted negotiations with the princes 
and chose to ignore the Congress, the Congress sought its own solutions to 
a decision to which it was opposed. It attacked the scheme of federation at 
its weak spot, the involvement of. the princes. 
[119]Government of India Act, 1935 Section 18 and First Schedule. 
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it 000" the Congress set out to democratize the constitution by a tour de 
force. No sooner had they agreed to take office in the provinces than they 
opened a campaign against the princes, Their object was to ensure that the 
states' representatives at the centre should be elected by the states' 
peoples and not simply nominated by the rulers. " [1201 
By joining states' peoples groups in their demands for democratic 
advances in the states, and in particular for states representatives to 
the federal legislature to be elected rather than nominated by the rulers, 
the Congress effectively attacked the scheme of federation. There was 
widespread support within the party for such a policy. This marked a 
change in Congress policy which, for a long period had been one of non- 
interference in the affairs of princely states. 
In December 1927, an All India States Peoples Conference (AISPC) had 
been convened by politically active workers within some states to press 
for administrative reforms and for the setting up of democratic 
institutions. [1211 Though the Congress was sympathetic to the aims of the 
AISPC, its policy was of non-interference in the internal affairs of the 
states. Gandhi urged the rulers to act as trustees of the people and 
maintained that the policy of non-interference was the correct one. [1221 
"Although the States' people's movement had derived its stimulus from 
the national movement and the leadership of the AISPC was in the hands of 
Congressmen, [1231 the Congress as a body was disinclined for a long time 
to play an active role in the Indian States. It expressed its support and 
sympathy to the States' people for securing the same rights for which it 
was struggling in British India; but at the same time it made it clear that 
the Congress as such would not involve itself in the struggle of these 
people. " [1241 
[120]Moore, R. J. (1970) "British Policy and the Indian Problem 1936-4011, in 
Philips, C. H. and Wainwright, M. D. (eds) The Partition of India London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, p82. 
[121]Phadnis, Integration Indian States p85. 
[1221ibidý pp84-85,91-92. 
[1233See ibid, P117, for Congress leaders associated with the AISPC. 
[1241ibidp p97. 
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The - Congress ýWorking Committee meeting at Wardha in August 1935 
declared - "the responsibility and the burden of carrying on that struggle 
must necessarily fall on the States' people themselves. The Congress can 
exercise moral and friendly influence upon the States and this it is bound 
to do wherever possible. The, Congress has no other power under existing 
circumstances .... In the heat of the controversy the limitation of the 
Congress is often forgotten. Indeed any 'other policy will defeat the 
common purpose. " [1251 There was recognition on the part of the Congress 
that it was not sufficiently strong to launch agitations against both the 
British and the princes. 
The elections of 1937 showed just how great was the popular support for 
the Congress. The success of the Congress encouraged states, peoples 
groups who were'agitating for democratic reforms in the states. There were 
popular agitations in several, states such as Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir, 
Hyderabad, Jaipurt Rajkot and Orissa. (1261 Pressures grew within the 
Congress for the party to formally support the states' peoples groups. Many 
left wingers of the party had been active in organising civil disobedience 
campaigns in the states, [1271 and they were in favour of adopting a 
revolutionary policy towards the states. 
At an AICC meeting at Calcutta in October 1937, a resolution was passed 
which censured the Mysore Government for its policy of repression and 
which appealed to the people of British India and the Indian states to 
give support -to the popular movement in Mysore. Gandhi was unhappy with 
the resolution and criticised it for going against the Congress policy of 
non-intervention. [1281 
At a meeting at Haripura in February 1938, a resolution confirmed 
earlier Congress policy. The resolution reiterated that the Congress stood 
for the same political, social and economic objectives in the states as in 
British India. The Congress would not accept federation unless the states 
[125]Pandey, B. N. (ed)(1979) ' The Indian Nationalist Movement 1885-1947. 
Select Documents., London, Macmillan, pp233-234. 
[1263Menon, Story Indian States p42. 
[127]Ashton, British Policy P170. 
[1283Menon, Story Indian States, p42. 
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participated as free units, enjoying the same measure of democratic 
freedom as the rest of India. In the existing circumstances, however, 
active participation by the Congress in the states' peoples struggle was 
not possible, and only false hopes would be raised by pledging support the 
Congress was unable to give. The main burden of carrying on the struggle 
for freedom must fall on the people of the states themselves. The Congress 
could offer only moral support and sympathy, though individual Congressmen 
were to be free to render assistance to such movements. [1291 
Gandhi managed to hold the party back for some time from formally 
associating itself with states' affairs. It was not however possible to 
maintain a rigid distinction between developments in the states and in the 
provinces. The growth of representative institutions in British India, led 
to similar aspirations among states' peoples who sought and received help 
from members of the Congress Party. Individual Congressmen took part in 
civil disobedience campaigns in the states and associated themselves with 
states peoples groups. 11301 Members of the left-wing had long been in 
favour of supporting such movements and Nehru had become president of the 
AISPC. 11311 Once Congress ministries were formed in several provinces, 
they were naturally not prepared to prevent agitations organised within 
their boundaries but directed at neighbouring states. 11321 
At an AICC meeting in Delhi in September 1938, a resolution condemned 
repression in Travanbore, Hyderabad, Kashmir and the Orissa states. It 
became impossible for Gandhi to "draw a khadi curtain screening the States 
from the general mass awakening. " [1331 He bowed to the inevitable and 
accepted that states' peoples movements could not be denied the support of 
the Congress. 
In an article in 'Harijan' in December 1938, Gandhi acclaimed the 
simultaneous awakening of the people. He declared it was impossible for 
him to continue to defend the non-interference policy of the Congress in 
[129]Phadnis, Integration Indian States, ppl25-126. 
11301See Ashton, British Policy P171. 
11311 
' 
ibidp PP170-171. 
11321Menon, Story Indian States? p43. 
11331libid, p43. 
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the face of the injustice perpetrated in the states. 11341 In an interview 
with the Times of India, Gandhi stated, "the policy of non-interference by 
the Congress was, in my opinion, a perfect piece of statesmanship when the 
people of the states were not awakened. That policy would be cowardice 
when there is all-round awakening among the people of the States and a 
determination to go through a long course of suffering for the vindication 
of, their just rights. If once this is recognised, the struggle for liberty, 
wherever it takes place, is the struggle for all India. Whenever the 
Congress thinks it can usefully intervene, it must intervene. " 11351 
When the Congress met at Tripuri (Jubbalpore) in March 1939, the policy 
of non-intervention was officially abandoned. Bose, in his presidential 
address, asked for a revision of the existing attitude. The official 
resolution declared that the policy of non-intervention had been dictated 
by circumstances, but had not been conceived as an obligation. The Congress 
had always reserved to itself the 'right of guiding the people'. The great 
awakening that was taking place imong the people of the states would lead 
to a relaxation or to a complete removal of the restraint which the 
Congress had imposed upon itselfq thus resulting in an increasing 
identification of the Congress with the people of the States. 11361 
Henceforth the Congress would actively participate in democratic 
reform movements within the states. The AISPC had, very early in its 
existence, made a demand that States representatives be elected rather 
than -nominated. 11371 Now they were to be actively supported by the 
Congress Party which had officially abandoned its policy of non- 
interference. 
The changed Congress policy towards the states set the seal on the 
princes rejection of federation. The princes were hostile to federation 
which they regarded as leading to a dimunition of their personal wealth 
and power. Congress demands for the election of states' representatives 
threatened further the autocratic position of the princes within their 
[134]Phadnis, Integration Indian States p126. 
[135]Quoted in jbidg p127. 
[1361ibid, ppl27-128. 
[1371ibid, p9l. 
217 
states. A memorandum to the Political Department put together by the Chief 
Ministers of some of the states gave the princes views. In it they stated 
that if they had known that there were to be constitutional changes within 
the states as a precondition to the establishment of federation - "the 
idea of federation would never have emerged into the realm of practical 
politics". 11381 That the change in Congress policy was one of the main 
reasons for rejecting the revised Instrument of Accession was made clear 
by the Chancellor, the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, at a session of the Chamber 
of Princes in 1940. He stated that "the political situation and the 
hostility in British India towards the States also proved a decisive 
factor with many Princes. It was felt that the attitude of a large section 
in British India towards the Crown, and the recent experience of organised 
subversive movements from British India against the States do not in the 
present circumstances provide that basis which is essential for a closer 
union between British India and the States. " 11391 
R. J. Moore pertinently comments - "Oni prerequisite to the working of an 
all-India federation was an accommodation between Congress and the 
princes, which alas, was never even approached at the Round Table 
Conference.? ' [1401 
Mention must be made, finallyq of the other target party in British 
India, the Muslims, represented by the Muslim League. The Muslims had 
supported provincial autonomy and they were willing, too, to cooperate in 
the establishment of a federation. They were given one-third of the 
British Indian seats at the centre and together with the support of the 
princes they would be able to outweigh the Congress. The federal scheme 
had been designed to assuage Muslim fears of domination by the Hindu 
majority, and it was one they could be expected to support. 
The change in Congress policy towards the states and its active support 
for statest representatives to be elected, turned the -Muslim League 
against federation, for it opened up the possibility of a Congress 
1138]Lbid, ppl2l-122. 
1139]Quoted in Lbidq Pl 13. 
[1401Moore, "Paper Federation", p77. 
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dominated centre. -The Aga Khan admitted as much to Linlithgow early in 
1940: "the sugar had all come off the pill the moment the States' 
representatives were to be elected by the States' peoples rather than 
nominated by the Rulers, for under such an arrangement the Muslims would 
not get 'from the States in the Central Legislature the support they 
required to balance Congress votes. " [1411 Congress activities, when 
attempts were made to implement federation, were responsible for making 
federation unacceptable to the Muslims. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Federation, one of the two major decisions in the Act, was not 
implemented. While it might be difficult in other cases to establish when 
efforts to implement a decision came to an end, such a difficulty does not 
arise in this particular case. History provides a neat cut-off date on 
which attempts to implement federation ended. Linlithgow's address to both 
houses of the Indian legislature on 11 September 1939, marked the end of 
attempts at implementation, for though the Viceroy spoke of efforts being 
suspended, they were never revived. 
Unlike the earlier case of provincial autonomy which enjoyed 
widespread support among the involved partiesq there was opposition to 
fpderation from a number of sources. This opposition had been made 
manifest during the long period of decision-making and continued during 
implementation. The princes, an important target partyq particularly 
because of the veto given to them, were not willing to cooperate, for after 
initially being in favour of federation, they had turned against it. The 
Congress, the other major target party was largely ignored as the 
Government of India sought to býing in the princes, but it had the ability 
to resist implementation and to seek its own solutions to the problem. The 
Government of India, in particular the Political Department was not in 
favour of federation and was able to withhold cooperation by not giving 
the princes a lead. The Viceroy, it has been seen, was subject to domestic 
pressures which restricted his ability to act on the matter, and these 
[141 ]Quoted in Moore, "British Policy", P83. 
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pressures came about as a result of the activities of an interest group, 
the diehards. The Viceroy did not resist these pressures but allowed 
himself to be held in check. The above account of attempts to implement 
federation demonstrates again the importance of target parties and the 
need for cooperation from them for successful implementation. The princes 
, refusal to sign the Instrument of Accession meant that the first step in 
implementing federation could not be taken. Vitally important too to 
successful implementation, was cooperation from the Congress party, but 
the Congress was hostile to the scheme and its activities set the seal on 
the failure to implement federation. 
I 
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Chapter 6 
Comparison of the Case Studies 
6.1 The Model 
The 4 tier model of implementation set out in Chapter One, suggested 
that implementation was a process involving 4 main groups of actors, 
namely, interest groups, decision-makers, implementers and target parties. 
The model suggested that implementation was not a separate stage that 
followed the decision, but that decision-making and implementation were 
together part of one process, involving the 4 groups of actors identified 
above. The arrows in the model indicated that there was interaction 
between these 4 groups throughout the process. In each of the three cases 
however,, there was a distinct decision as incorporated in the Act, which 
can be seen as a point at which the process froze or crystallised. 
It is necessary to examine first the extent to which the model provides 
an accurate picture of implementation in the light of the three case 
studies examined. Though a simplification of reality, does it correctly 
represent implementation of the three decisions? 
Provincial Finance - The decision-makers were the various committees 
appointed to examine the question of centre-state finances. Implementers 
were the Government of India, in this case this meant the Finance 
Department, and the single expert appointed to conduct the Financial 
Inquiry. The target parties were the government at the centre and the 
provincial governments# in particular the Finance Department of the 
Government of India and the financial authorities in the provinces. This 
reinforces the point made earlier about the difficulties of putting the 
actors into separate categories. In this case the Finance Department of 
the Government of India was both an implementer and a target party* There 
was, it has been seen, no involvement of interest groups. Thus in the first 
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case, a simplified version of the model, with onlY 3 tiers was sufficient 
as a description of implementation. 
> Decision-Makers 
_> Implementers 
_> Target Parties 
Provincial Autonomy - The decision-makers in the case of provincial 
autonomy were all those who participated in the lengthy period of 
decision-making that stretched from the appointment of the Simon 
Commission to the passing of the Act. Implementers were the Government of 
India, chiefly the Viceroy, though the Governors in the provinces were also 
involved, also the Secretary of State for India and the Cabinet of which he 
was a member. The target parties were the various political parties in 
India. Several of the target parties were involved in the making of the 
decision, representatives of political parties such as the Hindu Liberals 
and the Muslims had participated in the Round Table Conference discussions 
(the Congress was a notable absentee), highlighting again the difficulty 
encountered in categorising actors. There was involvement too, of an 
interest group, the left-wing of the Congress was an interest group that 
functioned within one of the target parties. This indicates that interest 
groups can get involved not just in the decision-making environment as 
suggested by the model, but also in the environment of implementation. In 
the second case a modified version of the model, indicating the presence 
of interest groups among target parties, would provide a better 
description of implementation. 
> Decision-Makers 
Implementers 
Target Parties 
Interested Parties <1 
Federation - In the case of federation, as in provincial autonomy, the 
decision-makers were all those who participated in the negotiations that 
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stretched from the appointment of the Simon Commission in 1927 till August 
1935 when the Act received the Royal Assent. There was involvement by an 
interest group, the diehards in the Conservative Party, who made their 
opposition felt in a variety of ways. The implementers were the Government 
of India, chiefly the Viceroy who kept negotiations in his own hands, also 
the Political Department, as well as the Secretary of State for India and 
the Cabinet in London. The principal target parties were the princes, the 
Congress Party and the Muslims. The model provides the most accurate 
description in this case, for there was involvement by the four categories 
of actors as set out in the model. 
> Interested Parties 
Decision-Makers 
Implementers 
Target Parties 
The model indicated that there was interaction between the 4 categories 
of actors throughout and that implementation does not follow decision- 
making as a separate stage. That there was interaction between the 4 
categories of actors is brought out in the case studies. The case studies 
also show that issues of implementation were under consideration, and that 
involved parties were making moves to further or to prevent 
implementation, during the period when the decision was being formulated. 
In the case of provincial finance, the target parties, the financial 
authorities at the centre and in the provinces, made representations, to 
the various committees. All the committees were aware of the provinces 
demands for greater resources to be allotted to them, and of their demand 
for a share in the proceeds of income-tax. The Finance Department too 
provided the committees with information on the financial needs of the 
centre. Both the centre and the individual provinces also made 
representations to the one-man financial inquiry. The Finance Member, it 
has-been shown, was making moves to ensure that the financial inquiry 
would be conducted by someone who would be sympathetic to the views of the 
centre before the Act was passed. The Finance Member wrote to Niemeyer and 
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approached the India Office before the decision was made. Thus he was 
making moves towards implementation before the decision was formally 
embodied in the Act. 
In the case of provincial autonomy too, implementation did not neatly 
follow decision in a sequential manner. The Congress Party was debating 
the issues of contesting elections and of office acceptance before the 
passing of the Act. Whether to cooperate, or not cooperate in 
implementation, was the subject of much debate and some controversy in the 
Party well before the decision was made. While several of the target 
parties were involved in the making of the decision, the Congress, which 
was not, was able to make its views known to the decision-makers through 
public statements and speeches. Not only did the implementers try to 
implement the decision, the target parties and the interest group 
involved, also attempted to influence the implementers. This is to be seen 
in the period of bargaining between the Congress and the Government of 
India on the issue of office acceptance. There were, as suggested by the 
model, interactions between the actors and these interactions ran both 
ways as indicated by the arrows in the model. 
The interaction between the four groups of actors is also brought out 
in the case of federation. The interest group in this case, the diehards, 
were active during decision-making. The diehards also made attempts to 
influence the implementers by giving warnings about being on the lookout 
for pressure being put on the princes to accede. In addition the diehards 
made direct approaches to one of the principal target parties, the princes. 
Thus the interest group was seen to interact with all the other three 
groups of actors. Some of the target parties were involved with the 
decision-makers when they attended and participated in the Round Table 
Conference. There was interaction too between the target parties and the 
implementers and the interactions ran both ways. One of the target parties, 
the princes, tried to influence the implementers as they sought to improve 
the terms on which they were to accede to the federation. 
In the case of federation too, implementation did not follow the 
decision as a separate stage. It was issues of implementation that caused 
a change in the princes attitude towards federation. Once they realised 
22 4 
the'sacrifices'they would' have to make, the princes began to turn against 
federation. The change in the princes attitude came about quite early 
during the period of decision-making. The changed attitude of the princes 
encouraged the diehards to make approaches towards them. They tried to 
influence the princes to reject federation, for with the veto given to 
them, the princes were in a position to prevent implementation of 
feder'ation. These approaches by the diehards to the princes were made well 
before the Act was passed. 
That implementation is a process with close interaction between the 
units as portrayed in the model is supported by other works on 
iýplementation. Pressman and Wildavsky wrote that programs make policies 
operational by forging the first link in the causal chain connecting 
I actions to objectives. Implementation is the ability to forge subsequent 
links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results. Each link is 
related to the other, but the relations run both ways, from front to back 
as well as f rom back to f ront. C1 
"The passage of time wreaks havoc with efforts to maintain tidy 
distinctions. As circumstances change, goals alter and initial conditions 
are subject to slippage. In the midst of action the distinction between 
the initial conditions and the subsequent chain of causality begins to 
erode. Once a program is underway implementers become responsible both for 
the. initial conditions and for the objectives toward which they are 
supposed to lead. " [21 
In an analysis of Britain's CSCE (Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe) policy, Clarke found that major elements of 
Britain's general CSCE policy were formulated during the implementation 
process., He shows how the aims, priorities and expectations of the policy 
were evolved in the process of implementing it. 
"The very ambiguity of the original commitmentj the Final Actq has meant 
that CSCE policy is largely being made in the process of implementation 
[11 Pressman, J. L. & Wildavsky, A. (1973) Implementation, Berkeleyq 
University of California Press, p xv. 
[21 ibid, p xv. 
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it provides a very good example of a case of 'Policy process' as opposed to 
'decision-making' in the more traditional sense. " 131 
The authors quoted above are all making th e point that much of policy 
can be made during implementation, so that decision and implementation are 
closely intertwined. The case studies analysed here show that links can 
run the other way as well. It has been seen that issues of implementation 
were being considered, and moves towards implementation (or non- 
implementation) were being made during the period of decision-making. 
There is support too for the idea that policy can be madet the initial 
decisions altered, during implementation. In the case of provincial 
autonomy, Congress demands for assurances from the Governors were aimed at 
making the decision more favourable to the Party. In the case of 
federation, Linlithgow recommended that the princes be allowed to retain 
revenues from certain sources which would be lost to them under the 
federal scheme, and he was involved in some controversy with the Secretary 
of State on this matter. 
"What emerges from this controversy over the terms on which the states 
would be required to federate is that Linlithgow, in his anxiety to 
inaugurate federation, was moving steadily away from the principles of the 
Act. ', [41 
That decisions can be altered during implementation, is shown 
dramatically by Congress activities during attempts to implement 
federation. Congress demands for states' representatives to be elected 
would have led not just to an amendment of the federal scheme, but would 
have revolutionised it. 
Thus 'decision-making and implementation are closely linked: "it has 
been suggested that we may in fact find it impossible to say where policy- 
131 Clarke, M. (1985) "The Implementation of Britain's CSCE Policy, 1975- 
8411, in Smith, S. & Clarke, M. (eds) Foreign Policy Implementation, 
London, George Allen & Unwin, p 162. 
[41 Ashton, S. R. (1982) British Policy Towards the Indian States 1905-1939, 
London, Curzon Press, p 168. 
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making stops and implementation begins. " [51 Despite the interconnections 
between the two, it has been recognised that there is a need, to separate 
decision-making and implementation. 
"However extensive the links and overlaps between the two stages, there 
are nevertheless good reasons (in addition to the ordinary usage of words) 
for drawing a distinction between them. " [61 
If we are to gain an understanding of implementation, it is necessaryt 
despite decision-making and implementation being part of the 'policy 
process' to deal explicitly with issues of implementation. 
6.2 The Propositions 
1. The longer the time taken over the decision, greater the chances of 
opposition to the decision, as there is more time available for opposition 
to form and thus the greater the likelihood of controversy. 
In the case of provincial finance, the time taken over the decision was 
long, but during the period in which the decision was made, opposition did 
, not gather 
force. The problem of separation of revenues between the centre 
and the provinces was a difficult one to which there was no easy solution. 
Attempts to find a satisfactory formula led to the appointment of several 
committees to investigate the issue and to make recommendations. 
Discussions were confined to these committees and the reports produced by 
each committee served as the basis for future bodies of experts to make 
further recommendations. There was thus little controversy, but much 
reexamination of the problem, during the lengthy decision-making period. 
In the case of provincial autonomy too, the time taken over the 
decision was long. The length of time available did not lead to the forming 
of opposition. There was little controversy, for there was a widespread 
consensus on the need to make the provinces autonomous of the centre. -The 
[51 Lewis, D. (1984) "Conclusion. Improving Implementation. ", in Lewis, D. 
& Wallace, H. (eds) Policies into Practice London, Heinemann 
Education Books, p 204. 
[61 ibid, p 204. 
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Report of the Simon Commission had recommended that dyarchy be abolished 
and that fully responsible governments be established in the provinces. 
This recommendation had the support of all the parties in Britain, 
including the diehards on the right-wing of the Conservative Party who 
were critical of other'concessions to nationalist opinion. The Government 
of India had expressed itself in favour of provincial autonomy. The 
political parties in India, too, it has been shown, were in favour of the 
decision. The lack of controversy meant that issues connected with 
pýovincial autonomy were quickly settled and discussions at the Round 
Table Conference and afterwards revolved round other issues. 
In the third case, federation, the time taken over the decision was long 
and there was considerable controversy over the decision. The presence of 
the *princes at the first Round Table Conference and the demand for an all- 
India federation by the Indian delegates came as a surprise. The Simon 
Commission's Report had envisaged a federation in the distant future. This 
was the view too of the British delegates to the RTC and of the Government 
of India. When federation was adopted as a more immediate prospect, a 
section of the Conservative Party which was bitterly opposed, attacked it 
at every stage. The lengthy procedure, three Round Table Conferences, issue 
of a White Paper, examination by a Joint Select Committee of Parliament, 
gave the diehards plenty of time to make their opposition felt, both 
inside and outside Parliament. It should be noted that opposition from the 
diehards caused delays in the passing of the Bill, so that controversy 
over the decision contributed to an increase in the length of time taken 
over the decision. 
Thus the proposition that greater the length of time taken over the 
decision, the greater the likelihood of controversy as there is more time 
for opposition to-form, is supported only in the third case. In the first 
two cases, the lengthy decision period did not lead to controversy, in the 
case of federation, the opposition led to a lengthening of the decision 
period. 
2. Greater the controversy at the time of decision, greater the chances 
0f opposition being carried through to implementation and thus greater the 
difficulties in implementation. 
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In, the case of provincial finance there was no controversy at the time 
of decision, thus no opposition to be carried through into implementation. 
In the second case, that of provincial autonomy, there was opposition and 
difficulties in implementation, but this was not carried through from the 
time of decision, but came about through the activities of an interest 
group, the left wing of the Congress Party. There is support for the 
proposition in the third case study. The controversy over the making of 
the decision on federation, in particular, opposition from a section of the 
Conservative Party did affect implementation. A Conservative Viceroy in 
India, and, a Conservative Government in Britain, had responsibilty for 
implementation. The diehards gave repeated warnings on the need for 
caution in proceeding with federal negotiations, and the need to give the 
diehards no excuse to renew their attacks, led to difficulties in 
implementation. Negotiations with the princes could not proceed solely 
with a view to getting them to accede, but had to take into account 
probable diehard reactions, and this increased the difficulties in 
implementation of federation. 
3. Greater the controversy at the decision stage, the less the chances 
of successful implementation as there would be less willingness to reopen 
or amend a decision reached after long negotiations, hence reducing the 
room for manoeuvre. 
In the case of provincial finance, the obverse of the proposition was 
found to be true, there was willingness to reopen and amend a decision 
which had involved little controversy. Niemeyer asked for a change in the 
terms of reference of his Inquiry, so as to be able to include matters not 
covered by the original decision, such as provincial debts. The broadening 
of the terms of reference requested by him was readily agreed to. Thus it 
became possible to deal with certain issues during implementation, that, it 
would not otherwise have been possible to deal with under the terms of the 
decision as incorporated in the Act. 
In the case of federation in contrast, when the Viceroyq Linlithgow, 
sought an amendment of the Act, both the Secretary of State and the Prime 
Minister expressed their unwillingness to reopen the decision. The reason 
given by them was the controversy at the time of decision, they were 
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reluctant to go to Parliament to seek an amendment of a Bill that had been 
passed after lengthy negotiations. Reopening the issue, they feared, might 
lead to fresh dissensions in the Conservative Party. 
In the case of provincial autonomyp one can see Congress demands for 
reassurances from the Governors as^an attempt to amend the decision. Its 
failure to achieve this was not however caused by unwillingness to amend a 
decision reached after long negotiationsv but by an unwillingness on the 
part of the Government of India to make concessions to the Congress. 
4. More open the decision, the greater would be the difficulties in 
implementation. Decisions are often intentionally open as this may be the 
only way to make a decision acceptable to those responsible for making it. 
While the decision on provincial autonomy was not an open one, the 
other two decisions examined in this study were both open in that many 
details of both decisions were left to be settled during implementation. 
The decision on separation of revenues though open did not lead -to 
difficulties in implementation. It had been left open as it had been found 
difficult to find a way of separating completely the revenues of the 
centre and 'of the provinces without affecting the financial stability of 
either. While the Act settled the broad question of separation of finances, 
it left the final details to be settled during implementation. The 
decision was not left open as a way of settling differences between 
parties to the decision, but because of the technical difficulties 
involved. 
There is support for the proposition in the third case examined, 
federation. The fact that the terms on which the princes were to accede had 
not been settled, but were left to be resolved after the Act had been 
passed, caused difficulties in imp lementation. Without the princes' 
accession, the first necessary step in the 
"implementation of federation 
could not be taken. Negotiations to settle the terms on which the princes 
would be asked to accede stretched over a number of years till brought to 
an abrupt end by World War IL The decision, it has been shown, had been 
deliberately left open. The initial enthusiasm of the princes for 
federation had faded very quickly. They began to realise the disadvantages 
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to them of federation, such as loss of revenue and curtailment of 
sovereignty. They began to demand a satisfactory resolution of these 
issues, in particular, a definition of paramountcy. The difficulties in 
resolving these issues, led to them being postponed to be settled during 
implementation. The decision on federation as embodied in the Act was made 
acceptable to the princes (they criticised it, but did not reject it 
completely) by leaving it open. 
It has been -recognised that decisions are often deliberately left open 
to make them acceptable to the various parties: 
"The ambiguities of political language reflect the difficulty of 
obtaining agreement on policy between conflicting and competing interests, 
especially when a number of parties are involved. It is no accident that, 
in the- reports of committees, the crucial passages are frequently written 
in an obscure and Delphic way. 11 
and that this causes difficulties in implementation: 
"Where ambiguities and discrepancies do cause problems of course is at 
the implementation stage. The implementation of the compromise policy has 
to satisfy all conflicting interests, and they in turn are expected to 
fulfil the commitments they made in the process of bargaining which led to 
the statement of the policy. But this means translating ambiguous words 
and *symbols into unambiguous , or at least less ambiguous reality. .... It 
seems almost inevitable that some of those concerned will end up 
disappointed or discontented. " 171 
5. The greater the amount of time available for implementation, more the 
chances for opposition to make itself felt and therefore less the chances 
of successful implementation. 
In the case of provincial finance, the amount of time available for 
implementation was fairly short. The necessary Order s-in-Counc ii had to be 
passed before provincial autonomy was inaugurated on 1 April 1937. The 
Order s-in-Council were therefore to be placed before Parliament in the 
171 Lewis, "Improving Implementation", pp210-21 1. 
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summer of 1936. This meant that the inquiry into provincial finance had to 
be conducted during the winter of 1935-36. The fact that there were 
constraints on the amount of time available for implementation expedited 
the appointment of the one-man commission to conduct the financial 
inquiry, and also ensured that it was carried out without delay. Thus in 
the first case, the limited amount of time available was a contributory 
factor in ensuring implementation. 
In the case of provincial autonomy, a definite date was set by which 
responsible governments were to be established in the provinces, 1 April 
1937. The first step towards implementation, the holding of elections was 
taken before this target dateg in the winter of 1936-37. Provincial 
'autonomy was implemented by the target date in the four non-Congress 
-'Provinces (Bengal, Punjab, Assam and Sind), but in the Congress provinces, 
with the refusal of the Congress to accept office, minority governments 
were installed, and a crisis was avoided by postponing the summoning of 
the legislatures. The fact that these legislatures would have to be 
summoned within six months provided a focus for the negotiations that 
followed. As the months passed, pressures grew on both sides to resolve the 
issue. The Viceroy was subject to criticism from many sources for his 
stand, and there were pressures within the Congress Party from those 
anxious to accept office, to find a way to do so. All the parties involved 
were aware of the need to seek a way of implementing provincial autonomy 
within the six month period after 1 April 1937. The fact that after this 
six month period a totally different situation would prevail, was an 
important factor in influencing the parties involved to seek a resolution 
of the issue before that date. While implementation was not achieved in 
the Congress provinces by the initial target date, 1 April 1937, 
circumstances provibed a second target date (six months from 1 April 1937) 
that limited the time available for implementation. In the second case 
thusq though there was opposition, the limited amount of time available 
contributed to limiting this opposition, for those in favour of 
implementation sought a compromise before the six month period was at an 
end. 
In the third case, federation, no date was set by which federation was 
to be implemented. The Viceroy tried to set target dates by which 
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negotiations with the princes were to be completed, but they lacked any 
kind of sanction. The fact that no target date was set for the inauguration 
of federation, meant that negotiations with the princes were conducted in 
a leisurely manner. The princes kept putting forward demands and the 
Government of India sought ways to make concessions. Correspondence 
between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State stretched from August 1937 
to January 1939 on the revised Instrument of Accession to be put to the 
princes. (Opposition from the princes did not form during this period, they 
had become opposed before the passing of the Act. ) The amount of time 
available did however encourage the princes to continue putting forward 
demands, to try to secure better terms for accession. Even when they 
rejected the revised 'Instrument of Accession, they expressed the hope that 
HMG did not intend 'to close the door on an all-India federation'. The 
amount of time available encouraged both the Government of India and the 
princes to act in a leisurely manner, devoid of a sense of urgency during 
implementation of federation. 
The amount of time during which negotiations were conducted between the 
Viceroy and princes, allowed the Congress Party which was opposed to 
federation, to make its opposition felt. It set out to revolutionise the 
scheme of federation, to change it forcibly by abandoning its earlier 
policy of non-interference in states affairs and by demanding that states, 
representatives be popularly elected. 
Thus the lack of a date by which federation was to be implemented 
encouraged the Government of India to act in a leisurely manner while the 
princes had ample opportunity to put forward a never-ending series of 
-demands. This contrasts sharply with the sense of urgency displayed 
by the 
Government of India and the Congress Party in negotiations over provincial 
autonomy. It allowed time too for the Congress to make its opposition felt 
and this was an important factor in the non-implementation of federation. 
Comparison between the cases shows that the setting of a target date 
can help implementation. Lack of a target date leads to a leisureliness in 
negotiations which may drag on indefinitelyq while setting a target date 
brings a sense of urgency in concludinj negotiations. 
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6. The greater the number of parties involved in implementation, the 
less the likelihood of the decision being implemented, as bargaining among 
the parties would need to be resolved by compromise. Greater the number of 
parties involved, the greater the difficulty in reaching a compromise. 
In the case of provincial finance, the number of parties involved in 
implementation was very small. The Niemeyer Report reflected a consensus 
reached between Niemeyer and the Finance Member of the Government of 
India. The correspondence reveals certain differences in the attitudes of 
the two parties, but these were-soon resolved. 
In the second case, that of provincial autonomy, the number of parties 
involved in implementation was very ýarge. Bargaining during 
implementation did not however involve all the parties. In the non- 
Congress provincesq the non-Congress parties who were in a position to 
form governments, did so on 1 April 1937. There was some bargaining between 
the Government of India and the Congress Party, but a compromise was 
reached when the Congress accepted the conciliatory tone of the Viceroy's 
speech to end its opposition to taking office. 
In the case of federation, the number of parties involved in 
implementation was very large, and with little support for federation 
among any of the parties, bargaining involved all of them. Negotiations 
with the princes meant that the Government of India had to negotiate with 
144 individual princes, and it proved difficult to find a formula that 
would cover all their demands. The Congress by making demands for states' 
representatives to be elected introduced an element that made'federation 
even less acceptable to the princes and turned the Muslims against 
federation. Reaching a compromise between all these parties would have 
presented enormous, perhaps insuperable difficulties, but with the princes 
rejection of the revised Instrument of Accession and suspension of federal 
negotiations, the necessity for doing so did not arise. 
There is thus some support for the proposition that the greater the 
number of parties involved in implementation, the greater the difficulties 
in implementation. However, not all the parties become engaged in 
bargaining. Parties who support the decision, such as the non-Congress 
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parties in the case 'of provincial autonomy, ' 'do 'not become involved in 
bargaining. Parties who do not support the decision, such as the princesq 
or are opposed to the decision, such as the Congress (both in the case of 
federation), are responsible for the need for further bargaining during 
implementation. Thus it is not just the number of parties involved who 
cause difficulties in implementation, but the number of parties involved 
who do not support the decision, or who oppose the decision, who cause 
difficulties in reaching a compromise and therefore in implementation. 
7. Lower the level of cooperation received from implementers, - greater 
will be the problems in implementation. 
, . 
In the first case study, the implementers were the Government of India, 
particularly theTinance Department of the Government of India, and the 
single expert appointed to conduct the financial inquiry. The Government 
of India was in favour of the provinces being granted autonomyg and 
financial autonomy for the provinces had to be granted if provincial 
autonomy was to have real meaning. Since there was support for the 
decision in the Government of India, cooperation from the implementers was 
forthcoming during implementation. 
In the second caset the main implementers were the members of the 
Government of India, in particular the Viceroy. The Government of India in 
its despatch had expressed itself in favour of provincial autonomy and 
thus there was cooperation from the implementers during implementation. 
In the case of federation there was cooperation from some of., the 
implementers. The Viceroy made many ef forts to get the princes to accede 
and was supported to a large extent by the government in Britain. There was 
however no-cooperation from the Political Department of the Government of 
India which was in a position to influence the princes. The Political 
Department did not utilise its influential position to persuade the 
princes that accession to federation was in their best interests. The 
Political Department was opposed to the decision on federation, fearing it 
would bring about a dimunition of their authority in the statest and thus 
was unwilling to cooperate in its implementation. Though there were some 
cases, of Political Officers working actively against federationo most 
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members of the Department were able to withhold their cooperation by 
simply doing nothing. The princes needed to be given a definite lead and 
Political Officers were well placed to provide such a lead. Their policy 
of doing nothing contributed to the problems encountered in attempts to 
implement federation. 
In an analysis of implementation of oil sanctions against Rhodesia, 
Brian White found that the British Government, to effectively impose 
sanctions, needed cooperation from a wide range of agents. These included 
transnational corporations and states with oil interests in Southern 
Africa, and the United Nations. There was support within the U. N., but 
cooperation from many of the oil companies and states involved was 'half- 
hearted at best', while Portugal and South Africa actively opposed 
sanctions. Lack of cooperation from these agents, he found, contributed to 
the failure of oil sanctions against Rhodesia. [81 
8. The greater the ability of target parties to resist, the greater will 
be the problems in implementation. 
In the case of provincial finance, the target parties were the Finance 
Department of the Government of India, and the financial authorities in 
the provinces. The Finance Department was closely involved in 
implementation and in securing favourable terms for the centre. The 
provinces did not have the ability to resist implementation, though some 
provinces were unhappy with the assistance they had received from the 
centre. Once the Orders-in-Council had been passed, they became binding on 
the provinces (and on the centre). 
-In the case of provincial autonomy, the target parties were the various 
political parties in India. All the target parties had the ability to 
resist implementation by not contesting the elections, and by not 
accepting office if elected. All the target parties chose to contest the 
elections, and all except the Congress agreed to take office. The Congress 
Party refused to accept office for a period of three months. If it had 
[81 White, B. (1985) "Britain and the Implementation of Oil Sanctions 
against Rhodesia"t in Smith & Clarke (eds Foreign Policy 
Implementation pp 41-42. 
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continued its policy of refusal, implementation of provincial autonomy 
could not have' taken place in the Congress provinces. The Viceroy would 
have had to instruct the governors in these provinces to assume all powers 
under Section 93 of the Actt thus admitting failure to implement the 
decision on provincial autonomy. The non-Congress parties did not resist 
implementation because they were in favour of the decision. The Congress 
too, ceased to resist implementation after a period of three months, 
because a majority within the party was In favour of provincial autonomy, 
and only a minority on the left of the party was opposed. 
'In the case of federation, the principal target parties were the 
princes, the Congress, and the Muslims. The princes ability to resist 
implementation was self-evident, they had been given a veto on the 
establishment of an all-India federation, a veto that was written into the 
Act. That the Muslims, and to an even greater extent the Congress, as the 
main political force in India, also had the ability to resist, was obscured 
as efforts to establish federation revolved round attempts to gain the 
accession of the princes. Congress demands to have statest representatives 
elected, and its changed policy towards the princely states, dramatically 
demonstrated the strength of the Congress. It sought to forcibly alter 
implementation of federation in a manner that would allow theXongress to 
gain power at the centre which the Act had been designed to prevent. 
'Congress 
domination of the centre could be prevented in the decision, but 
during implementation, given its political strength in the countryt it 
could alter this position. In devising the scheme of federation the 
princes and Muslims could be allotted enough seats so that together they 
could act as a check on the Congress. During implementation, the Congress 
demonstrated its ability to resist this by seeking to revolutionise the 
scheme of federation. 
The ability of the princes and of the Congress to resist caused 
sufficient problems to prevent federation from being implemented. The 
princes resisted implementation as by the time the Act was passed, they 
had ceased to be supporters of federation. The' Congress had all along 
opposed federation, unlike provincial autonomy which a majority within the 
party supported. Thus the Congress resisted implementation of federationt 
not by refusing to cooperate in an all-India federation - the princes 
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refusal to accede meant that the first condition in implementing 
federation was not met - but by seeking to revolutionise the federal 
scheme. This made federation even more unacceptable to the princes and 
turned the Muslims too against federation. The problems created were so 
great that federation was not implemented. 
That the ability of target parties to resist is an important factor was 
shown in the case of non-implementation of oil sanctions by Britain. It 
was found that an important reason for Britain's failure to impose oil 
sanctions against Rhodesia, was the ability of Rhodesia and the Smith 
regime to frustrate the sanctions effort. Portugal and South Africa played 
a significant role in helping Rhodesia to resist sanctions. In addition, 
the Rhodesian economy, which had appeared vulnerable to economic and oil 
sanctions, proved instead to be very resilient. [91 
The longer the chain of command, the greater would be the 
difficulties in implementation. Decisions are rarely tailored to 
facilitate monitoring and as a result senior players have great difficulty 
in checking on the faithful implementation of a decision. 
This proposition proved somewhat problematic. The chains of command 
could be enumerated as follows. In general, there was a distinct hierarchy 
in that the Viceroy was subordinate to the Secretary of State. The Viceroy 
had departments under his charge at the centre, such as the home and 
finance departments, while each province had at its head a Governor, who 
was subordinate in authority to the Viceroy. - 
In the first case examined, the chain of command was Secretary of State 
-> Viceroy -> Finance Department. However, implementation was mainly in 
the hands of the expert appointed to conduct the Financial Inquiry,. and he 
functioned independently of this chain (of command). In the second case it 
was Secretary of State -> Viceroy -> Governors. In this case, the Congress 
under Gandhi's leadership, resisted efforts to decentralise negotiations. 
Though Governors in some of the provinces were involved, particularly in 
Madras, negotiations were concentrated in the hands. of the Viceroy at the 
[91 Whitet "Implementation of Oil Sanctions", p43. 
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centre. In the third case, the chain of command was Secretary of State -> 
Viceroy -> Political Department. In this case, it was the Viceroy, whot 
aware of the hostility within the Department to federation, sought to 
exclude the Political Department from federal negotiations, and did 
succeed, at least initially, in doing so. 
In each of the three cases, the chain of command was bypassed and 
therefore was not an important factor in implementation. Thus the evidence 
for this proposition in the cases examined was found to be sketchy. The 
proposition. may be more fruitful for analysis in cases where 
implementation within a bureaucracy is examined, for in a hierarchical 
structure such as a bureaucracy, it would be possible to trace a more 
distinct chain of command and the role of Junior players in promoting or 
blocking implementation. [101 
This is supported by oth& works which examine implementation in a 
wider context than the bureaucracies involved. Smith and Clarke found that 
a study of implementation led to certain shifts in emphasis. One was to see 
the international arena as an arena of policy implementation. In this 
arena, the metaphor of 'chain of command' is less accurate than the 
metaphor of ' 'coalition'. [111 This is because "to pursue a policy the 
initiator must build and maintain over time a coalition of implementing 
agencies who will accord an appropriate priority to that policy in some 
meaningful way". [121 Once it is accepted that implementation involves a 
number of implementing agencies, the concept of 'chain of command' becomes 
less relevant. 
10. Greater the number of actors involved in both decision and 
implementation, the greater the chances of successful implementation. A 
corollary of this is, that typically, ambassadors and field commanders do 
not feel-obliged to faithfully implement decisions because they are not 
usually involved in the making of the decision. 
[101 See Halperin, M. H. (1974) Bureaucratic Politics and ForAgn-Policy, 
Washington D. C. 9 Brookings Institution. 
[111 Smith, S. & Clarke, M. (1985) "Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreiin 
Policy Behaviour", in Smith & Clarke (eds) Foreign 
_P0 
11 cy 
Implementation pp 6-7. 
[121 Clarke, "Implementation of Britain's CSCE Policy", p 171. 
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In the case of provincial finance, there were no actors involved in 
both decision and implementation, the decision was the result of 
deliberations by a succession of committees. This did not however create 
difficulties in implementation. 
In the case of provincial autonomy, political parties such as the 
Liberals and the Muslim League were involved in both, decision and 
implementation. The main political party, the Congress, was not involved in 
the decision, but after its success in the elections of 1937, it became 
clear it was the main party involved in implementation. Objections from a 
section of the Congress did lead to difficulties in implementation, so 
that there is some support for the proposition in this case. The 
Government of India, though not involved in the decision, had expressed 
itself in favour of provincial autonomy and thus was willing to cooperate 
in its implementation. 
In the case of federation, the princes had not only been closely 
involved in the decisiono the initiative had come from them, yet they wqre 
one of the principal parties in precluding the implementation of 
federation. The reason for this is that their attitude changed from one of 
support to one of hostility. The proposition has an implicit assumption 
that the attitude of the actors remains the same, while that of the princes 
underwent a drastic change within a very short period of their 
enthusiastically proposing the federal scheme. The Congress Party had been 
virtually excluded from the decision and Congress activities during 
implementation were such as to ensure non-implementation of federation. 
The Viceroy was in favour of federation, as chairman of the Joint Select 
Committee he had been involved in the decision, and he did make efforts to 
ensure its implementation. The Political Department on the other hand, 
which occupied a position similar to that occupied by ambassadors or field 
Commanders, had not been involved in the decision, and did not feel obliged 
to help in its implementation. 
Thus there is evidence to support both the proposition and its 
corollary in, the third case. The behaviour of the princes which 
contradicts the proposition is explained by the change in their attitude 
which went from enthusiastic support at the first Round Table Conference 
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to outright hostility during implementation. 
11. Organisatiops get involved in implementation in fairly regularised 
ways. Where a decision leaves leeway for the organisation that As 
implementing itq that organisation will act so as to maximise its 
organisational interests. 
In the case of provincial finance, the involvement of the Finance 
Department in implementation followed as a matter of course. The financial 
expert appointed to conduct the inquiry naturally sought information from 
and consulted the Finance Department of the Government of India and the 
financial authorities in the provinces. (It was the degree of 
collaboration between the Finance Department and Niemeyer, and the 
influence that the former was 'able to bring to bear on the latter that was 
unusual. ) The provinces for their part, in sending information to Niemeyer, 
made demands for the maximum allocation of finances to be made to the 
provinces. It was not that the provinces acted together on this issue, but 
rather that each sought to gain the maximum of financial benefits for 
itself. The Finance Department too sought to retain the maximum of 
revenues for the centre. Its influence and success in this issue, it was 
able to prevent any immediate distribution of income-tax to the provinces, 
has been shown. Thus the (financial) organisations acted in such a way as 
to maximise their interests. This had implications for the manner in which 
the decision was implemented but did not create difficulties in 
implementation. 
In the case of provincial autonomy, while the administrative machinery 
of the Government of India would have been involved in the holding of 
elections, there was little involvement by any organisation in the 
subsequent negotiations. I 
In the third case, that of federation, since negotiations concerned the 
princes in the first instance, the organisation dealing with relations 
with the princely states was involved. The Viceroy sought to exclude the 
Political Department, but once it was decided to meet the princes demands 
for financial concessions, the Political Department could not be kept out 
of the picture. The Political Department for its part did nothing to 
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persuade the princes to accede to federation. The motives of the 
Department were clear; federation would lead to a lessening of the 
authority of political officers in the states, and it was in the interests 
of the Political Department that federation should not be established. 
Members of the organisation did not commend the federal scheme to the 
princes, they failed to give the prices a lead in this matter and some even 
worked actively against implementation of federation. Thus the involvement 
of the Political Department also followed as a matter of course and its 
members acted so as to maximise their interests and this added to the 
difficulties in implementation. 
12. Interest groups tend to get involved in implementation on an ad hoe 
basis and on particular, discrete issues, and act so as to protect or 
advance those interests which are the raison dletre of their group. The 
greater the involvement of such groups, the greater the difficulties in 
implementation. 
In-the first case, that of provincial finance, no involvement by 
interest groups was found. 
In the case of provincial autonomy, the involvement of an interest 
group, the left-wing of the Congress Party, has been traced. While the 
Congress Party as a whole could be said to be involved in implementation 
as a matter of course, being one of the principal target parties, the left- 
wing of the Congress chose to get involved on the issue [133 and to oppose 
one particular course of action, acceptance of office. The left-wing was 
committed to a revolutionary attitude towards the government, and was 
opposed to any form of cooperation with it, such as agreeing to the 
formation of ministries. The evidence shows that the involvement of this 
interest group was the principal cause of the difficulties encountered in 
the implementation of provincial autonomy. 
In the case of federation too there was involvement by an interest 
group, the, diehards. As part of the Conservative Party whose members were 
the chief makers of the 1935 Act, they were involved in all the decisions 
1131 The left-wing was an interest group that functioned within one of the 
target parties, namely the Congress Party. 
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in the Act. There was no opposition from the diehards to separation of 
finances or to provincial autonomy. It was only on the issue of federation, 
that the diehards became actively involved. They adopted a variety of 
tactics to mobilise opinion within the Party against the proposed 
federation. The diehards were committed to the concept of Empire. 
Federation, which involved transfer of some responsibility to Indians at 
the centre, was felt by many of them to be a threat to this concept. They 
acted to oppose federation for they feared that it would lead ultimately 
to India being lost to the Empire. Some of the opposition, it has been seen, 
was also motivated by a desire to attack Baldwin's leadership. 
Thus in the two cases where there was involvement by interest groups, 
it was on an ad hoe basis and on particular issues. The left wing of the 
Congress did act to protect those interests which were the core interests 
of the group. The diehards too acted in defence of Empire but not all of 
them were so motivated. The role played by these interest groups created 
dif f iculties in implementation, which were absent in the first case where 
there was no involvement by any interest group. 
- 13. Interest groups will have influence when there is an ideological 
connection between them and those whose task it is to implement decisions, 
the implementers. Such groups will not be able to influence officials if 
they are in ideological or political conflict with them. There is 
generally a close affinity between officials and the individual or group 
whose position they are persuaded to support. 
There is some evidence for this proposition in the latter two cases 
where there was involvement by interest groups, and the evidence is 
strengthened when a comparison is made between the two cases. During 
negotiations with the Congress Party on the issue of office acceptance, 
the Viceroy refused to make any of the concessions demanded by the Party. 
The Congress Party's demands had come about because of the activities of 
its left wing and the Viceroy, a Conservative, was ideologically far 
removed from this interest group. So determined was he not to make 
concessions which would be seen as a victory for this interest group, that 
at one stage he even threatened to resign if forced to act otherwise by 
the Cabinet in London. 
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In the case of federation, in contrast, Linlithgow accepted the 
Secretary of State's suggestion that it was necessary to proceed in 
federal negotiations in a manner that would not arouse the hostility of 
the diehards. He acquiesced by not putting pressure-on the princes and 
instead attempted to gain their accession through concessions. As a former 
member of the Conservative Party, he accepted that there was a need to keep 
the Party united by not provoking the diehards in any way. Though 
Linlithgow did not support the diehards position that no responsibility 
should be tranferred at the centrev the diehards were able to influence 
federal negotiations. Thus the Niceroy's ideological background was an 
important factor, but the relationship between this and the interest group 
which was able to exercise influence, the diehards, is not a simple one as 
suggested by the proposition. 
14. Domestic pressures or even anticipation of such pressures can 
hinder implementation as they can restrict a government's ability to act. 
In the case of provincial finance, there were some domestic pressures, 
in that the India Office had its own views on the implementation of the 
decision, and these had been communicated to the expert conducting the 
financial inquiry. These views had been ignored almost completely so that 
these domestic pressures had little impact on implementation. 
In the case of provincial autonomy, domestic pressures were very 
evident. The Viceroy was made aware of the views of some liberal members of 
the Cabinet, that he should make some conciliatory moves to break the 
deadlock with the Congress. As the stalemate continued, members of the 
Cabinet became more alarmed and finally made it clear that a peace offer 
would have to be made to the Congress, before the Governors would be 
allowed to assume power in the provinces, if the Congress continued to 
stay out of office. These domestic pressures did not hinder implementation 
for two reasons. Firstly, the Viceroy resisted these pressures and stood 
firmly by his policy of not making concessions. Secondly, when it seemed he 
was going to be, forced into making concessions, he threatened to resign, 
but by that time the Congress Party had met and had changed its stand. The 
Viceroy's resistance of domestic pressures, and the timing of them, 
pressures were most intense at the time the Congress was changing its 
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stand, made the domestic pressures ineffective in this case. 
In the case of federation too there were domestic pressures channelled 
through the Secretary of State. The Viceroy was warned that the princes 
were not to be subjected to any coercion in attempts to gain their 
accession. Thus the Government of India found its ability to act on this 
issue restricted and it sought to gain the princes accession by making 
concessions. It is significant that the diehards were not as active during 
implementation as they had been during the lengthy period of decision- 
making, ýet ýanticipation of trouble from that quarter, reinforced by an 
occasional, warning, was sufficient to instill caution in the Government of 
India's conduct in its negotiations with the princes. 
Thus it is only in the third case that the proposition As fully 
supported. In the first caset domestic pressures were ignored. In the 
second case, the Viceroy resisted pressures from Britain and was helped by 
events in India, the Congress reversed its earlier st. and and decided to 
accept office. 
That domestic, pressures cause difficulties in implementation is shown 
in the-case of. implementation of French policy in Africa: "traditional 
lack of interest in government policy in Africa .... had been'a major 
governmental resource since the end of the Algerian problem in 1962.11 [141 
Once the domestic context changed, criticism in France caused difficulties 
in implementing French policy in Chad. 1151 
6.3 Neglect of issues of implementation 
The three case studies thus provide some evidence that supports both 
the model and the propositions. The above analysis provides some answers 
to. the fundamental question asked in Chapter 1: What were the factors that 
were conducive to implementation and what were the factors that prevented 
[141 Farrands, C. (1985) "'Diamonds and Impotence': The Implementation of 
Giscard d'Estaing's African Policies", in Smith & Clarke, Foreign 
- Policy Implementation, p 82. 
[151 ibid, pp 81-84. 
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implementation? The analysis also suggests some conclusions. 
Implementation in the first case examined followed a distinctly 
different pattern from implementation in the latter, two, cases. Despite the 
length of time taken over the decision, this had not-led to controversy, 
and despite the decision being an open one, this did not cause 
difficulties in implementation. Factors which contributed to successful 
implementation were the restricted amount of time available, the small 
number of parties involved, the lack of involvement of interest groups, the 
absence of domestic pressures, and perhaps most important of all, the 
inability of the target parties to resist implementation. , The target 
parties were able to make representations to the expert conducting the 
financial inquiryt but the Order-in-Council once passed, was binding both 
on the centre, and on the provinces. 
In the second two cases, the political context was different, for in 
both, implementation involved target parties who had the ability to resist 
implementation. Though no attempt was made while setting out the model and 
propositions, to distinguish the political context in which implementation 
takes place, it is, the analysis of the case studies shows, an important 
factor in implementation. Political support from these target parties was 
essential for successful implementation, but was not needed in the first 
case. 
"we might say that political support, or the lack of it, and the degree 
of prominence or saliency that a policy achieves, has an impact on the 
manner or style of its implementation. Independently of the choice of 
strategy, there will be a considerable difference of style between an 
everyday policy .... which is uncontroversial and attracts 
little public 
attention, and one *,... which has great priority and very strong ministerial 
support. The whole way' in which the latter is managed will be quite 
different because the political context is different. " [161 
In the case of provincial autonomy, the number of parties involved was 
very large. Not all the parties however became involved in the period of 
[161 Hyder, M. (1984) "Implementation. The Evolutionary Model. ", i*n Lewis & 
Wallace (eds) Policies into Practice, pp 7-8. 
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bargaining that followed. Despite the length of time taken over the 
decision, there had been no controversy. There was a widespread consensus 
over the decision, both in England and in India. There was support for the 
decision among the implementers, and they were willing to cooperate during 
implementation. There was support too among the target parties, both among 
the non-Congress parties, and within the Congress Party. The non-Congress 
parties did not resist implementation, they participated in the elections 
and formed governments in the four provinces in which they were in 
position to do so. The activities of an interest group, the left wing of 
the Congress Party, led to the Congress party as a whole resisting 
implementation for a period of three months, but the resistance soon ended. 
The setting of a target date was a contributory factor, but the crucial 
factor was the desire among the majority of the party to accept office. The 
case of provincial autonomy showed that the Congress was the principal 
target party in India, for it was in control in 7 out of the 11 provinces. 
With cooperation from the Congress, provincial autonomy could be 
implemented, whil e resistance from the Party could have prevented 
implementation. Resistance from any of the parties in the non-Congress 
provinces could not have prevented implementation for they were in control 
in only 4 provinces. 
The decision on federation in contrast, had had been surrounded by 
considerable controversy. The controversy had lengthened the time taken 
over the decision, had led to the decision being left open, had meant that 
no target date had been set for its implementation and there was 
unwillingness to reopen and amend the decision. The number of parties 
involved was very large and virtually all of them became involved in the 
negotiations that followed. Opposition to the decision came from two 
extremes, the diehards in the Conservative Party felt federation went too 
far in transferring responsibility to Indian hands at the centre, while 
the Congress opposed the scheme as it did not signify a real transfer of 
power into Indian hands. Tfie controversy was resolved by excluding the 
Congress, from decision-making, and by making the Act conservative, stiff 
with safeguards, and by giving the princes a role in the proposed 
federation out of proportion to their position in the country. This 
ensured that the Act passed into the statute books, but it created 
problems during implementation. 
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While the Government of India sought to bring in the princes, its task 
made difficult, by a change in the princes attitude which was by then one 
of hostility, by the presence of domestic pressures, and by the lack of 
,, cooperation from the Political Department, the principal target party, the 
Congress, not only withheld its cooperation, but worked actively to 
revolutionise. the scheme, - to wrest for the party a dominant position in 
the federation. This it has been seen, turned the princes completely 
. against federation, and made the Muslims too hostile. The Congress Party's 
unwillingness to cooperate with the decision as it stood was responsible 
for the princes finally rejecting the revised Instrument of Accession. 
"Furthermore, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the task of 
landing the princes could not be isolated from the British India problem. 
The princes' attitudes to federation were conditioned by events in British 
India. In 1929 and 1930 the princes espoused the federal idea chiefly 
because they feared the exercise of paramountcy, large and undefined, by a 
viceroy subject to the influence of a strong, reformed British Indian 
centre .... The princes could only be brought into a federation if British 
India were first seen to be united and if public opinion were felt to be 
irresistibly favourable to federation. " 1171 
Comparison between the cases of provincial autonomy and federation 
suggests that a scheme of federation which had the support of the Congress 
would have stood a better chance of being successfully implemented. 
Provincial autonomy, it has been shown, was implemented because the 
majority of the members of the Congress Party were in favour of 
implementing the decision, by contesting the elections and by accepting 
office in the provinces in which they were in a majority. In contrast, the 
Congress Party opposed the decision on federation and the Party's 
opposition effectively prevented implementation. As Moore suggests, 
Britain would have done better to have concentrated on the British Indian 
problem. This would have meant formulating a decision that was acceptable 
to the main political force in British India, the Congress Party. 
1171 Moore, R. J. (1970) "The Making of India's Paper Federation, 1927-3511, in 
Philips, C. H. & Wainwright, M. D. (eds) The Partition of India London, 
George Allen & Unwin, pp 76-77. 
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"One can only speculate upon what might have happenned if, after the 
failure of the Second Round Table conference to solve the communal 
problem, Britain had declined to proceed unilaterally. The alternative was 
the Congress proposal to call together some kind of constituent assembly 
to draft a constitution that provided acceptable safeguards for the 
minorities and for British interests. " [181 
But Moore goes on to state that such a course of action was unlikely 
given the climate of political opinion in Britain. 
"One suspects that the proposal was thought to be tainted at its 
source. Such a procedure would never have been condoned by the 
Conservatives of the thirties. " [191 
It is possible to generalise from the evidence of the case studies and 
suggest that one way to increase the probability of successful 
,. 
implementation, is to consider problems of implementation at the time of 
decision-making. 
In their analysis of the failure of the EDA program in Oakland, 
Pressman and Wildavsky came to a similar conclusion in making policy 
recommendations. 
"The great problem, as we understand it, is to make the difficulties of 
implementation a part of the initial formulation of policy. Implementation 
must not be conceived as a process that takes place after, and independent 
of, the design of policy. " 
*de* 
,, "We have learned one important lesson from the EDA experience in 
Oakland; ý implementation should not be divorced from policy. There is no 
point in having good ideas if they cannot be carried out. Stated in the 
form of this homily, everyone would agree. But in the EDA Oakland program, 
the formulation of policy was divorced from its eventual attempt at 
[181 ibid, p 78. 
[191 ibid, p 78. 
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execution. " [201 
In the EDA program, separation, of implementation from policy meant that 
there was an emphasis on designing the program, obtaining initial 
agreement and committing the necessary funds, while the steps required for 
implementation were seen as routine and were expected to follow as a 
matter of course. 
In the cases of provincial autonomy and federation, separation of 
implementation from decision-making, meant that the Congress Party was 
excluded from the making of both decisions, though it had the ability to 
cooperate and thus ensure successful implementation, or to resist and 
prevent implementation in both cases. It is interesting to note, that 
mention of the Hindu Liberals, who played such a prominent role in 
"devising the federal scheme, is conspicuous by its absence in all 
historical works that deal with the period during which attempts were made 
to implement federation. An emphasis on implementation would have led to 
greater efforts to accomodate Congress demands, But as Moore suggests, 
this may not have been possible, given the fact that it was a Conservative 
Government which had responsibility for making policy towards India. 
In a critique of U. S. foreign policy, G. Allison and P. Szanton were also 
critical of, the tendency to concentrate on decisions and to neglect issues 
of implementation. The authors are critical of: 
"the absence of a capacity to foresee problems of implementation. By 
concentrating on the making of "decisions" and neglecting questions of how 
to get from here to there, Presidents and Secretaries make it inevitable 
that some decisions will be put into effect only slowly and partially, or 
-in distorted form. Moreover, the orientation toward "deciding" leads to 
policies preferable in theory only over courses whose actual consequences 
might well have been preferable. " - [211 
[201 Pressman & Wildavsky, Implementation, p143. 
[211 Allison, G. & Szanton, P. (1976) Remaking Foreign Policy, New York, Basic 
Books Inc, p 42. 
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Though one problem is that decisions are implemented by lower-level 
officials whose perceptions and objectives may be different from those who 
make the decisions, this is not, they recognise, the only problem 
associated with implementation. Another is that proba'ble foreign 
consequences of U. S. acts need to be taken into account. The U. S. foreign 
policy organisation needs to be capable of assessing likely foreign 
developments. 
"In both the IPC [221 and offset [231 cases, for example, the United 
States took actions without understanding their probable effects on 
foreign governments. In both cases such an understanding could have been 
obtained, and in both cases it would - or should - have altered U. S. policy 
choices. " [241 
In the making of decisions about India's constitutional future, 
problems of implementation were ignored. Failure to assess the probable 
effects and to consider the actual consequences of these decisions, led to 
problems in implementation and in particular to the non-implementation of 
federation. Britain concentrated on getting the Act onto the statute books 
and thus concentrated on making it acceptable to the majority of members 
of the Conservative Party. An emphasis on issues of implementation would 
(if it had been possible) have led instead on making it acceptable to the 
Congress Party. 
That the conduct of foreign policy often involves target parties which 
are capable of acting independently, was recognised explicitly some years 
ago by Roger Fisher: 
"In essencev foreign affairs are affairs which tak. e place outside the 
United States. They are thus affairs which are not under the exclusive 
control of the United States but ones in which all or a substantial part 
[221 International Petroleum Company. The International Petroleum Company 
. was 
in dispute with the government of President Belaunde over the 
ownership of oilfields in Peru. 
[231 During the 1960's an issue that figured prominently in U. S. - W. German 
relations was that of U. S. troops stationed in Germany and the share 
of the foreign exchange costs of these troops that Germany would 
cover or offset. 
[241 Allison & Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy pp 41-42. 
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of the action is being taken by or with the acquiescence of a foreign 
government. " [251 
"The central feature of foreign affairs is that its problems arise 
where other governments have the power to make decisions. Major actors are 
those whom we do not control. The resolution of international problems 
requires actions - decisions - by countries other than ourselves. We will, 
I believe, be more effective in foreign affairs if we realise that most of 
the job consists of exerting influence - usually marginal- on týe 
decisions of others. " [261 
Though the term implementation is not used, it was concern about issues 
of implementation that led him to argue for a major shift in perspective 
in the conduct of foreign policy. For policy to be effectively implemented, 
he argued, it was necessary to recognise that implementation depended on 
actors whom - one could not control, If they were to be successfully 
influenced, it was necessary to start with the problems of the actors one 
was seeking to influence. 
"Since it is their decision which we want to influence, and since they 
are the ones who will have a choice, it is their state of mind which is 
crucial. The focus of our policy is their decision. Our job is to so alter 
their perception of their choice that they will decide in the way we 
prefer. How they feel about the choice we will be asking them to make is 
just as important to us as how we feel about it. Typically the taking of 
international action concentrates first on domestic political. feelings 
and limitations. What is it that we want? The views which are prevalent in 
the pressq around the country, and in the various departments of government 
are reconciled, and a statement is produced. Such a statement is often 
issued without conscious attention to who it is that we want to make a 
decision, to what the decision is that we want and can expect them to make, 
or how we propose to go about convincing them that they ought to make it. 
The starting point should, instead, be the political problems of those we 
are trying to influence. What is their- view of the situation? Can we say 
[251 Fisher, R. (1971) Basic Negotiating Strategy, London, Allen Lane, p 18. 
[261 ibidý p2l. 
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anything which will affect that view - affect their political problem? .... 
What kind of a decision can we formulate which will be practical for them 
in their terms? " [271 
In making decisions about India's constitutional future, problems of 
implementation were neglected. Some attempts were made to accomodate the 
demands of the target parties in India, but when this proved difficult to 
reconcile with the political climate in Britain, Britain proceeded 
unilaterally and domestic considerations predominated in shaping the new 
constitution. 
"Once again, the impact of British politics had affected the conduct of 
Indian affairs. Whilst in the eighteenth century it had been Indian 
politics that for many years dominated the British Parliament, it was 
British politics at the time of the Government of India Act that chiefly 
frustrated agreement on a united India. " [281 
"It is also the fundamental charge against the Conservative policy- 
makers of 1930-5: they failed to take sufficient account of the fact that 
the paper federation met the minimum demands of neither the Congres 
.s 
nor 
the Muslims. " [291 
This did not prevent implementation of some of the decisions 
incorporated in the Act, 'and the propositions suggest various factors 
which contributed to these decisions being implemented. The proposed all- 
India federation remained a 'paper federation'. It was not implemented, for 
"it was flawed in essential respects". 1301 
[271 ibid, p24. ' 
[281 Templewood, Viscount (1954) Nine Troubled Years London, Collins, 
p 103. 
[291 Moore, "Paper Federation", p 55. 
1301 Moore, "Paper Federation", p 78. 
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6.4 Pluralist and other perspectives on implementation. 
This study has analysed implementation from a pluralist perspective; it 
incorporates a view of the state as being highly fragmented, composed of 
several groups such as political parties, bureaucracies and interest 
groups. It required an identification of the plurality of actors involved 
and an analysis of their interactions on the issues being studied, namelyj 
implementation of the decisions incorporated in the Government of India 
Act, 1935. The pluralist approach was adopted as one which provided the 
best description of the attempts at implementation. It was also one which 
provided a fruitful approach for investigation of the phenomenon of 
implementation. 
The above analysis of implementation, places the study in the pluralist 
school or approach. Other approaches, such as the realist and 
structuralist approaches can also be identified. The three perspectives 
express broad differences of philosophy and of emphasis in the study of 
world politics. Each perspective sees a different relationship between the 
international system and its components. In the realist perspective, the 
anarchic international system and the existence of independent states 
leads to a situation of insecurity so that the possibility of violence is 
ever present. In the pluralist perspective there is multilateral 
adaptation by the various actors. In the structuralist perspective the 
actions of the parts are determined by the dominance structure built into 
the international system. In the first category, change is possible as the 
power of particular states increases or decreases. -In the second 
perspective, the possibilities of reform are admitted and it is accepted 
that better management can lead to more effective action by the actors of 
the international system. This possibility for reform is rejected by those 
who adopt the structuralist perspective. They see the dominance of certain 
classes over others as being built into the system. The only way to achieve 
reform according to this perspective, is through radical political action 
that leads to fundamental changes so that a system which systematically 
oppresses some of its members is replaced by one which does not. Thus those 
who adopt. the first perspective stress the need for political realism in 
which actions are based on rational calculations of capabilities; those 
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who adopt the second 'see the possibility of progress by adaptation to 
changing circumstances; while those who adopt the third see such efforts 
as futile as long as the dominance structure in the system remains 
unaffected. 
This division into schools of thought is an attempt to organise the 
vast literature that now exists on the subject of international relations. 
These are broad and arbitrarily imposed categories on a complex and 
diffuse'subject matter, so that some works may not fit neatly into any one 
of these categories, while others may seem to belong to more than one 
category. The choice of categories or perspectives in which the subject 
-matter is arranged is, to a large extent, an individual choice. 
,ýR. 
Pettman identified two categories, pluralist and structuralistg [311 
into which theories in international relations can be divided; each 
perspective, has certain advantages and some inadequacies, but both have 
important contributions to make to the subject. M. Smith, R. Little and-M. 
Shackleton divide theories into three categories, realist, pluralist and 
structuralist. 1321 M. Banks had suggested- that literature in 
international relations can be divided into four approaches or 
paradigms. 1331 These four paradigms were identified by Banks as follows: 
1) State centric paradigm also known as the billiard-ball or power 
political approach. Explanations of 'world events are given in terms of 
state'- behaviour, as the state is regarded as the primary unit'of analysis 
and the-role of other actors is seen as being secondary. 2) International 
relations paradigm. Analysis of state behaviour is considered necessary 
but the need to examine other phenomena such as alliances, non-state 
actors and economic relationships is recognised. States themselves are not 
ýseen as billiard balls, but as varied and complex entities. The number of 
variables to be considered is vast and analysis is thus difficult. The 
boundaries of this approach are almost non-existent. 3) World society 
1311 Pettman, R. (1981) "Competing paradigms in international politics"t 
Review of International Studies Vol 70), 39-49. 
132]'Smith, M., Little, R. & Shackleton, M. (eds) (1981) Perspectives on World 
Politics Londong Croom Helm. 
1331 Banks, M. (1978) "Ways of Analysing World Society", in Groom, A. J. R. & 
Mitchell, C. R. (eds) International Relations Theory London, Frances 
Pinter. 
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paradigm. The world is seen in terms of a cobweb model composed of many 
overlapping. systems and analysis is not in terms of, the state but of the 
system as a whole. 4) Global social class paradigm. Analysis is not in 
terms of states or actors, but in terms of classes and the dominance 
exercised by some classes over others. It may be possible to identify 
other perspectives as well, and it is not always clear where the 
boundaries of each perspective lie. 
Both Pettman and Smith et al go beyond a mere organisation of the 
literature into categories. Whether one adopts the pluralist or -the 
structuralist perspective-is important, wrote Pettman, because the concept 
of world society that one arrives at differs according to which 
perspective one adopts. The three perspectives adopted by Smith et al, do 
not just provide a framework for the-organisation of existing literature 
but "shape the forms of academic activity and practical politics where 
they are implicitly or explicitly adopted. " 1341 Thus it is necessary to 
recognise which perspective is being adopted as this can 11colour and at 
the same time reflect issues of method, values and action". The three 
perspectives are not just facets of an agreed 'world' but provide different 
versions of the world as a whole. 
Smith, Little and Shackleton, identify three perspectives on world 
politics. 1) Realism - the politics of power and security which assumes 
the dominance of states as the primary actors in world politics, with 
groups being able to exercise, influence only by affecting the policies of 
states. 2) Pluralism - the poli tics of interdependence and 
transnationalisau In this perspective, the state, instead of being, viewed 
as, a cohesive autonomous actor is seen as being highly fragmented, 
composed of a number of groups, such as political partiesp bureaucracies 
and interest groups. Not only is the state fragmented, other non-state 
actors too actively participate in world politics. The activities of both 
subnational and transnational actors leads to a condition where the 
international system explodes. 3) Structuralism - The politics of 
dominance and dependence. The real actors in world politics are not states 
or mixed actors, but dominant class or economic interests which act 
1341 Smith, Little & Shackleton, World Politics P13. 
256 
through states to preserve their position of dominance both within and 
between nations. What emerges from this perspective is a global structure 
within which those in a dominant position systematically prevent those in 
a dependent position from achieving an improvement in their condition. 
"The three perspectives .... are not simply rival theories about what 
world politics looks like. Built into the perspectives are evaluators 
about what the world ought to look like and how that I desired state of 
affairs can be achieved. These elements. profoundly affect the aspects of 
wor ld politics which are examined and the way in which events in the 
international arena are explained. The perspectives not only establish 
rival theories about how the world operates but also rival programmes of 
action. " [351 
That it is possible to adopt another perspective' such as a 
structuralist perspective in the analysis of implementation, has been 
explicitly recognised: 
"Some social scientists, particularly those in the Marxist tradition, 
might argue that there is a deeper level at which one might speak of 
quasi-administrative limits on implementation than the level of policy 
objectives. This is the level of social structure in a broad sense. In 
particular, - it might be argued that, even if policies are sincerely 
pursued, many administrative problems are intractable because they are 
rooted in the nature of a class society. Administrative structures are not 
autonomous from class structures in practice, so administrative 
'tinkering' in the face of class power will be futile. " 1361 
While recognising that analysis is possible from another perspective, 
Hood suggests that such an approach is not fruitful for ana . lysis: ".... it 
does not tell you very much about the precise circumstances in which 
administrative measures will fail. Clearly, all administrative measures do 
not fail, in the same way or to the same extent. Some even succeed. To 
-attribute all cases of administrative failure to class struggle and to the 
1351 Smith, Little & Shackleton, World Politics p24. 
Cý61 Hood, C. C. (1976) The Limits of Administration London, John Wiley, 
p194. 
257 
power of one class or another is to argue by a process of definition 
*e9o" 1371 
Adoption of another perspective for the analysis of implementation 
would lead to a different description, explanation. and prescription. If, 
for example, a structuralist perspective was adopted to analyse the case 
studies examined in this study, description would not consist of 
identifying who was involved and on the negotiations which took place, but 
an attempt would perhaps be made to identify key interest groups. 
Explanation would involve showing how successful implementation resulted 
when key interest groups were in favour, or how failure of implementation 
came about by manipulation of events by these key interest groups to 
prevent implementation when they were opposed. It should be pointed out 
that manipulation of events does not necessarily mean that key interests 
are a party to them, for there is a second, less visible face of powery when 
power is wielded behind the scenes by those who exercise dominance in a 
given situation. 1381 Finallyq prescription would not - consist of 
recommendations for better management of the bargaining process, but would 
advocate ways of bringing about a change in the existing dominance 
structure. 
Recognition of the location of the present study in the pluralist 
approach is important for it leads to an awareness that it is possible to 
study implementation from other perspectives, that there can be other 
views of implementation. 
6.5 Conclusion 
While the importance of the study of implementation in decision-making 
analysis was recognised quite early on, issues of implementation tended to 
be largely ignored. In the early studies of decision-making, the emphasis 
was on the process by which decisions are arrived at, and the execution of 
these decisions was regarded as a simple matter, one that followed as a 
1371 ibid, p 194. 
1381 Bachrach, P. & Baratz, M. S. (1962) "Two Faces of Power", American 
Political Science Review, Vol 56(3), 947-952. 
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matter of course. It led Pressman and Wildavsky to assert: "Research on 
implementation is primarily conspicuous by its absence. " 1391 
Since this sweeping (and not entirely justified) assertion, there has 
been a major expansion in the literature in the field of political 
science, and some of, the more important works have been referred toý irr 
Chapter One., In a second edition of the book, brought out six years after 
the first, Wildavsky wrote: 
"'Previewers'. of the first edition took us to task for failing to 
integrate our findings into the vast literature on the subject. So ýwe 
tried to prove a negative - namely, that at the time we wrote there, was 
little such literature. Today that is no longer true; the literature is 
growing so rapidly that the bibliography (replacing the appendix'saying 
'no one was there') can only be suggestive rather than comprehensive. " [403 
In the study of foreign policy, implementation issues continued to be 
neglected. Early works on decision-making tended to consider issues of 
implementation implicitly rather than explicitly. The expansion in the 
studies of implementation. in Political science, is however now being 
reflected in studies of implementation in foreign policy. The study of 
decision-making developed first outside the study of international 
relations and there was a time lag, before it was applied to foreign policy 
decision-making. Similarly, issues of implementation, studied in political 
science are, after a similar time lag being applied to issues of 
implementation in the field of international relations. 
The recent works on implementation in the literature of international 
relations show that there is a very wide range of issues that can be 
studied in an analysis of the phenomenon of implementation. The present 
study, it is clear, has dealt with only a few of the issues involved in 
implementation. Some, though by no means all, of these other aspects of 
implementation are enumerated below. 
1391 Pressman & Wildavsky, Implementation p 167. 
[401 Pressman, J. L. & Wildavsky, A. (1979) Implementation 2nd editiong 
Berkeley, University of California Press, p xv. 
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This study, has dealt with decision and implementation as a closely 
integrated process. Though the historical background to the case studies 
was gone into briefly, the propositions dealt primarily with the period of 
decision-making and implementation. A study of the development of the ICBM 
in the USA, suggests that what happens in the pre-decision period may also 
be of great relevance. [411 The major part of the book provides a detailed 
reýiew of what happens before a major decision. It is devoted to the period 
prior to the assignment of highest priority to the development of an ICBM. 
"A major American redirection of effort to accelerate ballistic 
missile development did n6t occur until 1953-54, some seven years after 
the Soviet Union had initiated such a program. The reasons for the later 
American lag in ICBM attainment will be seen to lie in these years. They 
will consequently be studied at length. This approach differs 
significantly from the more usual concentration upon the pulling and 
hauling attendant upon a major decision. The latter moments are usually 
marked by the participation of those occupying the highest positions in 
the government. I hope to cast light on what happens before this point. 
The date of arrival of an issue for high-level action can be as 
important as its resolution. Indeed, in the case of ballistic missiles, 
this might well have been the case. Yet, an issue may be invisible not 
because it is irrelevant or impractical, but simply because it hasn't been 
brought up to the "visible" level. And this lack of visibility may be due 
not to its unimportance, but rather to an organisation's failure to provide 
important information for the busy, often harried top figures. Government 
leaders cannot be expected to keep abreast of all developments on their 
own, and I shall provide a detailed review of what happens before a major 
decision. This period may well shape the timing of the large decision as 
well as its nature. It should be examined more often. (emphasis added) [421 
The present study concentrated on a few select decisions and their 
implementation, but it is also possible to consider implementation of a 
range of decisions, within a given international context. Such an approach 
1411 Beard, E. (1976) Developing the ICBM New York, Columbia University 
Press. 
[421 ibid, p 12. 
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was adopted in an analysis of implementation of decisions within the 
Eurýpean Community. [431 The study led to the conclusion that the 
Community has been more successful in the sphere of 'low politicsIt such as 
in removing barriers to trade between its member states, than it has been 
in implementing policy in the sphere of 'high politics'. There has, the 
study shows, been little progress in implementing the Community's original 
objective of developing an economic and political union capable of 
exerting supranational power and authority over its constituent states; in 
this sphere progress has been slow, and lincrementalism is the order of the 
day 1. 
Policies agreed internationally but implemented within individual 
states have also been the subject of analysis. [441 Implementation of 
international agreements, it was found, created difficulties for a variety 
of reasons; impl ementation depended primarily on national agencies, 
participants in the agreement are culturally, politically and economically 
diverse and the pace of international cooperation is extremely slow. 
David Lewis points to a difficulty that can arise in the study of 
implementation, one that did not arise in the cases studied, recognising 
successful implementation is not necessarily an easy matter. Difficulties 
can arise, for example, if policies are modified and developed during the 
period of implementation. It then becomes necessary to determine whether 
these modifications indicate success or failure. Lewis lists eight 
possible criteria for success. [451 
1. The policy has been carried out exactly, and without any variation. 
2. The policy has achieved its objectives. 
The implementation of the policy has resulted in the best possible 
outcome. 
[431 Allen, D. & Byrne, P. (1985) "Multilateral Decision-Making and 
Implementation: The Case of the European Community", in Smith & 
Clarke (eds), Foreign Policy Implementation. 
[441 Wallace, H. (1984) "Implementation across National Boundaries" in 
Lewis &Wallace (eds) Policies into Practice. 
[451 Lewis, D. "Improving Implementation", pp 212-213. 
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4. The implementation of the policy has produced the best outcome for 
the organisation(s) responsible for the policy and/or its implementation. 
Implementation has not been accompanied by undesirable and 
unexPected side-effects. 
6. The measures taken to implement the policy have been appropriately 
designed and are cost-effective. 
7. Implementation has met with general public assent. 
8. Implementation has satisfied the expectations aroused by the policy. 
Lewis rejects 1 and 2 as being too restrictive, 3 as being too vague to 
be useful, 4 and 5 as being too narrow, and concludes that a general 
criterion can* be obtained by combining the last 3 criteria. "The 
Isuccessfull implementation of a policy is the cost-effective use of 
appropriate mechanisms and procedures in such a way as to fulfil the 
expectations aroused by the policy and retain general public assent. " (461 
A study of the unsuccessful attempts to implement oil sanctions against 
Rhodesia by the British Government after declaration of UDI (Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence) on 11 November 1965 indicates that the 
decision to impose sanctions had two dimensions. 
"At one level the decision can be labelled strategic, the object being 
to induce political change in Rhodesia. At another level the decision was 
symbolic, the object being to demonstrate or signal concern about and 
disapproval of UDI, to a domestic and especially to an international 
audience, " [471 
There is general agreement that, in strategic terms, sanctions were a 
failure, they were not implemented. (481 However an analysis which 
concentrates on the problems encountered in implementing sanctions does 
[461 ibid, p215. 
[471 Whitev "Implementation of Oil Sanctions", P 39. 
[481 This provides an example of a case in which success or failure is 
clearly indicated. 
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not by itself provide- an adequate explanation. This is because the 
decision had another dimension, the symbolic dimension. 
"To the extent that the decision was strategic and designed to secure 
compliance, then implementation was crucial. The policy that flows from 
the decision must be implemented if compliance is to be achieved.... On the 
other hand, to the extent that the decision was symbolic, the 
implementation process was much less significant. If a policy is 
essentially presentational, it merely needs to exist and to have a degree 
of credibility. " [491 
The study concludes that sanctions against Rhodesia served primarily 
symbolic functions for the British government, and thus non-implementation 
was not critical. This is supported by other studies which conclude that 
sanctions are most useful as 'expressive acts' - they serve to express 
protest and condemnation. 
Not only are sanctions often imposed as symbolic acts to declare the 
position of a government both domestically and internationally, there is 
much in foreign policy that is 'intentionally vague and highly 
declaratory'. Thus one should be aware that when the symbolic dimensions of 
a policy are important, analysis of implementation in strategic terms 
alone will not be adequate. 
"if we concentrate only on the limited, but specific, behavioural 
changes demanded by the Final Act, then we will miss a great deal of the 
posturing and declaratory activity that is a vital part of the foreign 
policy outputs. " [501 
The above studies indicate that a, 4ehavioural analysis of 
implementation as was undertaken in this study, will not always -be 
appropriate. If policy is declaratoryt intended to 'serve symbolic 
functions, it will be necessary to recognise this and to be aware of this 
in analysing implementation of that policy. 
[491 White, "Implementation of Oil Sanctions", P 39. 
(501 Clarke, M. "Implementation of Britain's CSCE Policy", p148. 
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It has been recognised that implementation is a complex process, with a 
greater number and diversity of actors than are to be identified in 
decision-making: 
"the study of policy-making is concerned with the activities and 
attitudes of formal political leaders, institutions and definable groups, 
whereas the study of policy outputs is more concerned with the working of 
informal groupings, lower-level of f icials and half-understood 
procedures. " [511 
The complexity is further increased when implementation is studied in a 
complex arena such as a world political economy: 
"Current levels of uncertainty in the world economy and its 
institutions make the arena of international economic policy 
implementation a very difficult and problematic one. It is, .... a highly 
complex arena with unique difficulties of analysis and 
implementation, " [521 
While earlier, it was the complexity of the implementation process that 
led to its neglect, it is now recognised that it is this very complexity 
that makes studies of implementation vitally necessary: 
"What is very clear, however, is that the analysis of implementation is 
of fundamental importance. Given the extent of knowledge about the 
international monetary process, the degree of complexity of the structure 
and the levels of risk and uncertainty presently prevailing, 
implementation is the key to the success or failure of IMP. [531 And the 
process of implementation itself - whether within the institutional 
confines of 'Banks' or 'Treasuries' or the arena of international political 
activity - is political. Implementation can no longer be assumed to be a 
matter of technical application of objective criteria, as was the tendency 
1511 Smith & Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour", p 5. 
[521 Tooze, R. (1985) "Implementation in a Complex Arena: International 
Economic Policy in World Political Economy", in Smith & Clarke (eds) 
Foreign Policy Implementation, p 121. 
[531 International Monetary Policy. 
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"'in the Bretton Woods period. " [541 
The complexity of the implementation process causes difficulties in 
analysis, in -that it is difficult to adopt a deductive approach to the 
study of implementation. In trying to characterise the process of 
implementation of international agreements, for example, H. Wallace found 
that: 
"the process of agreeing and executing policies through international 
agreement is often experimental and tentative" [551 
The fact that policy-making at the international level is a process of 
gradually moving towards a consensus through mutual persuasion, the 
immense diversity of the participants in the process, and the slow pace at 
which international cooperation moves, all led her to conclude: 
"These inchoate features of international co-operation illuminate the 
difficulties of identifying an international policy process or its 
parameters. " [561 
Though complex, and difficult to characterise within a theoretical 
framework or conceptual schemeg particularly when analysis is extended 
beyond the two-tier model to encompass the environment in which the 
decision is implemented, implementation, involving as it does, a shift in 
focus from decision to behaviour, goes, as it were , to the heart of the 
subject matter of international relations. 
The complexity of the process does not however mean that only 
historical 
_analyses 
of implementation are possible. The case study 
approach makes it possible to seek generalisations about this complex 
subject matter. The recent works on implementation referred to above have 
all adopted the case study approach in analysing a range of cases of 
implementation. The method adopted here was that of comparison of a small 
number of cases of implementation within a particular historical 
[541 Tooze, ItImplementation in a Complex Arena", p 120. 
[551 Wallace, "Implementation Across National Boundaries", p 129. 
[561 ibid, p 132. 
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framework. Some of the advantages of adopting a case study approach were 
set out earlier in Chapter One. Another advantage, revealed by the recent 
works on foreign policy implementation and by the present- study, is that 
it enables one to seek generalisations of a complex subject matter. The 
importance of the study of implementation is now generally accepted. The 
case study method has enabled a beginning to be made in the analysis of 
cases of implementation that cross national boundaries. 
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